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Abstract
This paper presents and analyzes most empirical research about crime and police corruption in 
Kenya that has been based on vicitimization statistics. It shows the wide variation in outcomes 
and draws implications of this for the potential use of this approach for police and crime policy. 
This is used as a background for the researcher’s own victimization study which combines this 
information with a survey of police officers’ attitudes and experiences. In a more theoretical sec-
tion it discuss how officer rotation, crime registration procedures and citizen mobility controls 
may work when crime policies are considered as a set of collective action games where both 
police officers and community members are engaged. 
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1. Introduction1 
It is early Sunday morning in a village in western Kenya. It is still 
fairly cool and fresh. We, a group of three researchers, are sitting out-
side the local police station on a bench with a table – on the courtesy 
of the new commissioner seated in Nairobi. He has ordered that such 
public amenities should be available at all police stations in the coun-
try. On the shaky table there is nicely coloured tablecloth – on the 
courtesy of the new local police chief. We are waiting to get access to 
one of the ten police stations chosen for our project. According to the 
standing order from the commissioner’s office that paved the way for 
our research, each has to be visited by 9 o’clock in the morning. 
 
At our left a group of youths are congregated, sitting on their motor-
bikes. How come they are here that early? Rural surroundings and ru-
ral work rhythms are not the complete explanation. It may also have 
something to do with the police and the fear of crime in the communi-
ty we are about to discover.  
 
Behind us a male chorus is singing Christian hymns, underlining the 
peacefulness of the early Sunday morning. How come that a small vil-
lage may present this kind of entertainment at that point of time of the 
week? Here the explanation again has something to do with the police 
and the fear of crime as well as its reality. It is the Sunday stock of 
male prisoners in the local police station jail who are singing. 
 
Later we are given access to the police and talk with our assigned quo-
ta of five officers. The impression of rural idyll is reinforced. True 
enough, the police station has only one car that often has to be re-
paired or lack gasoline, but the local population is helpful and lend 
their cars or give gasoline when needed and crime scenes visited. 
 
When we talk with a cross-section of the local population, however, a 
different impression emerges: the police rarely emerge when needed, 
                                                 
1  We would like to thank the Norwegian Research Council, the Poverty and 
Peace/Norglobal programmes for economic support and their patience. The same applies 
to the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs that allowed Andvig to spend more 
time on this project than scheduled. The authors are also grateful to Aggrey Mutimba, 
Jane Nambiri and Fridah Kithinjih for excellent research assistance that sometimes devel-
oped into research guidance. We would also like to thank all the respondents that spent 
some of their valuable time with us and the civil society organisation leaders who assisted 
in organising the logistics as well as enabling us to meeting members of local communi-
ties. Finally we would like to thank the Kenya Police Commissioner’s office in Nairobi 
for giving us access to the police stations, their commanders for their hospitality and the 
individual police officers who willingly and in a friendly manner answered our sometimes 
nosy questions. That response may by itself carry promising prospects for future policy. 
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they requisition transport without paying, and often perform arbitrary 
arrests. How may so different views emerge from the same experi-
ence? Are the police lying or is it the local respondents complaining 
for nothing? Will the incompatibility of perceptions create a policy 
space for better mutual understanding? 
------ 
This paper is based on an explorative research venture where we visit-
ed ten police stations located in rural and urban areas in Nairobi, Cen-
tral, Nyanza, Western and Coast Provinces in July 2010. At each sta-
tion we asked five officers about their professional experiences and 
views on corruption and crime. Similarly, we asked twenty five citi-
zens in their neighbourhoods about their experiences with police cor-
ruption, with crime and their eventual economic consequences. It is 
mainly by this combination of police and citizen responses to two dif-
ferent questionnaires on related issues that we may bring some new 
empirical insight compared to existing victimization surveys. In addi-
tion we ask more about the direct economic consequences reported by 
the respondents than in research of this kind. Particularly in the case 
of crime these may become surprisingly large for a significant number 
of respondents. Some of the theoretical analyses are quite new. 
 
The disposition of the paper is as follows: 
 
1) In a background section we first outline a few general charac-
teristics of police activities that expose them to corruption 
risks generally, and not only in Kenya. These risks appear par-
ticularly high in low income countries.  
2) Then present some of the historical background to policing 
and crime in Kenya, indicating that the behaviour pattern of 
the police today not only reflect general patterns, but is also be 
influenced by the particulars of Kenyan history. 
3) We outline some of the statistical information and results from 
a number of already published studies that deal with police 
corruption and crime in Kenya.  
4) We conclude the background part with outlining the rough 
consequences for the police activities and crime numbers for 
the whole country if the various survey results apply 
5) In a separate section we describe the procedures and results 
from our own surveys project and present results both in an 
aggregate and  
6) A community-based form.2 In the latter we also summarize our 
own more subjective impressions from the field. 
                                                 
2  While we don’t believe that we will supply much confidential information in the follow-
ing, in order to be on the safe side, we will not supply the name of the police stations in 
the community-sorted data presentation part of the report. 
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7) Finally we explore the usefulness of victimization data for po-
lice reforms and discuss a few police policy instruments as ve-
hicles for explaining police and criminal behaviour.  
 
The style of this paper is in the manner of a research report. For one 
thing it is much too long for being a regular paper. The reader will 
find a considerable number of cases where judgments and observa-
tions are simply repeated. For this we simply make an excuse. The 
different parts are not tied together in any explicit logical order. Even 
regular make-up is missing. For example, we reproduce in an appen-
dix the questionnaires we actually had to use with all their typos and 
language defects. Those were at least partially caused by a mix of low 
budgets and the suddenly granted permission from the Commission-
er’s office to visit the police stations, at a specific set of dates only. 
We had to run.  
  
 
Part A: Backgrounds 
Chapter 1. Police characterized – activities and tasks 
The police in Kenya as elsewhere may be considered to have three 
major tasks. Two of them, the service functions, are highly visible: a) 
to assist the citizens by preventing or resolving crimes against persons 
and property and to arrest the perpetrators, b) to assist the public in 
resolving interpersonal conflicts. The third, c), is mainly latent, but 
will receive priority when conflicting with any other; that is to protect 
the elite against potential insurrections or other small and medium 
scale violent threats directed against its political authority. This be-
came highly visible in Kenya during the post 2007-election violence. 
To contain large-scale threats is mainly the task of the military, how-
ever.3  
 
The legitimacy of the political task is likely to have strong spill-over 
effects on how the first two tasks are performed and the legitimacy of 
the police itself, but will not be highly visible in the kind of data we 
present. Hence, it will not be the focus in this paper. The issues of le-
gitimacy will appear briefly in our perception data, but perhaps more 
interestingly when we look at the crime reporting processes and the 
related policy issues. Here we will argue that many crime reporting 
situations may arise as collective action problems that involve both 
crime victims and the police where each in isolation may have only 
weak incentives in reporting while both the police and the rest of 
community together may reap considerable gains. 
 
To a higher degree than for other public bureaucracies the police’s 
task rely on visual monitoring of different forms of social and eco-
nomic spaces and systematic information gathering from them. Unlike 
most other branches of the public bureaucracy, the main input and 
output from police activities don’t consist in written information, but 
is based on visual inspection. In addition, the application of or threats 
of using instruments of violence is a distinguishing characteristic. To 
solve their tasks the police have to move more freely around in the 
social and economic space within its geographic area of responsibility. 
This gives the police larger freedom of what to inspect, register or act 
on compared to other groups of bureaucrats, as does the geographical 
                                                 
3  The tension between the two tasks is reflected in the recent change of the name of Kenyan 
Police from the former ‘Kenya Police Force’ to the present ‘Kenya Police Service’ (cf. the 
motivation for the name change in the Ransley Commission, or Republic of Kenya (2009: 
214). 
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and thematic spread of the interpersonal conflicts, criminal (or rebel-
lious) act they are supposed to handle.  
 
They have to handle situations that often are inaccessible (at the mo-
ment of handling) to superiors. Hence, it is even more demanding to 
create a disciplined police force and monitor it than it is to achieve 
that in most other public organizations.4 On the other hand many of its 
actions – but by all means not all – are open to visual inspection by 
the public. What the police are doing become a kind of visual adver-
tisement for the characteristics of the state.  
 
An equally important characteristic – and a more generally recognized 
one – is that most tasks demand that the police are allowed and able to 
handle instruments of violence. Together with the military are the po-
lice the major public institution that is allowed to apply means of 
physical force. Instruments of violence are obviously needed for elite 
defence, but are also important when solving interpersonal conflicts 
and for bringing suspected criminals into prisons and from prisons to 
courts. The combination of visual monitoring, free movement across 
space and access to instruments of violence allow the police to possess 
the everyday control of a geographical space on behalf of the public 
authorities. The degree of control may vary, however, depending on 
the properties of the social and economic space involved and the char-
acteristics of the police. This combination of visual monitoring of an 
area by with the right to use instruments of violence for control by a 
public institution I will define as the policing of the area. Note also 
that there is also a greater kind of freedom of choice from the side of 
the public to decide when it needs to interact with the police or not 
compared to most other citizen-state interactions –arrests of course 
excepted. If you need an id-card, you need to have it and you may on-
ly get it at a predetermined office. If you have been victim of a crime, 
you may or may not report it to the police. 
 
 The economic and social characteristics of the space in question, in-
cluding its crime and violence propensities will influence the nature of 
its policing including its potential for generating corrupt income op-
portunities for the policing institutions. Here we may usefully distin-
guish between urban and rural space that is a key distinction for our 
field work and a number of other kinds of space not analysed here: 
through-roads with their traffic, country borders, sea- and airports, 
railways, coastal waters with their traffic, and more recently, the vir-
tual space with its special needs for policing. Some policing activities 
are done by organizations that are not considered as a police organiza-
                                                 
4  New technology, such as GPS, is likely to ease the monitoring of police in most countries, 
as it has done with truck-drivers, but this is not likely to be part of most present police re-
forms in poor countries yet. 
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tion in the narrow sense. Custom officials, for example, do a number 
of policing tasks.  
 
The further specifications of police tasks will, of course, differ accord-
ing to the crime and violence characteristics of the space controlled as 
well as its social and economic properties, but will in addition be in-
fluenced by the rules that define actions to be criminal or not. This 
variation across countries will be less for victim crimes that we have 
to focus on than for non-victim crimes where the legal definition of 
whether a set of market transactions (such as gambling, sexual ser-
vices and drug trade) is legal or not, may define a transaction to be a 
crime. Illegality of market transactions often creates the economic ba-
sis for organized crime (through increasing returns to scale, they give 
rise to), which may cause significant changes in the crime space the 
police will monitor, including its violence characteristics. The latter 
may also change from political events, as it did in Kenya during the 
2007-2008 election violence. It is possible, however, that a significant 
share of the police corruption data reported in our survey may be non-
victim crimes as they tend to be when the bribes paid are voluntarily. 
 
Some crimes vary systematically with the kind of social space in 
which they are taking place other seem to be of a more spontaneous, 
exogenous nature. It is, for example, difficult to explain the high crime 
and high violence levels in many African and Latin American coun-
tries compared to Asian ones on the basis of economic differences be-
tween the spaces monitored alone (cf. Andvig and Shrivastava, 2009). 
So far, any satisfactory explanation of this ‘spontaneous’ difference is 
missing.5 Here we may note that Kenya belongs to a high 
crime/corruption area and take this as determined by a number of ex-
ogenous factors from a contemporaneous point of view. We will argue 
in the following, however, that some of the most important factors 
have been shaped by colonial history and are endogenous to the coun-
try’s historical development. 
 
The ease by which the police may control a space will also hinge upon 
the general strength and impact of other public apparatuses in the area: 
Efficient schools will as a side effect of its normal activities monitor 
families, collect information about children who are likely to get in-
                                                 
5  Glaeser et al (2006) seek to explain the large variation in crime rates across US. cities 
through social interaction mechanisms between the criminals. They may vary between cit-
ies. If all are susceptible to what the others do, they argue, the variation in crime rates 
generated by the resulting multiple equilibrium models will still be too narrow. To permit 
such variation in their model a sufficient number of agents will have to be non-susceptible 
(either die-hard law breakers or law abiding) with mixes varying across populations. 
When considering the continent-wide variation in criminal acts the question then remains 
why there should be any systematic difference in the fraction of non-susceptible and their 
distribution between die-hard criminals and law-abiding types? We are led back to some 
unexplained exogenous – to present criminal interactions – factors. Several are likely to 
be influenced by colonial history, some maybe from even older cultural inheritance. 
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volved criminal activities when they reach the high crime risk age, and 
sometimes intervene. Even when not having the capacity or inclina-
tion to do the latter, the behaviour of citizens is likely to be somewhat 
modified, knowing about this monitoring. Similar side effects arise 
from the workings of local medical institutions, but to a smaller de-
gree. The weaker the other parts of state, the harder will the policing 
tasks become, but as we have already suggested, the police itself are 
likely to be among its weakest parts. The most direct factor is, of 
course, the ‘strength’ of the police itself.  
 
For reasons outlined, such as its roaming characteristics, the police are 
a part of the public apparatus where it is extraordinary difficult to cre-
ate a disciplined, efficient organization. A higher degree of commit-
ment among executive officers as well as among their monitoring su-
periors is needed to circumvent these difficulties. That is, if the public 
employees in general are less committed, that is that the public appa-
ratus has a low internal legitimacy, the police are among the most ex-
posed, but any weakness will be reinforced by the other parts of the 
bureaucracy. Any missing external legitimacy due to a generalized 
lack of trust of the state may also be exposed through the police-
citizens interactions since both the police’s methods for information 
collection as well as the amount of information reaching the police 
hinge on cooperation with the public. More violence is needed to im-
plement arrests and less information will be collected – information 
needed for crime prevention – the lower the legitimacy of the police, 
we have reasons to believe.  
 
Crime levels will also be influenced by various forms of informal po-
licing and forms of cooperation among community members that 
don’t involve the state. These forms of policing can sometimes assist; 
sometimes compete, with the work of the police. While we focus on 
the police citizen relationships only and have not asked about these 
other forms of crime control, they are clearly important and more so in 
the case when the reach of the state is narrower and less firm than is 
the case in most developed countries.6 
Chapter 2. Police corruption – classified and risk assessed 
A number of the interactions among the police and the public are gen-
erally considered corrupt. Roughly the main forms of such interaction 
consist in bribes, extortion and position-related theft. Extortion occurs 
when the police arrest or otherwise threaten someone who has not 
                                                 
6  When presenting our results we will outline some other formal public and non-formal 
community forms of  crime control possibilities, but we will not investigate them since we 
have not collected the relevant data. We will, for example, note one community case 
where the elders appear to play a significant role wherein youthful vigilante groups appear 
to play that role in another, but similar community. 
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done any crime (for example has not in fact been speeding) and re-
leases him from the threat against payment. Bribing occurs when 1) 
someone has done a punishable act (such as drunken driving) and pay 
a bribe to avoid a fine or another form of punishment or 2) has to pay 
the police for a service that is supposed to be free, such as the register-
ing of a crime.7 Position-related theft occurs when police officers use 
their position-related information or decision-making power to steal 
from the public. In addition police corruption includes forms of be-
haviour that are internal to the police, such as embezzlement, illegal 
selling and buying of police positions or tampering with evidence 
against payment. Like any other organization, bribes may arise in 
connection with its procurement. 
  
Although organized crime is likely to grow into larger complexes in 
countries with weaker public apparatuses, the eventual corrupt interac-
tion with organized crime is a relatively greater temptation (relative to 
police corruption grown from regular crime) in developed countries 
due to its higher and less risky income potential. Since the agents in-
volved all have incentives to keep the transactions secret, they will 
remain secret – most of the time and it may become less risky to re-
ceive bribes.8 The same low risk applies to forms of corruption that 
Prenzler (2009: 5) denotes ‘process corruption’, i.e. the tampering 
with evidence in order to get results in bribe payer’s favour, Internal 
corruption in form of the selling of positions on the other hand appears 
to be more common in developing countries, maybe because their val-
ue hinge upon the collection of petty bribes. 
 
As pointed out in an earlier work (Andvig and Fjeldstad, 2009), it is 
striking that the police appear to be the most corrupt and the least well 
regarded part of public bureaucracies in most developing countries 
while it may often be highly regarded in developed countries and con-
sidered not more corrupt than any other public organization there. 
This may be partly explained by the fact that while some corrupt 
transactions made by the police are highly visible and semi-public, 
others are not. Naturally, visible, petty corrupt transactions have 
stronger impact on opinion and they are more frequent in low income 
countries.
9
 Among those, the police apparently dominate, as shown in 
                                                 
7  A more extensive classification of corrupt police acts is presented in Andvig and 
Shrivastava (2009). 
8  Particularly in low corrupt environments, any involvement with organized crime may 
expose a police officer to additional risks. While ex ante to detection, they may both have 
interest in keeping the transaction secret. Ex post the criminal may well gain from expos-
ing or threating with exposure of the transaction since their reputation loss will be lower.  
9  This judgement is based on citizens’ or households’ reported experience with so called 
petty corruption, corruption that citizens encounter in their daily interactions with bureau-
cracies. Since this form of corruption is quite rare in most developed countries in any part 
of the bureaucracy, it is impossible to explain any cross-country and cross agency varia-
tion for this group of countries on this kind of statistics. According to Weber Abramo 
(2007), a shift in the levels of reported petty corruption appears to take place for countries 
when their average level of income crosses around 10 000 US$ per capita. 
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general in Andvig and Fjeldstad (2009). The low social esteem as well 
as the high rates of corruption related to the police has been confirmed 
for Kenya in several surveys that we will present and analyse later. 
Our own exploration confirms this impression. The exact incidence 
varies considerably across the surveys, however. That together with 
the limitations on crime victimization data that make them inappropri-
ate for revealing non-victims crime actions and thereby the effects of 
organized crime, leave a large area of uncertainty regarding the crime 
and police corruption incidence in Kenya. By bringing the different 
data sets together, however, including our own, we hope to narrow the 
area of uncertainty down. They all leave no doubt that both police cor-
ruption and crime hit Kenyans regularly in their daily life. 
 
In order to really explain the relatively high incidence of corruption 
among the police compared to other public organizations in poor 
countries, some general explanation should be sought since it reap-
pears in countries as divergent as Cambodia, Ghana or Kenya. We 
have already suggested three lines of inquiry: 1) the relative difficul-
ties in establishing police organizations in poor environments com-
pared to other parts of the bureaucracy, 2) whether there are different 
characteristics between social and economic spaces in developed ver-
sus developing countries, or 3) in the kind of interactions that may de-
velop between police forces and social spaces with slightly different 
characteristics, interactions where somehow mutual degree of trust is 
likely to become important. 
 
This relative high incidence of corruption among the police compared 
to the other public sectors certainly characterizes the Kenyan police 
too. It is embedded in a public apparatus where corruption levels in 
general are high. But given this background of generally high street-
level corruption in developing countries, it is of course not satisfactory 
to explain the high level and structure of public sector corruption in 
Kenya from specific Kenyan history and circumstances only. The fair-
ly high Kenyan crime level is also shared by a number of countries in 
its region and is also asking for some general explanations. Neverthe-
less, the police and crime behaviour observed in Kenya must basically 
have evolved through Kenyan mechanisms. Models like the ones de-
veloped by Glaeser et al (1996) suggest how the specifics of a country 
may be fed into some general interaction patterns. Moreover, both po-
lice corruption and crime rates appear to have been somewhat higher 
than in neighbouring countries. We consider it helpful to look briefly 
into their specific history in Kenya. 
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Chapter 3. Kenyan police – colonial behaviour patterns 
transferred?10 
 The ambition in this section is to recover historical events, behaviour 
patterns and situations that show some structural similarity with those 
we observe today. They may lead us to understand the present situa-
tion and behaviour better. Some of these suggested historical residues 
may work mainly through the citizens’ attitudes to the police and the 
state; others are likely to work mainly through the police organization 
themselves. The ambition is not to trace the actual empirical paths 
from historical events to present day police behaviour and crime den-
sities, however, structural similarity is all we may hop for. If at all 
possible, such historical tracing will demand detailed historical inves-
tigations into archives and diverse secondary sources far beyond any-
thing presented here.  
 
The major historical sequence of events that once shaped both the 
Kenyan police organizations as well as citizens’ attitudes towards 
them was of course the colonisation of the Kenya area itself. Traces of 
that history are likely to remain. After all, it took place only about 
hundred years ago and had at the outset to be a foreign implant for a 
population that for the most part had not experienced the operation of 
anything like a police or other repressive state machinery – such as 
prisons – before the British arrived.11 At the outset most of the territo-
ry had to be conquered and kept by force. Moreover, in order to rule 
the colonies in a European-like manner a number of unpopular rules 
and arrangements had to be introduced. Taxes had to be imposed not 
only to finance the new and for the Kenyan population then unknown 
public apparatus, but as a way to develop labour markets by force. In 
this situation the repressive aspect of the state had to come into the 
foreground as policing and military activities shaded into each other, 
and it was quite ‘natural’ that policing in Kenya – as in most other Af-
rican countries – acquired several military attributes.  
 
While most of Kenyan policing today is made by smaller units, the 
need for the police to coalesce into larger military-like fighting units 
was persistent during the early colonial occupation period with the 
Nandi rebellions as the largest. The need for military-like operation by 
the Kenyan police was confirmed at times throughout the colonial pe-
riod, most strikingly so in the Mau Mau rebellion. It is now an excep-
tion at the national level (the 2007 election is an exception to this ex-
ception, however) although the need for military-like police in the 
Northern border areas is persistent. The military tasks of the police 
                                                 
10  An attempt to link recent more general forms of corruption to Kenya’s colonial experi-
ence is Kibwana et al (1996: 139 – 142). We only incidentally touch what was probably 
the major historical transmission mechanism – land distribution.  
11  The shock effect of introducing prisons is discussed interestingly in Branch (2005). 
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have mainly been taken care of by a special police unit (GSU), and a 
few units of the Administration Police. For the police in general mili-
tary ways of thinking has been more persistent, although it has not 
many military-like units to be embodied in. The Kenyan Police Force 
(Service) is not a gendarmerie. From that point of view are the mili-
tary ideals reflected in the Kenyan Police’s training a vestige of old 
tasks.12  
 
While this form of colonisation with variations occurred in most Afri-
can countries during the 19
th
 century, the repressive aspects were rein-
forced and made more extensive in Kenya as Kenya appeared more 
amenable to European settlement and a considerable share of the best 
agricultural lands was taken from the indigenous population and trans-
ferred to European settlers. Naturally, this created a continuous ten-
sion that reinforced and increased the continuity of the colonial style 
of policing compounded by the effects of the Mau Mau rebellion in 
the 1950s.13  
 
Among its so far lasting characteristics has been a military style where 
a large share of police officers still lives in separate police camps. Po-
lice officers may often still not be able to live with their families when 
on duty. The curricula have at least until recently been military-
inspired, and influence the thinking of a significant share of the pre-
sent stock of officers. Another characteristic that the Kenyan police 
appear to have inherited from the British rule is its policy preference 
for making ‘strangers do the policing of strangers’.14 When partly Af-
ricanised, this governance ideal was often achieved by a skewed tribal 
recruitment to police where most police officers were recruited from 
tribes not considered threatening to the regime.15 The likelihood of 
local police heading violent rebellions then was reduced.16 Today the 
                                                 
12  In northern Kenya active policing is more commonly done in larger units due to high 
levels of organized violence mainly between some of the pastoralist tribes. Moreover, the 
gendarmerie latency may be needed to be awaked by threats to the political elite. Scare of 
terrorism is a recent stimulant for keeping the military style of policing awake.  
13  The Mau Mau rebellion speeded up the political independence of Kenya, but for the ma-
jority of the incoming Kenyan political elite it signaled not only the vulnerability of the 
British, but the precariousness of its own political survival. Extensive use of force may be 
needed to prevail. Hence, the rebellion became another stimulant to heavy handed polic-
ing.  
14  Deflem, 1994: 58. Being part of a colonial system it was also expected that higher offic-
ers, the British, should rotate geographically from the outset of their careers. In Kenya 
some Indian police officers could also be used, knowing policing from India, but due to 
the racism of the time, the Indians could not reach the higher ranks. 
15  Deflem (1994: 55 – 56) reports that in1954 the Kikuyu – a ‘rebellious’ tribe – with 
about 20% of the population had only 2% of the African police force, while the Kamba, 
for example, had 18% of the police force and only about 12% of the population. We find 
no such skewed distribution of police officers across tribes in our own material from 
2010, but our sample is too small to be statistically significant. 
16  This is not the situation today in Kenya, but much of the same is achieved through the 
actual rotation policy. This practice appears to us as inconsistent with any meaningful 
form of community policing. It may reduce corrupt practices, but increase the use of vio-
lent policing methods. We return to the matter when reporting our results. We discuss it in 
the last policy chapters. 
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ruling by strangers appears rather to achieve through more random 
shifting around of officers across provinces assisted by the camp 
structure. Unlike India, the rotation policy in Kenya is not restricted to 
higher level officers, however, but applies throughout the ranks and 
the police officers’ careers. When located in police camps, the officers 
remain more estranged to the local communities than they would oth-
erwise have been. Moreover it is less risky to follow harsh policies 
when there are smaller retaliation risks against their families.17  
 
Finally, a striking feature of present day Kenyan police is its excessive 
centralism. It is likely to have spread through the police’s own organi-
sational culture. At the time of colonial occupation it was unavoidable 
and not to be explained by the military style alone. Occupying a large 
share of global space in a short time, the lack of higher level British 
officers with relevant education and values was acute. To spread their 
impact widely, centralism was almost unavoidable. The locals would 
need to go through a long educational process before they could enter 
the duties allocated to positions in a police organization as part of a 
‘modern’ state apparatus. The almost absence of indigenous hierarchic 
systems, did not make this process any easier.  
  
Another way British manpower was saved, and famously so, was the 
evolution of the so called indirect rule system. The colonial masters 
divided the occupied space into two main spheres; one operating ac-
cording to principles close to the ones applying in their home country, 
in this case mostly ‘modern’ British law, but with modifications.18 
Another geographical sphere was to be governed by laws closer to the 
rules that had been operating before the colonial occupation, but codi-
fied by the British and based on local ‘customary law.’ Also in this 
case the modifications were substantial, but not more so than the sys-
tem could be ruled by a few local specialists, the ’chiefs.’ By giving 
them sufficiently strong incentives it was possible to control a large 
tribal population through the control of a fairly small number of 
chiefs. While the direct payments to them were modest and did not put 
strong financial strains on the colony, their ’result’- based rewards 
gained through their manipulation of the two rule systems could be 
considerable in terms of accumulation of rights to land and cash on 
hand through bribes.19 These chiefs were allowed to use some force in 
terms of local unarmed strongmen, a rudimentary form of local polic-
ing.  
                                                 
17  Today the officers are allowed to live outside the camps and to bring with them their fam-
ilies. Our impression is that while many live outside the camps, few bring with them their 
families when not stationed in one of the larger cities. 
18  This included inter alia rather draconian laws for the operation of the labour market that 
had been lifted long time ago in the UK. (Cf. Anderson, 2000). Much of the British laws 
that were introduced in Kenya had already been codified in India. 
19  It was particularly manipulation of the two set of land rights that could become profitable. 
An analysis of the possibilities may be found in Glazier (1985). 
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If considerable use of force was needed, the formal police had to be 
drawn in from outside the tribal area. As just mentioned, most of the 
indigenous groups had operated without formally established hierar-
chies and most of the chiefs could not rely on formerly established 
legitimacy. They were appointed by the British and considered as 
such. Hence, the chief-led policing also would have to rely on a rela-
tive high degree of force.  
 
Most of the tribes in Kenya had operated with a mixture of farming 
and cattle holding, using age sets when collective actions, such as 
war-making, were needed. The older age sets were most involved in 
judicial matters; particularly their most highly regarded members, the 
‘elders’. Hence they were instrumental in community ‘policing’, but 
could recruit members of younger age sets when more active use of 
force was necessary for enforcing punishments in the pre-colonial ju-
dicial system.20 In the colonial tribal policing both community repre-
sentatives and British representatives were involved.  
 
While the tribal areas are gone, vestiges of the old forms may be 
found today, particularly in slums and rural areas. Chiefs are still 
chiefs, but the local chief today is wholly professional and don’t have 
to rely on result-based remuneration, although they may still collect 
bribes. The vestige of the former local strongmen may be found in the 
present day Administration Police, although the latter are allowed to 
carry weapons, and are in many ways not distinguishable from the 
regular national police. They miss some arresting rights, however and 
appears to only have weakly stronger ties to the communities they 
monitor than the regular police. Finally, the elders who unlike the 
chiefs are not appointed by the state (but who may have some formal 
state recognition) may still carry some responsibilities for crime con-
trol.  
 
The actual distribution of roles in crime and conflict control is under-
going changes, however. In particular, the role of the elders is in flux 
and is in many places declining. The reason is not only the internal 
expansive inclinations of the state institutions of force, but the in-
creased demands of communities for the application of external force 
to solve internal interpersonal conflicts, of which some may evolve 
into crime.21 At present the police’s application of force is not only 
considered in negative light, as vestiges of unwanted colonial powers, 
                                                 
20  A description of  the age set organizations for a large number of different tribes in Kenya 
may be found in Ng’ang’a (2006) 
21  In an important case study of a community in the mainly pastoralist Orma tribe, 
Ensminger (1990) shows how the council of elders voluntarily let their power to police 
the prevailing allocation of property rights be reduced and shifted over to the local state-
appointed chief as the system of property rights shifted with the move of many members 
toward a sedentary lifestyle. The community member demanded in particular the chief’s 
ability to command force through his access to the police and the courts.  
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but blunt instruments for creating present order, carrying both desired 
and unwanted attributes. 
 
Returning to colonial history: The coexistence of a ‘modern’ and a 
’tribal’ legal and economic areas meant that they together constituted 
a kind of ‘bipolar’ (Mamdani, 1996: 109) legal system. This had 
important consequences for the policing of Kenyan space during the 
colonial rule. Different policing systems for the two systems devel-
oped as implied above.  
 
Due to the impact of European settlers, the ‘modern’ rules were not 
only confined to urban areas in Kenya, but embraced a significant part 
of the more fertile parts of Kenya’s rural space, the White Highlands. 
This increased the strain of policing.22 To police the overall system 
one had additionally to monitor the migration of the non-European 
subjects when they were moving from one legal sphere to another. As 
part of this monitoring of sphere crossing, modern policing techniques 
were introduced. The IDs that the African subjects had to carry from 
1915 on, the ‘kipande’s, were from an early stage carrying their fin-
gerprints together with the employment history for the holder. Black 
holes in the employment story could easily lead the holder into jail. 
During the Mau Mau conflict this form of migration control was rein-
forced. At the end of 1953 the fingerprints of close to ten per cent of 
the population were stored at the Criminal Records Office (Throup, 
1992: 146) 
 
While the kipandes are long gone, Kenyan IDs have remained obliga-
tory (but now also obligatory for adult women); and they still carry 
fingerprints. The IDs are requested by the police in a number of situa-
tions. These requests give frequently rise to bribe demands, even 
thefts by the police cashing in on threats of incarceration of the subject 
when missing his or her ID. The ID system have been one of the insti-
tutions that appears to have kept alive some of the antagonism rela-
tionships between the police and the public that often may be ob-
served in Kenya although the strict division of the space to be con-
trolled between tribal and ‘modern’ space for the most part is gone. 
Nevertheless, we may – somewhat speculatively – discern some of 
                                                 
22  Anderson (1991: 196 – 197) notes that housebreaking had become almost a rural phe-
nomenon around 1930 and cattle stealing had evolved into a large area of organized 
crime. The strain on policing was compounded by the fact that the land rights acquired by 
settlers were frequently considered illegitimate by the African population and many of the 
rights of the settlers’ squatters’ were not acknowledged by the European owners. As is 
well known these rights’ incompatibles became an important ingredient in the conflict 
mix that led to the Mau Mau civil war. While the Mau Mau conflict in the 1950s brought 
many changes, for the main part it only reinforced the historical antagonisms and the 
heavy-handedness of the Kenyan police. –We should also note, however, that the geo-
graphical allocation of settlers also meant an articulate demand for policing services to be 
spread out and to be available at a large geographical area. Indirectly, this may have con-
tributed to the relative strength of the police that again may contribute to increase the po-
litical stability of the country. 
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this behaviour in our extortion data, and the tendency of the police to 
create a kind of unofficial post- eight o’clock rural curfew for pedes-
trians and bikers.23  
______________ 
 
What was the policing situation before the first build- up of the British 
occupation? According to Foran, (1962) the earliest rudiments of or-
ganized policing had their roots along the coast – protecting traders in 
the city of Mombasa, protecting trading caravans from the coast into 
the hinterland as well as the protection of the more or less centralised 
political structures along the coast. Elsewhere some tribes, such as the 
Luo, had developed smaller clusters of weakly centralized political 
structures, embracing rudimentary policing, but nothing like the large 
kingships that had ruled parts of present Uganda.24 More potentially 
important for citizen-police interactions today than these rudimentary 
policing structures, however, was rather the general absence of police 
and prisons. As already mentioned, they arrived together with the co-
lonial occupation. 
 
A finding with potential historical transmission capability was some 
initial adverse selection mechanisms apparently at work in the first 
recruitment to the Kenyan police at both the higher and lower ranks 
with impact on the selection of both the Indian and European re-
cruits.25 Both in Mombasa and somewhat later from Kisumu, Forlan 
(1962) could report on two forms of behaviour that frequently have 
reappeared in belief and in fact from our 2010 case studies: Writing 
about the Mombasa police around 1900 Foran (1962:8) recounts the 
following observation made by a British magistrate: ‘On several oc-
                                                 
23  The ID system has been debated a number of times in the Parliament where MPs have 
questioned whether it allows excessive controls compared to the ID systems in Uganda 
and Tanzania (cf. Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard, September 12 – 
November 23, 1972 and Kenya Gazette 4. December, 1991). That fingerprints joined to 
an extensive register are still in use is documented at the web page (checked August 24, 
2011) of the Ministry of State for Immigration and Registration of Persons. The personal 
control system has recently received attention through a demand that all mobile phone ac-
counts shall be officially registered. While also reflecting the strong desire of Kenyan au-
thorities to control the movements of its citizens, widely divergent public order phenome-
na such as Kenya’s last election’s violence experience and the summer 2011 British loot-
ing riot only suggest the potential usefulness of ID data for controlling crime, but also 
their conflict-making properties. 
24  In some Luo organizations one may have discerned some police-like structures according 
to Ng’ang’a (2006: 461-462) He mentions that ‘In addition to the existence of the lead-
ers’ tribunal, every clan had a standing force of policemen, Ogulmama, consisting of jun-
ior elders. The people who acted as the tribunal’s askaris (police) were those who had re-
tired from senior military service – and not young men’. How extensive their policing 
duties were is unclear from Ng’ang’a’s description, but apparently the guarding of people 
confined suspects of criminal behaviour when waiting for judicial decisions, was a key 
task. Hence rudimentary jails may also have been in use. 
25  Regarding the Indian recruits Foran (1962: 24) tells: ‘We subsequently heard from reli-
able sources in India that the Agent of the Protectorate had sent out his clerk to enlist men 
in the bazaars in Bombay, and no check had been made on their past records. We learned 
later that all of them, except Harnam Singh, had bad criminal records in India.’ His de-
scription of the abilities of the first Europeans employed at the higher ranks was not flat-
tering either. 
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casions I had to convict policemen of robbery from people at night, 
and in other cases to order them punishment for …arresting unoffend-
ing people and then charging them…’ – Similar behaviour of false 
arrests but now against payments for release, was in fact one of the 
most frequent form of police corruption in our case material. 
 
When Foran himself became a police officer and stationed in Kisumu, 
he got across extensive organised forms of cooperation between the 
police and local criminals (ibid. p. 24) – the same behaviour frequent-
ly suspected by many of our informants more than hundred years later 
when it comes to cooperation between corrupt police officers and 
committed criminals in performing serious and mutually profitable 
crime. -- While Indians were recruited to most urban forms of crime 
policing including the policing of the construction and running of 
railways, the policing of the countryside where the potential of larger 
scale rebellions made the approach more military-like, had to rely on 
Africans from the beginning. Also here there were signs of adverse 
selection and Muriuki (1974: 143 -146) recounts how discipline was 
considered to be loose among the askari, who frequently engaged in 
theft, harassment of women and brawls among themselves.  
 
The latter kinds of behaviour described by Foran and Muriuki points 
more directly to present day forms of police corruption than the vio-
lence related ones we have discussed so far, but in this case the simi-
larity of behaviour appears more likely to be accidental from an his-
torical point of view: officials when they do similar work also discov-
er similar ways to earn income on the side. Moreover, we have found 
less of historical evidence suggesting actual transmission mechanisms. 
Regarding the propensity to choose excessively violent solutions, 
however, a historical transmission of behaviour through a lasting or-
ganisational culture built up during colonial times looks more plausi-
ble and more extensively historically documented.. The same applies 
to the citizens’ distrust of the police. While none of this leads directly 
to high levels of police corruption, they are likely to contribute.  
Chapter 4. Kenyan crime and police corruption – a mapping 
of survey-results 
Most studies on crime and corruption in Kenya (including police cor-
ruption) are based on snapshot surveys based on victimization reports 
where respondents are either enterprises or individual citizens or both. 
To a large extent the research agenda has been driven by foreign do-
nors. They are naturally mostly interested in the present situation and 
the question: Which feasible policies at the moment may drive corrup-
tion and crime rates down?  
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– One should expect that both corruption and crime rates are slowly 
moving variables. In a country like Kenya citizens experience both 
crime and corruption quite frequently. Hence, we should expect that 
when asked about this experience in questionnaires using almost iden-
tical questions, the crime and corruption rates reported should not vary 
much across the different surveys. This is not the case. Even when 
sample sizes are large and with good sample designs, the variation in 
outcomes is too large to present the solid and consistent picture of the 
underlying phenomena we would expect. We will describe this in the 
following when we survey this survey-based research.  
 
While we will not present any systematic, empirical explanation of 
this variation, which has been underreported in most presentations of 
questionnaire-based research in this field, we will point to a number of 
plausible factors at work.26 The identity of the organizer is one candi-
date. For example, any survey made by an anti-corruption NGO may 
drive the reported rates upwards. A government sponsored survey on 
the other hand may tend to move it in the opposite, downwards direc-
tion; the respondents sensing some risks by admitting they have bribed 
a government official. Only by using the sampling frames of the Cen-
tral Bureau of Statistics, a survey may become perceived as controlled 
by the government whether the survey has been performed by an 
NGO, a foreign research institute or the state itself.  
 
What about the preceding media situation? Even when asked directly 
about their experience, that may not be what many of the respondents 
in fact do. Verbal responses in the context of a questionnaire are 
‘cheap’ in the sense that an incorrect answer may not result in any 
negative feedback. While not having any strong incentive to give an 
incorrect answer in this situation, the incentives to give a correct an-
swer are not strong either. A respondent may tell about robbery expe-
riences in order to make herself important, or in a belief that it may 
please the interviewer, or that she should have since her neighbours 
have told that they have had such experience, or as part of her strate-
gic motivation in moving the authorities towards pursuing crime-
reducing policies, and so on. This individual fragility in verbal re-
sponses in a questionnaire context may be expected to cancel each 
other out, but in fact it allows a strong impact from media situations or 
any preceding social interactions even on reported experience.27 
                                                 
26  Azfar and Murrell (2009) seek to explain some of this erratics as due to the prevalence of 
respondents who are reticent when asked sensitive questions, and have devised methods 
to identify these reticent respondents in order to questionnaire outcomes. While interest-
ing, it is difficult to see how the fraction of reticents may vary enough to explain the vari-
ation in outcomes.  
27  Although seemingly private, to respond to a questionnaire has public aspects. At the very 
least, the respondents are likely to discuss the questionnaire and their responses with 
family and neighbours and may fear to be identified by authorities and take all this into 
account before responding. A study of these processes where private beliefs are influ-
enced by private opinions have received considerable interests among economists recently 
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Hence, it is conceivable that all these pieces of information seemingly 
about reported experience may have been so strongly influenced by 
public opinions in Kenya believing that crime and police corruption 
rates are exceptionally high that the reality in fact is quite different 
from the reported rates. 
 
But this is the kind of research we in practice have got. We are not 
aware of any information on these subjects in Kenya based on thor-
ough fieldwork where the respondents’ signals may be cross-checked 
against field observations or against long historical time series. In 
Kenya, like elsewhere, it is – as we will see – impossible to gain any-
thing close to a correct picture of crime levels based on police statis-
tics, the so far only existing alternative. Official statistics on police 
corruption does not exist. So questionnaire-based crime victimisation 
reports are all we have. Since our own empirical observations are col-
lected the same way, but with some modifications, the questionnaire-
based research is also the kind of research that it is natural to relate to 
our own mini-survey. 
 
Despite the fragility of results from each survey in isolation, we don’t 
believe the questionnaire-based results to be so wide off the mark that 
they may not assist us in reining the phenomena in and give us plausi-
ble upper and lower limits for crime and corruption occurrences in ad-
dition to ideas about their likely impact. After all, we find these efforts 
with all their variance to get closer to reality than the alternative of the 
smoothed general governance indicators such as the Transparency In-
ternational’s Corruption Perception Index, (CPI), the WBI’s control of 
corruption index (Kaufmann et al, 2008) or the lesser known Organ-
ised Crime Perception Index (van Dijk, 2008).28 Nevertheless, we pre-
sent some of these indicators for a number of African countries as a 
matter of comparison in an appendix. 
4.1 What is the relative importance of crime vs. corruption as  
perceived by the Kenyans? 
In the Kenyan media we meet a steady stream of news about spectacu-
lar crime events and police misconduct. Police corruption and crime clearly 
receive considerable public attention. Among international donors Ken-
yan corruption in general (not police corruption as such) has been a 
                                                 
ranging from stock market values to participation in social revolutions (Kuran, 1995). A 
text book treatment is Chamley (2004). We are not aware of any study that applies these 
ideas to the validity of outcomes from questionnaire-based research. 
28  According to this index Kenya have less organized crime than Nigeria, but more than 
Uganda and considerably more than Tanzania or Ghana. The difference here is more strik-
ing (but has the same sign) than their difference in aggregate corruption rates measured by 
CPI, (ibid: 160). But whether we here really are considering corruption compared to orga-
nized crime is an open question. They may just prove to be words associated with two 
complex aggregates composed of a mixed bag of expatriates’ expectations, experts’ opin-
ions and citizens’ experiences and perceptions and opinions.  
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major concern for almost three decades. It has also driven a major part 
of the research agenda on Kenyan governance. While certainly con-
cerned about corruption, it is an open question how serious Kenyan 
citizens considered the issue compared to other social and economic 
ills.  
 
When, as part of the Afrobarometer research programme,29 the re-
searchers were asking people: ‘what are the most important prob-
lems facing the country that the government should address?’ both 
crime and corruption receded somewhat in the background. Compared 
to more traditional economic issues like poverty and unemployment, 
crime and corruption appear to play second fiddle in Kenyan minds. In 
its latest ‘Round 4’ survey (Institute of Development Studies and 
Michigan State University, 2008: 29) only 2% considered corruption 
to be the most important issue for the government while 6% consid-
ered crime and security to be so. 27 % considered the management of 
the economy to be the most important, followed by unemployment 
(14%), poverty/destitution (9%) and food shortage/famine at 7%. 
Crime was ranked as the 5
th
 most important problem among the 31 
alternatives outlined, a rank shared with roads/infrastructure. Sixteen 
issues were considered less important than corruption, however, in-
cluding gender issues and civil wars that no one considered to be the 
most important. This relative position was roughly the same as the one 
they held under ‘Round 3’ and ‘Round 2’ of the Afro barometer sur-
veys for Kenya.30 
                                                 
29  The Afro barometer is a research programme that was initiated by the Department of Po-
litical Science at Michigan State University with a varying number of African research 
partners. The first survey round was initiated in 1999 and the so far last one, the 4th, in 
2008. The focus of the surveys so far has been attitudes towards political institutions and 
forms of public governance, but the surveys also contain questions about corruption and 
crime experiences. The number of countries in each round has increased to 20 in the last 
one. Kenya was not included in the first round, but in all the rest. Institute of Develop-
ment Studies at the University of Nairobi is at the moment the Kenyan partner. This re-
search effort receives financial support from a number of sources, different for each coun-
try surveyed. Typical sample size is 1 200 for each country. The samples are drawn so 
they should be representative for the total population in each country. The major aims of 
the research effort are academic in nature. In addition to present and analyse the survey 
results the Afro barometer web page publishes a large number of research papers on polit-
ical science and economic governance that apply African data.  
30  In round 3 of the Afro barometer from 2005 (Afro barometer network, 2006 : 35 – 36) 6 
% of the respondents again ranked crime and security as the most important issue, while 
3% considered corruption to be so. In round 2 (Afro barometer network, 2004: 29) – 
(Kenya case performed in August/September 2003) – again 6% of the respondents con-
sidered crime and security the most important issue while this time 4% of the respondents 
considered corruption to be so. These shares are surprisingly stable given the large fluctu-
ations in answers to the same question compared to other presumed stable underlying is-
sues. For example, in 2008 27% of the respondents considered the management of the 
economy as the key issue while only 9% considered it to be so in September 2005. While 
twice as many considered unemployment a more serious issue than management of the 
economy in 2005, it was the other way around in 2008. One should however note that the 
questions contain two components: a respondent may consider one issue as inherently the 
most important, but something that the government can do nothing about. Then one may 
easily switch ranking depending on which component that will be uppermost in mind at 
the moment. For example, if one considers corruption as mainly a characteristic of gov-
ernment itself that the government can do nothing about it may come far down the list alt-
hough the respondents may consider corruption a key problem. Then corruption is some-
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4.2 Crime and police corruption in Kenya – compared to other  
African countries 
Some scattered questionnaire-based research addresses this compara-
tive issue head-on,31 and will be discussed in this sub-section while 
most research is focused on Kenya with comparison as a side issue 
that we will discuss later. Among these the Afro barometer surveys 
referred to above represent the largest research effort. 
 
One of the most striking results from the Afro barometer surveys re-
garding crime is that the fear of crime in Kenya is exceptionally high 
while its experience of crime is closer to the Sub-Saharan African av-
erage.32 While 60% of the respondents in Kenya reported that they had 
experienced crime fears at least once last year only 39.8% had done so 
for the African average. Regarding the close neighbours, only 38.2% 
in Tanzania and 40.0% in Uganda had experienced such fears. On the 
other hand regarding reported, experienced crime Kenya was close to 
the average. 33.5% of Kenyan respondents reported that they had 
something stolen from their house while 16.6% had experienced a 
physical attack. The corresponding African average was 34.0% and 
13.2 %. Looking at the neighbours, the Ugandan response was excep-
tionally interesting. Here 46.6% had experienced a theft from the 
house and 21.1% had been physically attacked the last year. Hence, 
we see while twenty per cent more feared crime in Kenya than in 
Uganda, five per cent more had been physically attacked and more 
than ten per cent had had something stolen from the house among the 
Ugandan respondents. Looking at Tanzania the experienced crime was 
more in line with the fears: 27.2% reported something stolen and only 
6% reported an experienced physical attack.  
 
Regarding police corruption the situation is somewhat similar. The 
Kenyan perceptions are also in this case exceptionally dark: 45.1% of 
the respondents in Kenya told that they ‘had not at all’ trust in the 
                                                 
thing only non- government (NGOs, church, foreign donors) eventually may be able to 
contain.  
31  We will not discuss systematically the rankings of such perception indexes as TI’s CPI 
index or the World Bank’s Institute’s index that embrace practically all countries in the 
world. Some of the reasons why are indicated in Andvig (2008), but the WBI outcomes 
for 1996 and 2006 for every country in Sub-Saharan Africa are presented in Andvig 
(2008b: 13), reproduced here as appendix 1. According to the WBI result the perceived 
corruption level was somewhat higher than the African average (-0.89 against -0.66) And 
the African average of -0.66 indicates that corruption levels are considerably higher than 
the World average that is defined to be 0 in this index.  
32  The countries for which the Afro barometer average for the 4th round that we have report-
ed on in the following are Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, 
Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. The criteria for including a country 
is either that GDP/per capita levels are similar to Kenya, or that it like South Africa is 
perceived to have high crime levels. Since we did not seek to make any statistical analy-
sis, it made no sense to bring in all the countries included in the Afro barometer rounds. 
The numbers used here are mostly collected from the Afro barometer web page visited 
September 2, 2011 where we used their facilities for creating tables at 
http:/www.jdsurvey.net/afro/OutputPrinter.jsp 
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police while the African average was 25.2%.33 Looking at the neigh-
bours again; in Tanzania only 13.5% of respondents were completely 
without trust in the police while 24.0. % of Ugandans was equally dis-
trustful. Regarding the reported experience the difference is also pro-
nounced: While 25.6% reported that they had paid a bribe last year to 
avoid the police in Kenya, about the same, 24.3% had done so in 
Uganda. In Tanzania, however, the situation was better than the Afri-
can average; 9.9% against the African average (with the Afro barome-
ter selection of countries) of 10.8%.34  
 
In the Round 3 edition of the Afro barometer surveys a number of hy-
pothetical situations are outlined. One is the following: ‘What will 
you do under a wrongful arrest?’35 While most answer it in some 
ethically ‘correct’ way in all the countries; such as lodging a com-
plaint in the right channels, there were two ‘corrupt’ alternatives: one 
to was to use connections; the second was to bribe. Regarding connec-
tions (surprisingly) Kenya was far below the African average (note 
that the composition of countries in the 3
rd
 Round differed from the 
4
th
) when it comes to suggesting influence, 5.3% against 9.9%, while 
far above in suggesting bribes in cash: 11.7% against 4.5%. Again 
somewhat surprising, Tanzania was the only country with a pattern 
close to Kenya.  
 
The lower income, French-speaking countries were at the opposite 
end. In Benin, for example, 22.6% would use influence and only 4.5% 
cash. We will return to this observation when we discuss the rotation 
pattern in Kenyan police.36 It is also interesting that in other hypothet-
ical situations, Kenyans are not exceptional regarding the fraction who 
proposes cash bribing compared to influence. When the respondents 
are asked about what they would do in case a permit is unreasonably 
delayed, 26% in Benin would use a cash bribe to speed up the process 
while 16% would use influence. Only 9.4% of Kenyans would use 
bribes in these situations and even fewer would apply influence, 5.8%. 
. Here Kenya was close to the African average regarding cash bribes 
(9.4% against 8.6%) and below the average again with respect to in-
fluence (5.8% against 9.3%). – Are these differences accidental? Why 
                                                 
33   The only country that was close was Nigeria with 44.5% complete distrust. 
34 This difference has been fairly stable. For the Third Round (Afro barometer network 2006, 
Table 5.3)), the difference between Kenya and Uganda was somewhat larger: 29.2% vs. 
17.7%; for Tanzania it was then 9.4%. In the 2nd round (2002): Kenya 28.3%, Uganda 
18.2%, and Tanzania 11.8%. Given Nigeria’s reputation it may have interest to note that 
Nigeria’s incidence of this kind of bribe reporting was slightly below Kenya’s in all these 
three rounds. 
35  This was a very common occurrence according to our respondents as will be evident when 
we present our mini cases. 
36  Statistically these differences between how to respond to police are likely to be significant 
Assuming that these differences between the countries are not created by some unex-
plained framing in the questionnaire situations, we may look at explanations either along 
the ways the public sectors operate in the different countries, or through differences in the 
size and coherence in their family structures.  
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is the fraction of cash bribers to influence peddlers only exceptionally 
high in Kenya when it comes to interactions with the police, but not 
when it comes to other parts of the public administration? Does it 
mean anything that the difference is most striking when we compare 
Kenya to former French colonies at approximately the same economic 
level? We believe the answers to these questions may prove signifi-
cant, but here our main focus remains Kenya and we are not in the po-
sition to do the necessary detailed multi-country research to answer 
these questions here. 
 
The Afro barometer surveys are based on samples of individual citi-
zens. The World Bank has developed several surveys that use samples 
of enterprise respondents instead where questions regarding crime and 
corruption are embedded. An underlying motivation is that their po-
tential effects on enterprises are likely to have stronger effects on the 
allocation of investment across countries and thereby also stronger 
and more immediate effects on economic growth.  
 
 Clarke (2011) makes use of some of these data, two surveys of Sub-
Saharan enterprises made in 2006-2007 as part of this World Bank’s 
Enterprise Survey programme. Kenya was one of the countries cov-
ered with a sample of 646 enterprises. In addition to the substantial 
comparative results regarding African crime and corruption that we 
will refer to below, he demonstrates a specific fragility in question-
naire outcomes due to a seemingly slight variation in the formulation 
of questions. A characteristic of these rounds of the enterprise survey 
is that the enterprises could choose whether they reported bribe costs 
(and security and crime costs in addition to a number of other items) 
as per cent of sales or as actual monetary expenses. About 2/3 of the 
enterprises choose the former representation; which is the one that has 
been most commonly used for comparative purposes.  
 
Clarke shows it is a dramatic difference between cost of corruption 
when reported as per cent of sales and when reported as an absolute 
amount and then calculated as per cent of sales: On average, for the 
enterprises that reported it in the latter way corruption constituted only 
1/10 of the share of costs compared to the per cent report! In addition 
to the general substantiation of our questionnaire fragility claims, the 
most interesting result of Clarke for us is that for the whole African 
sample, bribe costs reported as a percentage of sales were higher than 
for security costs as well as for crime costs when reported this way, 
while the opposite was the case when reported in absolute amounts. If 
our hunch that the absolute value reporting may be closer to the actual 
incidence holds (since it makes the respondent to think more carefully 
about what expenses they really are) the security/crime complex may 
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in fact on average be a substantially more serious economic issue for 
African enterprises than corruption.  
 
Looking at the data for Kenyan enterprises that are given in Clarke’s 
article, Kenya is at the upper end when it comes to the fraction of 
firms that report paying bribes (79%) while their average bribe costs 
are around the African average (2.7% of sales). For the Kenyan enter-
prises that report bribe expenses as percentage of sales, Kenya is at the 
lower end (4.2%)37. For comparison we may take Rwanda as an ex-
treme case at the other end.38 There only 20% of the firms reported 
that they had paid bribes, but when they did, they paid a large percent-
age, 11.3 %, of sales. 
 
The World Bank Enterprise Surveys are also used in Iarossi (2009) 
where Kenyan enterprises’ experience and perception of crime and 
corruption are part of his report on investment climate. He compares 
the ‘investment climate’ in Kenya to China, India, South Africa, Sen-
egal, Tanzania and Uganda. Regarding the firms’ subjective assess-
ment of the importance of crime and corruption as ‘major or very 
severe constraints’, 38% of Kenyan firms considered corruption to 
be so while 33% considered crime a major constraint. That is, corrup-
tion is considered to be more serious than crime. Compared to the oth-
er six countries only Senegal held similar widespread concerns for 
corruption and only South Africa had so for crime.39  
 
Interestingly, while more firms located inside Nairobi feel constrained 
by corruption, the opposite is the case regarding crime: while 28% of 
Nairobi firms feel constrained by crime, 41% of firms outside Nairobi 
do so. This is particularly intriguing when looking at the (slightly) 
more objective cost reports: Here it is told that crime costs for Nairobi 
firms constitute 4.8% of sales values, but only 2.7% of sales for non-
Nairobi ones.40 
 
 Returning to the comparison between Kenya and the six comparator 
countries, but looking at the reported objective costs of crime and se-
                                                 
37 For the Kenyan firms that were reporting bribe values, they constituted only 0.6% of sales. 
38  We choose the comparison with Rwanda because of the extremely low police corruption 
reported in TI Kenya’s latest East Africa survey. 
39  Regarding crime, Kenyan worries were just a little above the African average. For exam-
ple more than fifty per cent of the firms in countries like Benin and Ivory Coast and Ja-
maica held such concerns. In Kosovo, DRC, the Dominican  Republic this share increases 
above sixty per cent. Regarding corruption considered as constraint, Kenya is at Sub-
Saharan average that again is below both the Middle East and Latin America average (cf. 
http:www.enterprisesurveys.org/ExploreTopics/?topicid=3, assessed September 1, 2011). 
The sample size of Kenyan firms is about the same as in Clarke (2011). 
40  When comparing the relative importance of crime versus corruption, the costs of crime 
are higher than corruption for both Nairobi and non-Nairobi firms, a result that is rein-
forced when we combine crime and security costs. If we add all these cost items; corrup-
tion, crime and the protection against it, they cost Nairobi firms 12.3% of the value of 
their sales. 
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curity, the costs are considerably higher in Kenya than in the other 
countries. While Kenyan enterprise reported 3.9% loss due to crime 
(security expenses 2.9%) the nearest one was Tanzania with 1.1% 
(2.3%).41 Regarding the ‘objective’ bribe costs they were 3.6% for 
Kenya, but here Uganda was above (3.7%) and Tanzania close (3.4%). 
When discussing these as ‘objective’ costs we should of course have 
Clarke’s warning in mind; the sensitivity of the estimates to the exact 
formulation of the questions in the questionnaire. When looking at this 
specific selection of countries we may also note when comparing that 
perceived high crime country, South Africa, with Kenya, the enter-
prises’ concern with crime were almost at par (29% of the enterprises 
in South Africa perceived crime as a major constraint against the 33% 
in Kenya, Iarossi: 24), the reported cost difference was substantial: 
3.9% in Kenya against 0.6% in South Africa, that is more than six 
times larger as share of sales (World Bank, 2009: 3).42 
 
In these surveys the expenses due to police corruption are not sorted 
out, but as we will see, in the cases where police corruption are speci-
fied together with the other agencies’ petty corruption income, police 
corruption constitutes a major share and tend to follow the aggregate 
levels. In any case, bribes paid to the police will be lower than aggre-
gate bribes, so if the enterprise expenses on bribes are lower than the 
ones induced by crime, then certainly the expenses on police corrup-
tion must be lower too. 
 
Summing up this research, it appears that both corruption in general, 
police corruption and crime levels in Kenya are at the higher end 
compared to most other Sub-Saharan countries according to the Afro 
barometer rounds and World Bank’ enterprise surveys, but not excep-
tionally so. Somewhat surprisingly, influence peddling is less in use in 
Kenya, particularly regarding the police, than in comparable African 
countries. 
4.3 Crime research with focus on Kenya; Survey results 
It is striking that while Kenyans themselves appear to consider crime 
as a more serious issue than corruption; fewer surveys have addressed 
it. Nevertheless, several interesting surveys of the crime victimisation 
type have been published:  
 
                                                 
41  World Bank (2009: 3). This publication builds on the same original World Bank report 
‘Kenya Investment Climate Assessment’, World Bank, Washington D.C to which we 
have not gained assess at this time of writing. There are some minor discrepancy between 
the Iarossi (2009) and World Bank (2009) numbers that need to be clarified. 
42  The main explanation here may simply be that the South African firms are larger and 
some of the security and crime costs are likely to be of a fixed-cost type. A similar argu-
ment may apply when Kenyan and Rwandian firms are compared where the Kenyan ones 
may be larger.. 
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 We have already presented some of the more telling results from 
the crime research embedded in the Afro barometer surveys as 
part of a comparison of Kenya with other African countries. So 
far we have three Afro barometer surveys with data from Kenya 
(collected in 2003, 2005 and 2008, each with a sample size about 
1 200). It is the only survey we are aware of where academic re-
search and not policy aims have been the major motivation. 
 The largest survey where crime and corruption questions have 
been combined was made as part of the efforts to implement the 
so called ‘Governance, justice, law and order sector (GJLOS) 
programme’. GJLOS was an expensive, extensive and complex 
attempt to reform the whole judicial sector of Kenya. We will call 
its benchmark for the GJLOS survey. A large number of interna-
tional donors, NGOs and Kenyan public organisations have been 
involved. While the survey was performed by a private consultan-
cy firm (the Steadman Group, now Synovate) the context was 
quite official. The sampling frame used was the one already de-
veloped by the Central Bureau of Statistics. The sample size was 
exceptionally large (12 442 respondents) and great efforts were 
made to make the sample representative of the whole Kenyan 
population. The sample was composed of sub-samples from each 
province large enough to claim statistically significant results also 
at the provincial levels.43 The major aim of the survey was to 
make an empirical baseline so one later could study the effects of 
various policy actions as causing deviations from this base line.44 
As part of this base line a number of questions on both crime, and 
police behaviour and corruption were formulated.  
 The most recent one to cover the whole Kenya has been a crime 
victimisation survey organised by UNODC (UNODC, 2010) and 
implemented by the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research 
and Analysis (KIPPRA). The sample size is about 3 000 house-
holds. It is part of a large international effort to make comparable 
crime victimisation data that has lasted more than two decades 
(see Van Dijk, 2008: 20). The crime classification is finer than in 
the other surveys and follows with some modifications the fixed 
UNODC/UNICRI -nomenklatura that has been applied in a num-
ber of studies the last two decades (see Van Dijk, 2008) in order 
to make the results comparable across time and countries. This 
Kenya survey has some unique features, however, as it ask re-
spondents about crime experiences in three different periods 2005 
                                                 
43  Tentatively the results were also presented at the district level. Due to the low number of 
respondents in each district the results here were presented by percentage ranges, not 
unique numbers.  
44  Hence it should have been followed up by a number of later surveys. To our knowledge 
such studies have never been made, however. Hence no attempt to study the empirical ef-
fects of different policy reforms in the judicial sector has in fact been made. 
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– 2008, 2009 and the first two months of 2010. It also used the 
sampling frame of the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. 
 In addition to the surveys that cover the whole country a few have 
focused on Nairobi only. Here a crime victimisation survey of 
Nairobi organised by UN- Habitat (Stavrou, 2002) has been im-
portant by bringing the everyday presence of crime to life, but it 
contains less information about police corruption. We will call it 
the Stavrou survey. It consists effectively of four parts. One is a 
rapid survey of individual respondents sampled mostly from pub-
lic places, the ‘scan’. While efforts were made to make it repre-
sentative45, it could not claim to be wholly random, but it was a 
large sample (7 954 individuals) and it was used to improve the 
subsequent second part, the ‘main’ survey that has greater claims 
to being representative, also using a more detailed questionnaire 
(size: 1 500). Similarly there was a rapid ‘scan’ of enterprises’ 
crime experiences (size: 667) developed into part of the main sur-
vey (size: 300). Here we may also mention a study by Ngugi et al 
(2004) – later called the Ngugi report that deals with a wide range 
of crime and security issues in Nairobi.46 
Since Stavrou’s survey, as mentioned, only focuses on Nairobi it 
cannot properly be compared with the Afro barometer, but the cit-
izen part may be compared with the GJLOS survey’s Nairobi re-
sults (and its enterprise part with the World Bank enterprise sur-
vey -since that was split into a Nairobi and non-Nairobi part.47  
 
The Stavrou citizen scan was fairly detailed with respect to crime 
forms. Among the crimes listed in the Stavrou scan we find that 37% 
                                                 
45  Only 13% of the respondents were from a slum area according to Stavrou (2002: 28), so 
slums appear to be underrepresented since about half of Nairobi’s population may live in 
slum-like areas. The traditional number is 60% but after the dramatic scaling down of the 
population size in Kibera to about 1/4th of the traditional 1 million (Daily Nation, Septem-
ber 3 2010), there are reasons to doubt the traditional estimate of the share of slum popu-
lation of Nairobi as a whole too, but in any case it is larger than 13% however one defines 
‘slum.’ 
46  This study has collected samples from households, individuals, enterprises, NGOs and 
security workers (except the police (who the researchers were unable to get to respond de-
spite efforts). It is more specific about the spatial crime distribution in Nairobi. For this 
reason we have been unable to use it as much as we would have liked to, since they have 
combined the different respondents group to a kind of spatial cluster view that makes it 
difficult to compare most of its results with the other surveys. Moreover, it is sometimes 
unclear which group respondents the tables actually refer to. 
47  We are only aware of two major efforts in studying crime in Kenya that seek to cover the 
whole country that is not based on survey data. One relied mainly on official records from 
the police, prison and courts, Muga (1975). Its main interest today is that it combines fair-
ly detailed crime nomenklatura with tribe nomenklatura of the offender, but the author has 
refrained of trying to ask whether there is significant difference in arrest rates across tribal 
identities. Arrest rates across tribes obviously may hinge upon eventual criminal propensi-
ties, police discrimination and a number of structural economic differences. Later the po-
lice’s crime statistics become unavailable till 2001. Partly to compensate for this infor-
mation gap a series of publications based on content analyses of stories from the leading 
newspapers were collected and presented by Augusta Muchai at Security Research and In-
formation Centre around 2000. While the number of cases were below 1 000 and could 
hardly be considered representative for the crimes experienced by Kenyan citizens, they 
make an interesting and representative view of what kind of crimes that reached the 
newspaper columns (e.g. Muchai, 2002). 
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of Nairobi’s residents had been a victim of robbery, 29% of house 
burglary, 22% of theft and 18% of physical assault during the last 
year. This was results that did not differ much from the Afro barome-
ter results. If one could assume that everyone was hit by only one 
crime, everyone would be hit by a crime every year.48  
 
According to the GJLOS survey the situation is not quite so serious.49 
It included Nairobi as a separate sub-sample so the citizen part of the 
Stavrou survey is in principle comparable with it. Regarding the basic 
simple question of whether any member of the household has been a 
victim of a crime last year 16% of the respondents answer yes. Nairo-
bi is clearly more exposed to crime. The GJLOS survey reports that 
30% of the Nairobi sample respondents claim at least one crime expe-
rience the last year. The urban clusters generally report a higher crime 
incidence than the rural ones – 23% against 14% according to the 
GJLOS survey. Rift Valley and North Eastern province have clearly 
lower crime rates, 7% and 4%. When aggregating the different forms 
of violent crimes (murder excepted, since they for obvious reasons are 
difficult to include in any victimization survey) they constitute 25% of 
the crimes; that is 4% of the respondents in Kenya and 7.5% of the 
respondents in Nairobi are exposed to a violent crime during a year, 
according to this survey. This is significantly lower than the 17.5% 
that had been ‘physically attacked’ according to the Afro barometer 
(round 3) result50 and also lower in the case of Nairobi compared to 
the Stavrou’s 18%.  
 
The reported crime frequencies in the UNODC report of Kenya are 
higher than in the GJLOS report but lower than in the Afro barometer. 
(We will later see its corruption frequency is close to GJLOS.)51 The 
UNODC makes a basic distinction between household crimes and 
crimes against the individual respondent that is not made in the other 
surveys. Individual is in this case something that characterise the 
crime not the way the respondent is sampled (the sample size here is 
3000 households). The survey reports that about 10% the respondents 
                                                 
48  The Afro barometer round 2 (which was from 2002 and hence nearest in time to the 
Stavrou investigation) had a similar result, again if assuming (unrealistically) that each 
household experienced only one crime form each year. In addition 17.7% of the respond-
ents reported that they had been exposed to physical attack and 39.2% that something was 
stolen from the house. The questions are not formulated exactly the same way, but given 
that the Afro barometer sample was taken from the whole country, its crime recording is 
quite high. 
49  The survey was performed in the period 20th April – 11th June 2006. The GJLOS survey 
was a large scale effort employing 135 persons and it received considerable media atten-
tion, both paid and unsolicited that may have influenced the response rate (which was in-
tended) but also the actual verbal responses emitted – less desirable for a baseline. 
50  The Afro barometer round 3 was made in 2005 and hence is the nearest in time with the 
GJLOS survey. The 17.5% is reached  by adding the percentage that was attacked ‘once 
or twice’, ‘several times’, and ‘many times’, assuming then that these groups are dis-
junctive. 
51  Note that comparisons here cannot be exact since the definitions are not the same. That 
granted, the differences in reported frequencies are so large that this ranking is quite clear. 
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had experienced theft as individuals, 5% had been exposed to an as-
sault and 4% to robbery. As a member of a household 6.3% had expe-
rienced a robbery and 6.5% have had livestock stolen. If we simply 
add all these forms of household and individual crime together and 
add the other forms of crime experiences in the specified UNODC list, 
keeping consumer fraud, attempted burglary and corruption out; we 
get that 18.4% of the respondents had experienced a household crime. 
Doing the individual crimes the same way, 20.4% had been exposed 
to one of these forms of crime. Hence 38.4% of the respondents had 
been exposed to one of the UNODC specified crime forms.52 The 
most common crime in the UNODC survey was in fact consumer 
fraud (a crime not asked about in neither the Stavrou or in the Afro 
barometer surveys. Therefore we too have not counted it in the aggre-
gate crime experience). 22 % reported that they had experienced con-
sumer fraud the preceding year.  
 
Similarly, when we add all the forms of crime where goods are stolen 
from home, they constitute 42% of the crime recorded in the GJLOS 
survey; that is, about 6.7% of the respondents report that they have 
experienced this. Again, this is lower than the corresponding number 
from the 2005 Afro barometer where we find that 35.6% of the house-
holds have had such an experience. For Nairobi, 37% of the respond-
ents in the Stavrou (2002) report that some goods have been stolen 
from their home last year while 12.6% of the Nairobi respondents in 
the GJLOS report that they have experienced a form of theft from 
their home or homestead during the last year .  
 
With respect to perceptions relevant for judging the welfare costs of 
crime (and therefore also relevant for anti-crime policy) such as the 
feelings of fear of crime, the results were dramatically higher and 
brought in through the Stavrou main survey: 52% of the respondents 
‘worry about crime all the time’ and 75% ‘feel unsafe in their homes 
at night’ (ibid.: 32). In the Afro barometer 58.8% of the respondents 
have felt fear of crime at least once during the last year.53 Even so, 
they must have felt even more unsafe outside home since 72% of all 
residents avoid travelling and working after dark. But here the police 
might also have contributed. As we will see, at that time the risks of 
arrests may be high. The UNDP study reports that in urban areas 48% 
of the respondents feel ‘a bit unsafe’ or ‘very unsafe’ when ‘walking’ 
away from home while 30% do so at home. In rural areas the corre-
                                                 
52  Simple adding this way is likely to exaggerate the share of households that experience 
crime and underestimate the number of crimes per household. For example, a respondent 
who has experienced an assault may also have experienced a regular theft. 
53  In the Afro barometer round 2 survey 9.4% per cent ‘always feared of crime at home’. 
UN-Habitat has made a similar study of Dar es Salaam (Robertshaw et al., 2000), using 
the same methods as in the Stavrou study from Nairobi. Here 61% felt unsafe walking in 
their neighbourhoods after dark, a significantly lower percentage than in Nairobi since 
presumably people feeler safer in their homes than walking outdoors.  
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sponding numbers were 35% and 21%. The Ngugi report has some 
interesting observations regarding the distribution of fear (Ngugi, 
2004: 37). Among their household respondents 18.8% of high income 
households felt ‘unsafe or very unsafe’ when at home, 42.2% of mid-
dle income and 45.8% of low income household felt this way. When 
carrying out activity in Nairobi city the corresponding responses were 
44.0%, 57.2% and 56.7%,54 ‘when walking.’ The question about fear 
is formulated in a way that makes it difficult to relate GJLOS either to 
the Afro barometer, UNDP or the Stavrou surveys. In GJLOS only 
11% feel insecure at home while 39% feel somewhat secure and 49% 
feel ‘very secure’. In Afro barometer round 3, 58.7% report that they 
had feared crime once or more while at home, a result seemingly at 
odds with the GJLOS result. But if we only look at the extreme cate-
gories the result may become comparable: 41.2% of the Afro barome-
ter respondents told that they never fear crime at home while 7.9% 
told that they always fear crime. Maybe the respondents to GJLOS 
interpreted the question of ‘feeling insecure’ to mean ‘feeling always 
insecure’? 
 
In addition to their perceptions about fear the respondents in the 
Stavrou survey were also asked about their perceptions of the causes 
of crime. Perceptions here are clearly of considerable policy im-
portance. The cause of crime most frequently cited was ‘unemploy-
ment’ which forces people into crime, then ‘poverty’ (Stavrou, 2002: 
31). That this kind of ‘social’ understanding of crime is supported in 
the Ngugi survey that states: ‘All the respondents unanimously re-
ported that poverty and unemployment is the main determinant of ris-
ing criminal activities’ (Ngugi, 2004: 53). If, for example, ‘human 
greed’ had been perceived as the main cause, the space for crime 
‘fighting’ policy will look quite different. Harsher policies will be 
called for.  
 
When regarding policy relevant perceptions it was also significant that 
the respondents in the Stavrou survey claimed (Stavrou, 2002: 33) that 
36% of all crime could be attributed either directly or indirectly to the 
police. This is confirmed in the text of Ngugi (2004: 53 -54 and in ta-
ble 4.26) where corruption both in the police and in the judiciary to-
gether with demoralisation of the police and the loss of public confi-
dence are listed up as noticeable causes of crime. For example, around 
10% (ranging between 0.4% and 22%) of the respondents across Nai-
robi constituencies list ‘high level of corruption in the police force’ as 
a cause (ibid: 55 – 56). 
                                                 
54  The household sample size was 845 respondents (ibid.: 25).  
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4.4 Police corruption in Kenya: More survey results 
Unlike crime, which despite large public concerns has received only 
modest research interests, a fairly large number of surveys has been 
made in Kenya that have asked questions about corruption in general 
and police corruption in particular, too many in fact for us to discuss 
them all here. In addition to the Afro barometer surveys we will main-
ly focus on three of them, the GJLOS survey which crime results we 
have already discussed, the UNDP and the TI-Kenya’s surveys.55 In 
addition we will bring forward the few results on police corruption 
from the Stavrou survey since this was an attempt to bring together the 
phenomena of our concern – crime and police behaviour – in the same 
survey. 
 
In the UNODC survey corruption is not a major issue, but only con-
sidered one form of crime that victimise a number of households in 
2009, 456 out of the 2964 respondents – to be precise. The police do-
ing general duty made up 36% of those cases, traffic police 8%, thus 
44% altogether. This implies that about 6.8% had paid a bribe to the 
police in 2009. This is not the whole story. In the report it is noted that 
random inspections is a common method used by the Kenyan police 
ostensibly to maintain security (note the old-time kipande inspec-
tions)) by stopping pedestrians or vehicle owners. 48% of the re-
spondents had experienced this and 47% of those again had to pay a 
bribe.56 That is, 22.6% of the respondents had paid this bribe (or ex-
tortion fee). If we assume (unrealistically) that no one paid both the 
estimated share of citizens who paid a bribe to the police in 2009 was 
close to 30%. 
 
TI-Kenya has produced a comparatively long time series on police 
corruption comparing the police with a number of other public organi-
sations. While the GJLOS survey and the TI-Kenya surveys mainly 
focus on which institution (police, local administration, etc.) that the 
respondents paid a bribe to during the last year,57 the Afro barometer 
                                                 
55  For example, Kenya’s Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) has several years published 
an enterprise survey on corruption, e.g. KACC (2007) and a National Corruption Percep-
tion Survey (KACC, 2006). Although mostly only tangential to our interests, the latter 
confirms once more that the Kenyans consider the police the most corrupt of their public 
organisations, 69% of the respondents told the interviewers so. 
56  Interestingly neither the interviewers nor the respondents considered this as regular bribes. 
We had to adjust for this when we collected our own community data. 
57  Kenya has also been included in Transparency International’s comparative Global Ba-
rometer survey a couple of times (in 2006 and 2004). For 2004 the registered frequency 
was 19%, in 2006 it was 21%, 17% less than what the same survey found for Nigeria. 
This includes all kinds of street-level bribes paid, not only to the police. These results 
should indicate some of the large variation found by surveys using similar questions about 
the respondents’ corruption experience. The size of the sample and the rigorousness of the 
methods used to ensure random sampling were modest. A large research cooperation be-
tween central bureaux in a number of French-speaking African countries (the ‘1 2 3 sur-
veys’) has explored corruption issues using the sampling frames of the bureaux which 
should ensure more representative samples. For most countries they got even lower re-
ported corruption frequencies. Kenya was not included, but in the case of Senegal for ex-
ample, the reported corruption frequency in the 1-2-3 survey was about a half to close to a 
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surveys sketch typical situations and ask whether the respondent have 
paid at least one bribe in this situation or not.58 Two of the situations 
outlined have been kept throughout, that is ‘bribe to get a permit or 
document’ and a bribe to ‘avoid problem with police’ and we see that 
the situation appears quite similar across the rounds: 
 
Table 1. % Kenyan respondents paying at least one bribe last year 
(Afro barometer) 
 
Bribe act type Round 2 (2003) Round 3 (2005) Round 4 (2008) 
Permit 28.8% 24.9% 27.6% 
Avoid police 27.3% 29.2% 25.6% 
 
(Source: Various tables from the Afro barometer web page) 
 
If we compare this outcome with the GJLOS survey the situation ap-
pears dramatically different. The GJLOS reports a much lower corrup-
tion frequency – about 12% altogether – as an average for rural and 
urban areas. GJLOS survey published a separate corruption frequency 
for the police in each Kenyan province. The police narrowly defined 
were involved in more bribing incidences than any other institution - 
33% of all (for Nairobi 37%). If we include the fact that some of the 
other institutions engage in policing more broadly defined as are the 
case of chiefs and the administration police, we may add a 10%. This 
implies that about 50% of the bribing incidences in Kenya as reported 
by households in the GJLOS survey are related to policing. That is, 
about 6% of the households pay a bribe to policing during a year. 
 
 Due to its large size and its efforts in making sample representative-
ness, I will use the GJLOS survey report as a frame for comparison of 
the various survey results. Note, however, that since GJLOS study re-
ceived considerable public attention as part of the Kenyan govern-
ment’s policy efforts to reform the judicial sector, the respondents as 
well as survey’s organisers may have significant strategic interests in 
its results and may have answered (or influenced answers) according-
ly. Efforts to use media to improve response rates and thereby to im-
prove the statistical significance of the results may have strengthened 
the framing effects and caused stronger distortion of the ‘true’ results. 
 
                                                 
quarter of the Afro barometer and Global Barometer results (the references to the results 
referred to in this section may be found in Andvig (2008)). The questions formulated were 
similar. 
58  As before we will focus on the round 3 data of the Barometer due to its proximity in time 
with the GJLOS survey, but since we have corruption data for the different situations that 
have been held constant through round 2, 3 and 4, we will explore whether there have 
been any striking changes here.  
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Stavrou’s (2002) research into crime and police behaviour in Nairobi 
which also includes the small sample of enterprise’ experiences, is 
more detailed on crime than corruption, but the limited information it 
contains about the police, suggests that it was in the high range com-
pared to the GJLOS here too . About 25% of the households and 50% 
of the commercial enterprises admitted that they had bribed a police 
official the last year (Stavrou, 2002: 106). 
 
TI, Kenya has pioneered surveys of corruption experiences. The or-
ganization has made a survey almost yearly since 2001. The samples 
of respondents have increased and in various ways become more rep-
resentative both geographically and socially. Their main results, while 
fluctuating quite strongly from one year to the next, appear generally 
high compared to other surveys. In both 2001 and 2008, for example, 
almost 60% of the respondents answered that they had a bribe experi-
ence with the police (TI Kenya 2001, 2008). Adding the experience 
with other agencies each respondent would have on average more than 
two bribe experiences each year. While not necessarily unrealistic, 
these results are certainly different from most multi-country victimiza-
tion surveys, including the other ones from Kenya. The Afro barome-
ter is a partial exception. 
 
The TI Kenya survey reports contain substantial information not in-
cluded in the other surveys, information clearly relevant for explaining 
corrupt behaviour: the number of transactions a respondent have with 
each public agency, assessments of the relative frequency of officials 
in each agency that have accepted bribes, the average size of bribes 
paid to employees of each agency, and so on. Each dimension of the 
corruption phenomenon pertaining to each agency are then compared 
and aggregated. Each dimension receives the same weight. The result-
ing index may then reveal the different agencies overall corruptness. 
For most dimensions in almost every year the police appear as the 
most corrupt and have therefore been ranked as the most overall cor-
rupt every year. This confirms the general observation about the rela-
tive corruption propensity of the police in developing countries made 
in Andvig and Fjeldstad (2008). To make their results about corrup-
tion propensities comparable to the other results we have chosen to 
focus on the percentage of respondents paying bribes and the percent-
age of respondents having transacted with the public organization in 
question. To have another Kenyan public institution to compare with, 
we have chosen public hospitals since we find this institution also 
among the ranked ones most of the years that TI-Kenya has performed 
its corruption survey. In general TI finds exceptionally high corruption 
levels: 
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Table 2. Incidence of bribe payments to the police and public hos-
pitals 2001-1059 
 
 
% of respondents paying a 
bribe to the 
Given an interaction, % of 
respondents paying a bribe to 
Year police public hospitals police public hospitals 
     
2001 57,5 20,1 90,4 77,1 
2002 70,7 31,3 96,9 86,8 
2003 28,4 23,7 82,1 41,2 
2004 25,6 24,9 81,6 38,2 
2005 32,0 22,4 82,3 38,4 
2006 36,7 29,6 63,5 49,6 
2008 59.0 38 93 53 
 
In
60
 2009 the TI Kenya survey was expanded to include Tanzania and 
Uganda and in a 2010 survey Burundi and Rwanda was added. This 
may give us another set of numbers useful for comparing (police) cor-
ruption in Kenya. Again, the prevalence of corruption in Tanzania ap-
pears lower than in Kenya. In the 2009 survey 40.9% of the respond-
ents’ interactions with the police had resulted in their paying a bribe to 
the police (against the 63.4% in Kenya). In 2010 the difference was 
insignificant 54.4% against 53.8 %. In Uganda the prevalence of po-
lice corruption (again measured the new way) was also close to Ken-
ya’s: 53.1%. The same was the case for Burundi with a prevalence 
rate of 54.3%. It is noteworthy, however, that unlike Kenya (and in 
most other comparative crime victimisation surveys) the police in nei-
ther Uganda (in 2009 nor Burundi (2010)) were at the top. The minis-
try of defence, the judiciary and the revenue authority had all higher 
prevalence rates in Uganda in 2009 (TI-Kenya 2009: 49), but were 
back on the top – as normal – in 2010. The customs/revenue authority 
was at the top in Burundi.61 
                                                 
59  Sources: TI bribery index Kenya for 2001 – 2008, East Africa bribery index 2009 and 
2010.The numbers across years are only roughly comparable due to changes in sampling 
procedures, institutional changes and partly to changes in definitions. The 2001 survey sin 
particular should only be considered as a trial since the number of respondents were about 
only half of the ones later collected (about 1200 against 2 400) and confined to urban are-
as. Higher income and education groups were heavily overrepresented. The survey 
planned for 2007 was delayed to summer 2008 due to the disturbances at the turn of 2007-
2008. Some of the large changes in the police index are probably due to changes in moni-
toring responsibilities for the matatu industry between the police and the Ministry of 
Transport. 
60  In the 2009 and 2010 it appears as if the prevalence definition used is changed from 
#bribes paid to institution/# respondents to # bribes paid to institution X/ #interactions 
with institution X Hence, we can’t compare the prevalence rates with regular victimisa-
tion rates later than to 2008. In the next section we are using the new definition of preva-
lence rates for the comparison of corruption levels across the East African countries. 
61  In the newest survey (TI Kenya, 2011) the police was again on the top in all the five coun-
tries. While still low it was now possible to make some statistics for Rwanda. While in 
2010 only 78 out of 4350 interactions with public organisations had given rise to a bribery 
situation, in 2011, 1 358 out of 6 954 interactions had done so. And the police was on the 
top where 21% of the interactions with the police had given rise to a bribery situation. 
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The most striking result from the 2010 survey was the remarkably low 
corruption rate in Rwanda in general and for the Rwandan police, in 
fact so low that no specific rates were published for Rwanda in TI-
Kenya (2010), only perception data. Such data is published in a sepa-
rate study on Rwanda (Transparency Rwanda, 2011) where it is re-
ported a prevalence rate of 6% according to the new definition (and 
2.0% according to the old definition, and the one used in most victimi-
sation surveys including ours).  
 
In the most recent survey of corruption in the East African countries 
(TI Kenya 2011) Rwanda this time had enough bribery observations to 
make some ranking of institutions possible. Corruption levels re-
mained much lower than in the other East African countries, however. 
Rwanda also displays some significant corruption when the public 
meets its police force, although also for this institution significantly 
less than what the citizens in the other countries are confronted with. 
The bribery prevalence (% of interactions with the institutions that 
resulted in a bribe demand) for Rwanda police was 21%, for Kenya 
45%, Uganda 57%, Tanzania 47% and Burundi 52%. In the 2011 East 
African the police were the most corrupt institution in all the countries 
in the survey, Rwanda included.  
 
One may wonder why the corruption levels are so much lower in 
Rwanda. The 2010 survey was really remarkable because it brings 
Rwanda close to OECD corruption rates. This makes it not only really 
different from its neighbours, but different from practically all other 
low income countries where we have data. It is so low that one may 
doubt the result to be trustworthy. Maybe it was caused by fear of the 
authorities, a fear that somewhat was abated by 2011? That may be 
part of the explanation, but outside visitors are also struck with the 
difference in observed police behaviour in Rwanda and Kenya.
62
 
 
We observe that the corruption prevalence in the police-citizens inter-
actions was slightly lower in in Kenya than in Tanzania which is the 
first survey that has had this result. This reflected quite new develop-
                                                 
Otherwise it was remarkable that the overall corruption measure in Uganda has increased 
significantly (but it is still below Burundi). Moreover, overall corruption in Kenya has 
dropped so it for the first time was below Tanzania. Whether this was real or due to the 
inherent variability in questionnaire comes, we cannot tell. It may also have been influ-
enced by the fact that Nairobi is really underrepresented in the 2011 survey with only 
8.4% of the respondents (against 12.2% in the 2010 survey). 
62  The experienced Daily Nation journalist Charles Onyango-Obbo, published an article 
where he analyses why the measures against drunk drivers had no effect in Nairobi. The 
immediate answer was that no one were caught by the police – and he continued: ‘For 
East Africans, a very good example of how to approach this business of ‘over-
drinking’ is to be found not too far away – in Rwanda….On Friday and Saturday nights, 
the Rwanda police throw a security blanket around Kigali. They set up roadblocks on eve-
ry path and road. ….because of low levels of corruption in Rwanda, when you are found 
to have drunk over the limit, you cannot bribe your way out’( The Daily Nation, July 27, 
2011). Incidentally, the article points out another serious consequence of police corruption 
– the number of deaths in traffic.  
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ments in corruption generally as recorded in this survey. While some 
of it may due to the fact that Nairobi was underrepresented in the 2011 
survey (8.4% against 12.2% of the respondents) and the corruption 
incidence tends to be higher in this city, as we have seen in the 
GJLOS survey. Again, the general fragility of survey results should 
make us careful in making any conclusion, but it is possible that cor-
ruption in Kenya experienced a slight decline while corruption in Tan-
zania is on the rise.  
 
The most important observation from these East African surveys from 
our point of view, however, is the low incidence of corruption in the 
Rwandan police. If only partially correct, it indicates the wide policy 
potential there may in fact be in Kenya too for reducing police corrup-
tion if only the political support for it is strong enough.  
Chapter 5. Plausibility ‘tests’ – some macro-consequences of 
the diverging survey results 
The wide variation in the survey results regarding both the police cor-
ruption and crime incidence raises a number of questions regarding 
the dimensions of the problems and their likely impact. What will the 
police earn from corruption if they rates are x or y, what do the public 
then have to pay when we know the total number of households and 
police? If the crime victimisation rates are z or w and we know the 
number of households, how many crimes are there then taking place in 
Kenya and how do the alternatives fit with the official crime statistics? 
Are crime rate z more reasonable than w if we know that the police 
corruption rate is y rather than x?  
 
The major intention of this section is not to make any precise esti-
mates, but more to see if we may restrict some of the variation in the 
victimisation data in a rough way when combining them with other 
measures that allow us to aggregate. This implies that it will suffice to 
work with rough approximations. In addition to the different crime 
victimisation and corruption rates we have used in the following, we 
will treat the following as stylised facts: 
 
 Kenya’s population: 40 million 
 Average household size: 5 
 Hence the # of households: 8 million 
 # of police officers: 80 00063  
 # of households per officer: 100 
                                                 
63  According to the Ransley commission (Republic of Kenya, 2009: 114) it was about 
70 000 police officers deployed in Kenya when we add officers in both the administration 
and the regular police. Assuming some growth we calculate with 80 000 officers. The lat-
ter is also chosen to allow us to stick with whole numbers 
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 # crimes reported to the police per year(official crime statistics): 
80 00064 
 Average bribe size paid to the police: 2 000 Ksh65  
 Gross pay for new police constable: 21 000Ksh per month66 67 
5.1 Crime rates and police capabilities 
We immediately note that according to these stylised numbers each 
police officer makes only one ‘successful’ crime report per year. This 
will make for a rather easy police officer life even if not all officers 
are on the beat, as we implicitly assume in the following. Only one of 
hundred household will ‘succeed’ in reporting a crime that will be reg-
istered. That is, the registered household crime victimisation rate will 
be 1% or less. Some crime will be directed against private enterprises 
or public organisations. How does this 1% max fit in with the various 
crime-victimisation data we have presented in Chapter 3? 
 
 It does not fit at all. According to the GJLOS survey, that reports the 
lowest crime rate among the surveys presented, the victimisation rate 
is around 16%, that is, if the respondents truly report each crime inci-
dent, only one of sixteen incidences will be registered by the police. 
On the other hand, if not registered, but somehow brought forth to a 
police officer, he/she has on average 16 incidents to consider per year, 
but only one of those will the police officer or rather his police station 
bring all the way forth so it registered in the official crime statistics. 68 
 
The UNODC survey presents, as we recall, a much higher crime rate. 
According to it almost 40 (38.4) of 100 households experience at least 
one crime event during a year. Then each police officer, given our as-
sumptions, would need to handle 40 crime cases, but only report 1, 
                                                 
64  The actual number is closer to 70 000, but varies between 80 000 to 70 000. See, for ex-
ample, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2011: 47), KNBS’s web site visited Septem-
ber 12, 2011.  
65  About 21 US $ at present (September 13, 2011) exchange rate. 
66  Maximum pay for a constable is 33 000Ksh per month while the gross salaries for a sen-
ior sergeant may reach 50 000 all as of the beginning of 2011 (Luvei Times, posted July 
18, 2010). The salary rates indicate that the economic value of a single average bribe for 
the primary collector to be around 10% of a month’s salary. We assume that most of the 
bribe collectors are of a lower rank. Presumable they would have to share the bribe with 
superior officers, however. Note that teachers on average have a lower pay 13 795 for 
primary school teachers after a pay rise also taken place at about the same time, late au-
tumn 2010 (The Sunday Nation, November 14, 2010.) Education levels among teachers 
are similar or higher than police officers, so low pay for the police is not an explanation of 
corruption that should be blindly accepted. That said, the rotation policy in the police 
force most police officers to organise two households. Hence, they will need a higher in-
come stream to keep the same consumption level as a non-rotating teacher.  
67  The actual average for the bribe size as registered in TI-Kenya’s surveys for 2001 t0 2010 
when we delete the exceptional year 2010 (when it was more than 10 000shilling) was ac-
tually 1801 Ksh,, but given the Kenyan inflation rate 2000 KSH may actually be in the 
lower end. 
68  It is obvious that only a fraction of what is reported in the police stations’ ‘Occurrence 
Books’ reach the official crime statistics. If researchers were given access of samples of 
these books, it is likely that it would be possible to get a much more precise view of the 
crime picture and the crime registration process in Kenya.  
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that is only 2.5% of the crimes would be registered. The Afro barome-
ter indicates even higher crime levels – a reasonable interpretation of 
the results from the round 2 survey could suggest more than one crime 
experience per household.69 If so, each police officer had, of course, to 
handle 100 crime cases a year, given that all were reported. All but 
one would then somehow be treated in ways that let it fall outside the 
official crime register. 
 
The police are not the only agent that ration crime information and 
prevents it reaching the official crime statistics. Households do so too. 
They only report a fraction of the crimes they experience. How large 
is this fraction? Among the surveys only the UNDOC presents the 
crime victims’ reporting percentages. The survey does not present any 
aggregate rate, but only rates for the single type of crime ranging from 
close to 100% (car theft) to close to 1% (corruption). For the kind of 
crimes we are mainly considering here – serious, but still everyday 
forms of crime such as burglary, robbery, regular theft, and assault – 
the reporting rate ranges from about 10% to 40 %. As a reasonable 
aggregate reporting rate for these kinds of crime we choose 25%, that 
is, households report about one of every four crime experiences they 
become exposed to. Let us then assume that the police ration away 
crime information with about the same rate as households. If they do, 
only ¼* ¼ =1/16 of the experienced crimes will be registered. We 
here see that the official crime rate fits very nicely with the reported 
crime rate in the GJLOS survey. On the other hand, the results from 
the UNODC survey appear to us at least as plausible as the GJLOS 
one. If the UNODC results are the ‘true one’, and the household re-
porting rate is 25%, ten reported crimes reach each police officer a 
year and in order to reach the ’output’ of one registered crime per po-
lice officer he has to ‘kill’ 9/10th of the crime information that reaches 
him.  
 
 While we may have some empirical information about the house-
holds’ crime reporting rates we have no evidence at all about the in-
formation rationing rates – the share of crime reports received from 
the public that the street police officer send upwards, the police station 
commander decide to investigate, and the share of investigated cases 
sent to the court. Here we simply have to play around with arbitrary 
assumptions; but note that we may have a multiplicative structure also 
                                                 
69  The Afro barometer’s crime incident measure listed up only two forms of crime: ‘how 
often anything stolen from the house’ and how often physically attack’ with answer alter-
natives, ‘one or twice’, ‘several times’ and ‘always’. When adding those one gets around 
40% of the respondents a little above and under in the various rounds). Interpreting the 
answers literally (although one may wonder what ‘always’ may mean in the context), a 
reasonable average would mean about twice crime incident per confirming household, i.e. 
on average 80 crime incidents a year among a sample of 100 households, and again a 
quite busy police. Looked at this way, we believe this to give a too high crime incidence, 
however.  
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inside the police that may determines the final official crime rate, 
mainly determined by the processing of information at the individual 
police stations, not the single officer. With only one hierarchical level 
that destroy information in the same rate (3/4
th
) as the preceding one, 
only 1.5% of the experienced crimes should reach the official crime 
statistics, and we are now around the Afro barometer’s crime rate as 
the one most compatible with the official crime statistics. Hence, we 
see that without getting to know more about the whole crime registra-
tion process, we are unable to decide whether the official crime statis-
tics may give us some additional information about the crime state in 
Kenya. 
 
A multiplicative structure implies that an unexplained variation in ei-
ther the households’ or the police’s reporting rates may cause large 
variation in the official crime rate. The latter is rather stable, however, 
which suggests that some ex post adjustments are taken place at the 
final stage of registration.  
 
An additional issue here is how compatible the reported crime rates 
are with households’ reported experience with police corruption, the 
police corruption rate? As will be clear from our mini cases presented 
later, bargaining between the police officer and the victim about 
whether to register and then to investigate a crime takes place where a 
bribe will often be a precondition for both. While a crime is a potential 
source for bribe income, it is not the only one, so we may not expect 
any one-to-one correspondence between crime rates a police corrup-
tion rates. 
 
In our own survey we asked the officers how many crimes they regis-
ter per week. The question appeared to be not sufficiently specific, so 
it was sometimes interpreted as the one the officer in question brought 
up, sometimes the number of crimes registered at the police station in 
question so the number ranged from 1 to 1000 with an average of 
about 78. If all this reflected a crime and assume that the numbers giv-
en was for the police station mainly, and we assume this number to be 
typical for the about 220 stations for the regular police we will get 
around 880 000 crimes registered per year, around two per month for 
each officer. 
5.2 Household-exposed police bribing/extortion rates  
Let us begin with the GJLOS survey. We recall that the aggregate 
bribery percentage was 12%, that is, out of 100 households 12 will 
pay a bribe. We further argued that about half of those would go to a 
policing institution. This implies that if the police would have no other 
bribe collection possibilities, the average police officer would collect 
6 bribes a year, each worth 2000 Ksh, that is, the average police of-
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ficer will earn less than half of a month’s salary extra through bribes.70 
If we compare that with the same survey’s crime rate they appear 
compatible. If the police only receive a bribe for an (informally regis-
tered crime, each officer would receive 4 bribes a year and 8000 Ksh. 
If some of the bribes received are not related to crime acts, we should 
be fairly close to a consistent picture of a modest police corruption.71 
Let us on the other hand assume – rather unrealistically – that all 
crime acts give rise to a bribe paid to the police, then each police of-
ficer could collect 16x 2 000Ksh = 32 000 Ksh a year (about 1.5 
months’ salary) and the total cost for society would be about 27 mil-
lion US$. 
 
Again these GJLOS rates are likely to be too low.72 Let us then look at 
an outlier in the other direction TI Kenya, 2002 where 70 % of the 
households paid a bribe to the police. If true, each police officer would 
gain 140 000 Ksh extra a year, close to half a year’s salary extra 
through bribes (and the direct extra cost to society would be close to 
120 million US $, a significant cost for a country at Kenya’s GDP lev-
el. Finally, we may consider the more realistic Afro barometer esti-
mates around a police bribing rate about 27 % (see our table 2). Then 
each police officer will gain 54 000Ksh during a year, about two 
months’ salary (and aggregate costs about 45 million US$). If the re-
porting rate of crime is 25% for the Afro barometer respondents (like 
the UNODC ones), the aggregate crime rate would be about 100 for 
100 households and only reported crimes give rise to a bribe, the po-
lice bribe rates would be compatible with the reported crime rates. Or 
we may consider the reported crime rates in the Afro barometer sur-
veys for one reason or another to be unrealistically high but believe in 
their police corruption rate that together with the UNODC crime rate 
under the assumptions that each crime experience give rise to one po-
lice bribe event, appear quite compatible. 
 
We could play around with other assumptions. For example, we may 
assume that only about 1/3 of the police may be in a position to collect 
bribes and be willing to do so. Hence each corrupt police may now 
feed on 300 households. In the most corrupt high corrupt situation 
                                                 
70  With 80 000 police officers the extra direct cost for Kenyans would be in the aggregate be 
a modest 1.7 million US$. 
71  We note from the UNODC survey that only one of four bribes were likely to be connected 
to a crime, since most payments were due to random inspections. If so, the picture chang-
es and the bribe earnings of the police may be much higher. In our survey about 50% was 
due to such inspections (combined with incarceration and subsequent extortion).  
72  In fact, we have only found one study from African countries that reports as low corrup-
tion rates as GJLOS, namely the so called 1-2-3 studies that are based on large scale sur-
veys from Francophone Africa using their official Central Bureaux of Statistics’ sampling 
frames (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2006 a, 2006b). they also get very low bribe rates 
in countries that otherwise got similarly high rates as Kenya. Having extra-large samples 
like GJLOS and using better sampling design than most NGO sponsored surveys, the 
‘true’ bribe rates may either be lower than commonly found or their size and official 
‘look’ may have scared respondents to shy away from truthful responses. 
Cops and Crime in Kenya   47 
 
47 
each corrupt police may now be able to collect 210 bribes (TI-Kenya, 
2002), 75 (Afro barometer) or 18 (GJLOS). If the first is true then the 
corrupt police will be able to add 420 000 in bribes a year, more than a 
year’s salary. Needless to add the income collected needed to be 
shared with the police officials who are not in a position to collect.73  
 
As we will see in part B of this paper, it appears in our small study 
that crime experiences and crime reporting give rise to a smaller share 
of the police corrupt collection events than we originally believed. 
Hence, there may be less tight connection between the number of 
crime events and police corruption acts than we held in our priors. 
While crime registering rely more on the public’s reporting acts than 
the police’s actions, the number of bribes or rather the frequency of 
extortive acts relies more on the police’s own active scanning of its 
environment. The UNDP study supports this observation. Here only 
one of four bribes was likely to be connected to a crime, since most 
payments were due to random inspections. If so, the picture changes 
and the bribe earnings of the police may be much higher. In our sur-
vey about 50% was due to such inspections (combined with incarcera-
tion and subsequent extortion). If we take the UNDP starting point and 
keep the assumption of only about 1/3 of the police are potential bribe 
collectors, each collector will take care of 840 bribes a year and col-
lect close to 1.7 million in bribes. A corrupt police officer will in that 
case be exceptionally busy, 
 
So far we have assumed that all (the 1/3) police officers who are in 
position to collect bribes do so. That is not likely. In our own survey 
about 45% admitted that they had received a bribe. If we stick to the 
assumptions that on any given point of time only 1/3 of the police 
force is in a position to collect bribes (but all have once been in that 
position) 15% of the police force is collecting bribes. Now each would 
collect more 1 900 bribes and more than 3.5 million Ksh. – this ap-
pears not realistic at all since it implies that each active bribe collect-
ing police officer has to collect 9.5 bribes each working day. This may 
be possible for officers working in the traffic police, but not else-
where. 
 
Some of the assumptions used to reach this result would have to be 
changed, but we will not pursue that matter here. The main point is 
that when we aggregate information of this kind, we may discover that 
                                                 
73  Such structure was revealed recently when a policeman stationed at Parklands station in 
Nairobi – a well-off neighbourhood – shot his boss and then committed suicide. The rea-
son was that he had paid the superior officer to be on duty for a week inside a casino 
where customer tips and management bribes were substantial. (The latter could be around 
1000 -3000Ksh a night. Then the commanding officer had broken the deal and stationed 
him outside the casino where practically nothing could be earned on the side at the same 
time as he had kept the bribe the constable had paid him and refused to return it (The Dai-
ly Nation, May 28, 2011).  
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some combination of results may appear implausible, even incon-
sistent while the intuition about the single result in isolation may be 
completely missing. Hence we may gain additional insight into what 
the data may tell us through their combination and aggregation. 
5.3 The variability of outcomes and the usefulness of reported  
respondents’ experiences 
We have already observed that the questionnaire- based approach to 
the study of crime and police corruption in Kenya has produced so 
large variation in results, that it becomes difficult to trust the single 
survey: If we at the outset knew nothing about the incidence of police 
corruption and crime as experienced by individual respondents and 
therefore held priors ranging between 0 and 100% with respect to 
both, the range after having studied them through the different victim-
isation surveys reported is only restricted to be somewhere between 
6% (maybe only 4%) and 70% for police corruption, and between 
16% and 100% for regular crime rates. It is not difficult to make new 
surveys, as we have done, that will be reach results inside this cone. 
 
If we have any intuition about how frequent households experience 
crime compared to police corruption, the ratio of ( # police corruption 
incidents) / (# crime experiences), we may compare that with the vari-
ous outcomes from the surveys. We see that it may range between 4.4 
and 0.06 if we allow comparing the crime and corruption rates from 
all the surveys. Do we believe that a typical Kenyan household expe-
riences more frequently a police- or a regular crime? If we only allow 
comparing that rate with crime and corruption rates from the same 
survey, however, only the Afro barometer, UNODC and the GJLOS 
survey have data from both. Here the Afro barometer outcomes 
rounds will be in the range 0.5 to 0.25 and the GJLOS ones between 
0.35 to 0.25. The UNODC fraction varies strongly with which corrup-
tion definition pertaining to the police. With inspections excluded, the 
rate is around 0.18. When they are included it is close to 0.78.  
 
We will have these rates in mind when analysing the results from our 
own small survey. The incidences of police corruption in that were too 
many to fit in with the GJLOS, but correspond better with the Afro 
barometer and UNODC ones.  
 
While the large variation in outcomes was a major motivation for our 
own try to find out what we could actually ‘find out there’, it also 
gives reason for pessimism: how could our results become any closer 
to the actual crime and police corruption experiences than the existing 
victimization studies? Our sample is smaller and we will break more 
statistical rules for proper sampling procedures than any of the report-
ed studies. But we have done it, have done our own recording of how 
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our citizen respondents have experienced the crime and the police’s 
bribe collection and extortion in their neighbourhood, and the police’s 
beliefs about these neighbourhood; and their beliefs about the local 
citizens beliefs about them. Hence, we consider our survey less as a 
quantitative survey and more like ten mini case explorations assisted 
by pre-made questions needed to get information fast enough. Speed 
was essential given our arrangements with the police. 
Part B: Report from a questionnaire-
based visit to ten Kenyan police  
stations with surroundings 
In this part we will present our own empirical findings. We will first 
present our procedure and methodology. It will be obvious from our 
presentation that we can make no claims to base our results on repre-
sentative random samples of either the Kenyan police or the Kenyan 
population. Nevertheless, we find it of interest first to present some of 
our observations from our whole population of respondents of about 
50 police officers and 250 community members74 before we discuss 
the observations from the separate stations/communities, our mini 
cases. The latter also presents information of more subjective and con-
textual nature. 
Chapter 1. Methodology and procedures  
The basic idea behind the empirical part of our investigation is to col-
lect information from the police with their experiences of working 
conditions, crime and communities jointly with the communities’ ex-
periences and beliefs about the same crime events, in addition to their 
experiences and beliefs about their local police. 
1.1 Practical organization 
The field work was a very low cost venture. This was mainly due to a 
lack of funds, but also due to a belief that it would be easier to get 
honest information if every stage of the procedure reflected the low 
budget. Nevertheless, lack of funds was one major constraint on the 
sample sizes. Another restraint that in fact dictated our whole ap-
                                                 
74  In one case 24 members of a youth organization were gathered in the same room where 
the participants filled in our community form (cf. Appendix 2) on their own under some 
guidance from the interviewers, us. Naturally in the context they shared questions and an-
swers, and the statistical ideal of considering each response as stochastically independent 
of the others was even more fragrantly violated for this group of respondents than the oth-
ers. Not satisfied with this, we compensated with doing a snowballing survey with 25 re-
spondents from the same community. Nevertheless the classroom survey responses added 
to our information about the community’s experience with crime and police corruption, so 
in Bayesian spirit it would be a waste not to use this information at all. Hence we have 
sometimes included, sometimes left out this group’s information. In another violation of 
our main procedure, we were unable to collect information from community members 
around a police station in a well-off district in Nairobi, but we kept the information from 
its officers. Hence, the community responses remained around 250 and the police officers 
around 50. 
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proach was due to the difficulty in getting access to the police stations 
and interview police officers and with the speed this had to be done.75 
 
The procedure: After some efforts we were finally given access to ten 
police stations through the Commissioner’s office. A message was 
sent out from that office through the police’s own commando line to 
the heads of the ten police stations that they should welcome us and 
that we should be allowed to interview five police officers. The police 
questionnaire was given to the commissioner’s office, approved there 
and then sent to the ten station commanders of the police stations cho-
sen by us. The station commanders then knew the content of the ques-
tionnaire before we arrived. The command from the Commissioner’s 
office specified date and hour of our arrival. If we did not arrive in 
time the local commander was not obliged to allow his officers to be 
interviewed by us. We were allowed to interview five officers at each 
station. Thus we had to arrive at nine o’clock in the morning at ten 
different stations ten days in a row, July 12 -21, 2010. This forced us 
to make the interviews of the police before lunch and the interviews 
with the citizens after lunch, but we had to finish the interviews with 
them the same day.  
 
This restraint combined with the fact that we were only a small group 
of interviewers put an effective roof on the possible sample size to 25 
at each citizen group. Moreover, the respondents had to be available at 
the same location. This made of course any pretense of random sam-
pling impossible, but we made considerable efforts – with the excep-
tion mentioned above – to make both the citizen and police respond-
ents to answer the questions independently of each other. 
 
The police stations were located in Nairobi, Central, Coast, Nyanza 
and Western provinces; two in each with one rural and one urban lo-
cated station in each province except for Nairobi where we had sam-
pled one station responsible for a slum area,76 and one responsible for 
a higher income area. The sampling unit of our investigation was then 
in fact the police station rather than the citizen respondent. 
 
The research/interview team: Most of the interviews were made by a 
group of five people, three men and two women ranging in age be-
                                                 
75  We recall that Ngugi et al (2004) had not been granted access to police stations in their 
much larger survey on security and crime in Nairobi. 
76  The interview data from this police station proved useless for any shedding of light on the 
slum community since it was only nominally in charge of the policing of the area. That 
was in fact mainly done by an Administration Police station where we had no access. The 
regular police were only contacted in serious crime cases. These interview data have not 
been deleted either, since they add to our description of the police. When the citizen re-
spondents from this area reports on police experience it will in most cases refer to meet-
ings with the Administration Police. We have not separated out these responses in our re-
port of aggregates, assuming that the behavior of the Administration Police will not be 
that different. Moreover, the respondents also in the other cases when asked about police 
behavior will not distinguish between these two police organizations themselves. 
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tween the early sixties and the late twenties. Two were members of 
the suit, two of the jeans brigade, with one in between. Three were 
Luhyas, one Embu and one Norwegian.77 The overall interview group 
was headed by Tiberius Barasa, Africa Public Policy Institute. When 
the group had to split up for logistical reasons, Aggrey Mutimba led 
the interviewers that went to the Western and Nyanza provinces. The 
advantage of having such a small group was that the researchers were 
directly involved in the interview process and would participate in the 
daily debriefing. 
 
The questionnaires: The police questionnaire was basically plain and 
logically unidirectional78 while the citizen questionnaire was more 
logically complex and had a tree structure. There were basically two 
forks in the tree. One question was (somewhat simplified) had you 
experienced a crime during the last two years? If ‘yes’, – a battery of 
questions were introduced that inter alia contained questions about 
possible interactions with the police. If ‘no’, one jumped to the next 
set of questions that dealt with possible bribe-paying with the police. 
Here it was the same: if ‘yes’ – a new battery of questions were intro-
duced, if ‘no’, another jump. Given the severe time constrains it was 
tempting to accept a no-question since it reduced the amount neces-
sary to spend on the respondent. 
 
If one for some reason or another one prematurely got into the ‘no’-
fork, substantial amount of information could be lost. This proved to 
become particularly a problem with the initial police bribe question 
that defined this fork. Given its location in the question sequence after 
the crime questions both the interviewer and the respondent became 
focused on the link between crime, crime reporting and police bribes, 
so many first answered ‘no’ if they had paid bribes that were uncon-
                                                 
77  This team information may appear superfluous, but it is our belief that the results of sur-
veys exploring sensitive, but slow to change issues somehow are likely to be more influ-
enced by factors like this than is often recognized. Otherwise it is difficult to explain such 
large variation in the reported outcomes of large samples- surveys meticulously planned 
and executed. The mechanism producing it is probably explained by the fact that respond-
ents are not simply answering the questions they are confronted with, but to the simulta-
neous occurrence of a question and a social situation defined by the interviewer and 
his/her organization. Part of the social situation is the characteristics of the interviewers, 
but this is of course not all. Azfar and Murrell (2009) have analyzed the consequences 
when a subset of respondents doesn’t answer candidly on sensitive questions and how to 
discover and correct for it. We return to it when presenting our questionnaire. Altogether 
this implies that the assumption of stochastic independence between the responses used to 
determine statistical significance and optimal sample size will not generally hold. In our 
case it was, for example, striking that the female interviewers reported much more fre-
quently larger sexual harassment crimes (since their respondents did so) than the male in-
terviewers. While maybe not reflected in the tables, but certainly in our qualitative inter-
pretations it was striking that our Embu colleague was much better in analyzing the re-
sults at our debriefing meetings after finishing our interviews in the Central Province than 
the rest of us, as she knew the local language and probably more of the other cultural 
codes helpful for their understanding. 
78  The police questionnaire was made in a hurry by Andvig and Barasa while the community 
questionnaire was inspired by International Crime Victimisation Surveys (van Dijk, 2008) 
and had contributions by Amit Shrivastava and the deceased Omar Azfar. 
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nected to any crime experience. This made for substantial underreport-
ing of the bribe paying at first. After a while it became evident that a 
large share of those bribes was forms of petty extortion unconnected 
to any crime experience. The interviewers started to probe this issue 
after a while, but there was no possibility of redoing the early inter-
views. 
 
We made a feeble and simplistic attempt to apply the Azfar and Mur-
rell (2009) method of dividing respondents into a candid and non-
candid group by asking the respondent about whether she/he has ever 
done anything criminal in their life, knowing that most people have 
done so. The no- answer may then be interpreted as an indication of 
non-candidness. But the question did not function at all since the re-
spondents were thinking of serious crime and practically all answered 
no. Given our time-restraints it was in practice impossible to imple-
ment the method in the recommended way.79 
 
Ethical considerations: One underlying motivation for the investiga-
tion has been to contribute to on-going efforts to improve the policing 
in a country where it has contributed to much misery. From that per-
spective it might prove helpful to publish the police stations surveyed, 
but we have considered anonymity to be an overriding concern: no 
single person should be harmed directly as an individual from this 
project so have chosen not to name the police stations in our commu-
nity-wise presentations although we don’t believe we present infor-
mation of that harmful kind. Since we lack sufficient oversight of the 
police commanders’ situation we don’t know that for sure, however, 
and we will delay such publishing till we have received permission 
from them. In our presentation of the aggregate data, we don’t consid-
er this a problem, however. 
 
The anonymity of the single citizen respondent’s answers has also 
been an important concern, but it has been easier to ensure that and we 
don’t believe this to have been a problem here. 
 
Although the citizen respondents have spent time and efforts to re-
spond to our questions, we considered unethical to hand out any mate-
rial incentives. We considered that essential in order to keep our im-
age (and reality) as a low cost project with committed researchers, try-
                                                 
79  To implement Azfar and Murrell (2009) in the way intended, we would have had to add a 
mix of sensitive and non-sensitive questions unrelated to our direct interests and where 
the compromising outcome would either be due to a random ‘head’ or a revelation, and 
the uncompromising outcome could either be due to a random ‘tail’ or a deliberate non-
revelation answer. The idea is that respondents that report too large difference in the 
number of heads and tails for sensitive and non-sensitive questions are likely to hold back 
also when they are asked about whether they have paid a bribe or not and are stochastical-
ly more likely to be reticent. To do so in our case would have made it too time-consuming 
to go through a questionnaire given our daily time restraints.  
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ing to create an atmosphere where we were together about understand-
ing a set of problems most citizens have come across and would like 
to rectify. We promised to report back to each community and police 
station when this report was finished. The only ‘reward’ we distribut-
ed at warm days was a bottle of mineral water.  
 
Although the final sponsor of the project is the Norwegian Research 
Council, the research has been performed by a Kenyan organization, 
Centre for Policy Research, which is the one that received the research 
permit from the Commissioner’s office. Hence, all the primary data 
such as the filled-in questionnaires, belongs to that institution and are 
kept in Kenya.  
 
The rights to academic publication of the results, however, belong to 
the individual researchers. 
Chapter 2. Observation aggregates. The police survey 
As indicated before we will present the respondents responses in two 
ways. In the first two chapters we present the results for the whole 
group of police respondents and the whole group of citizen respond-
ents. In the following chapter we present them in police station – 
community clusters, but here we will make the responses associated 
with the single police station anonymous. Let us first present the loca-
tions: 
 
Table 3: Province and Police Stations80 
Province Police Station Frequency Male Female 
Nairobi Kilimani 5 4 1 
Gigiri 5 2 3 
Central Thika 5 3 2 
Kahuro 5 3 2 
Coast Likoni 5 4 1 
Makupa 5 3 2 
Nyanza Kisumu 5 4 1 
Ukwala 5 2 3 
Western Busia 5 4 1 
Nambale 5 5 0 
Total  50 35 15 
Percentage  100 70.0 30.0 
 
                                                 
80  In this draft we have kept the police data from Gigiri, although we have no community 
results. Being a well-off area it is more difficult to get a sample of respondents willing to 
answer questionnaires. 
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2.1 The police officers  
Here we note some of the characteristics of this sample of officers – 
ranks, living conditions, etc.; and some of their beliefs about their 
work and their community. We see already from table 3 that 30% of 
the officers selected were women. In one, very small police station, 
we were unable to interview any, despite our efforts to interview at 
least one female officer at each station. No one was at duty that day. 
Note that some of the statistical measures are kept in the tables even if 
they have no statistical significance and little statistical interest. When 
kept, it is just to reduce the editing efforts at this stage. Many tables 
will be deleted when this work leaves the report stage. 
 
Table 4: Marital Status 
Marital status Freq. Percent 
Married 43 86.0 
Single 7 14.0 
Total 50 100 
 
 
Table 5: No. of Police officers children, wives and people in the 
household 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
No. of children 48 2.29 1.58 0 7 
No. of people in 
the household 49 4.92 2.76 0 15 
No. of wives 35 1 0.34 0 2 
 
43 of the 50 officers were married. On average their households had 
almost five members including two children, indicating that most of-
ficers lived in ‘modern’ nuclear family structures. No one reported to 
have more than one wife. On the other hand they reported that on av-
erage more than eight people were dependent on their salary.  
 
Their ethnic background is spelled out in the Table 6 below: 
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Table 6: Ethnic Background 
 
Ethnic Freq. Percent 
Kikuyu 12 25.0 
Kalenjin 7 14.6 
Kamba 5 10.4 
Luhya 5 10.4 
Luo 5 10.4 
Kisii 2 4.2 
Mbeere 2 4.2 
Mijikenda 2 4.2 
Nandi81 2 4.2 
Borana 1 2.1 
Digo 1 2.1 
Meru 1 2.1 
Rift Valley 1 2.1 
Sabaot 1 2.1 
Teso 1 2.1 
Total 48 100 
 
We note that this appears quite representative for the ethnic composi-
tion of Kenya at large, maybe with a slight underrepresentation of 
Luhyas and Luos. Given our method of selecting police officers for 
interviewing, it is difficult to tell whether this is the situation for the 
Kenyan police force at large, but if it is representative, it is not ethni-
cally skewed as it was in the 1950s as described by Throup (1992). 
Even if representative, it doesn’t imply that the Kenyan police have 
left the old British colonial maxim of letting strangers police the 
strangers. They may follow a policy that they deliberately transfers 
police officers to stay in areas where a different ethnic group than 
their own is the dominant one.82 – We will explore this further when 
we look at the police station – community clusters.  
 
But here we may note that 35 of the 49 officers who had answered the 
question lived in a government house, most (34) living in single 
rooms. This indicates that the majority lives away from home and may 
be policing an area where the majority belongs to an ethnic communi-
ty different from their own. Moreover, it may also be relevant, that the 
average number of transfers among our stock of police officers is 
around 5.5. Each had only received one promotion on average, how-
ever during their average employment period as a police officer of 
                                                 
81  Note that two of the respondents consider themselves Nandi. For many political purposes 
Nandi is considered as a sub-group of Kalenjin and will be considered as such. 
82  Even if a majority is ethnically a ‘stranger’, some are likely to be local for intelligence 
and possibly investigation (CID). But for arrests a ‘stranger’ should be preferred if harsh-
ness is sought. 
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about 8 years. The latter is ranging between 2 and 34 years. Hence, 
police officers appear to stay in their profession, but to be transferred 
quite often, but rarely promoted. 
 
The average age of the officers was 36.5 years. Their branch composi-
tion and rank distribution are indicated in Table 7 and 8 below. 
 
Table 7: Officers’ Branch Composition 
Unit Freq. Per cent 
General Duty 19 38.8 
Investigation 5 10.2 
Crime Branch 13 26.5 
Records 2 4.1 
Traffic 4 8.2 
Gender 2 4.1 
Signals 1 2.0 
Others 3 6.1 
Total 49 100 
 
Table 8: Officers’ Rank Distribution 
Rank Freq. Per cent 
Constable 27 55.1 
Corporal 17 34.7 
Sergeant 3 6.1 
Inspector 2 4.1 
Total 49 100 
 
Both the branches where the officers in our sample were working and 
their rank distribution may have been influenced by our wish to be 
able to interview officers who were ‘going the beat’ or in other ways 
had fairly extensive interactions with their communities. The average 
monthly income of the officers was 17 500KSh,83 while their monthly 
expenses were on average 18 000KSh. This difference could of course 
be explained by eventual bribe income inadvertently admitted84, but it 
might as well be due to the fact that at least 14 officers had regular 
outside income (8 from farming, 6 from business). The living standard 
among the officers appears modest, however. Almost half their salary 
was spent on food (and 14% on medical care). The police officers’ 
income was somewhat above the average of the households in the 
                                                 
83  This income was reported before the significant wage raise police officers received late 
2010. Our estimate of their salary compared to possible bribe income we made in chapter 
5, however, was based on post- raise salaries.  
84  We recall that based on the GJLOS survey we estimated that the average bribe income for 
the police could be 8 000Ksh a year that is a monthly average slightly above 650Ksh, i.e. 
Not far away from the 500 that expenses exceeded salary. 
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communities they were guarding according to our community sample. 
This was about 11 400Ksh per month. The community members also 
spent about half of their income on food.85  
 
The motivation for staying in the force appears as rather pragmatic 
and dominated by their salaries, as we read from Table 9 below. 
 
Table 9: Reasons for staying in the force 
Motivation Freq. Per cent 
Challenges in the force 2 4.2 
Unemployment 9 18.8 
Other reasons 10 20.8 
Source of livelihood/welfare 21 43.8 
An opportunity to interact with the community 6 12.5 
Total 48 100 
 
We see that only 8 (2+6) out of 48 give any task-committed reason, 
the rest of the 30 who had specified any motive, mention the income 
received from their job and their fear of losing it if unemployed as 
their major motivation. On the other hand only 7 officers considered 
their lack of motivation (including perceived poor salary) as any re-
straint on their doing their job. 
 
Looking at the economic side of motivation, the infrequent number of 
promotions (one on average) is one negative factor undermining task 
commitment motivation. In addition to promotions both the short- 
term postings of officers by the commanding officer at the station and 
the long run aspects of postings –the station to be allocated to – are 
obviously important for the welfare of the officers as well as for even-
tual corruption structures internal to the police, as illustrated with the 
tragic story told by Daily Nation from the Parklands Police Station 
(see footnote 73). We could not delve much into these structures here 
partly because our focus has been on the direct interactions between 
the public and the police, partly because questionnaires are not the 
best method to reveal such structures, and partly for research diplo-
matic reasons. Questions here might soon have proved too sensitive 
for allowing the Commissioner’s office to give us any research per-
mission.  
 
Only three questions touched upon the issue of whether some illegiti-
mate factors may be shaping the organisational structure of the police. 
One asked whether the officer had a ‘relative’ working in the police 
force. The presumption was that if an officer had a relative, his or her 
                                                 
85  The average of our respondents’ individual income was much below this as a quarter of 
them were either students or unemployed, but they were surprisingly willing to inform 
about their household’s aggregate income and seemingly precise when doing so. 
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employment, posting or promotion might have been influenced by this 
fact, but this was obviously only a possibility. Only three officers ad-
mitted that they had received such assistance when they got employed. 
To establish such impacts on promotions and postings a lot more 
probing had to be done than we could possibly do. I9 of the 47 of the 
officers who answered this question reported that they had in fact a 
relative in the Kenya Police Force. Some had several. A question that 
may suggest illegitimate political influence, but only vaguely so, was 
the following one: ‘Have you ever been compelled to attend cases by 
people who somehow can support you?’ Seven of 45 told that they 
had been compelled this way and 11 of 47 confirmed that they had felt 
pressured to take a statement from such a person.  
 
At the more positive end of police’s organization was that most offic-
ers claimed that on the whole they were satisfied with their postings 
(90%) and their commanding officer.86 Moreover most officers have 
received training fairly. Apparently more officers had received train-
ing recently than officers used to do before. During the three years 
2008 – 2010, our group of 50 officers had received 29 training ses-
sions while in the 17 years 1990 – 2007, they had only received 13 
training sessions.87 Most considered the training useful (90%) when 
directly asked. The key police organisational problem mentioned was 
not the lack of training, but the lack of equipment. When asked direct-
ly whether the officer had ‘the necessary facilities or equipment re-
quired for your job?’ 43 out of 50 answered that they had not. When 
asked to compare their task-solving constraints in a more general way, 
it remained the key issue: 
 
Table 10: Factors constraining officers from serving the commu-
nity better 
Factors Freq. Per cent 
Lack of equipment/facilities 32 69.6 
Lack of staff morale/poor salary 7 15.2 
Language barrier 2 4.3 
Other reasons 4 8.7 
Distorted image of the police force 1 2.2 
Total 46 100 
 
                                                 
86  Needless to explain these are extremely sensitive questions in such a heavily centralised 
organisation as Kenya’s police force. Although we got some secluded space when doing 
the interviewing, risks of being overheard were not completely absent. Nor could the of-
ficers be absolutely certain that we would not inform their superiors despite our assuranc-
es to the contrary. So sincere answering here could not always be expected, if the officers 
in fact felt there were any major problem with these questions. 
87  This cannot be explained by any recent surge in recruitment. Only two officers were re-
cruited in 2008 or later. 
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We note that only two officers mention language barrier as a cause. 
When the respondents’ attention is directed to some major but some-
what more specified tasks, this impression is modified. 
2. 2. The police and the community: Communication when making 
statements  
To take a statement from a citizen is often a major stage in any crime 
investigation. Here the lack of equipment receded into the background 
as major problem: 
 
Table 11: Problems encountered while taking a statement 
 
Problems Freq. Per cent 
Lack of adequate space 2 4.2 
Communication barrier 32 66.7 
Ignorance/fixed mind 2 4.2 
Lack of equipment 2 4.2 
Lack of cooperation 5 10.4 
No challenge 1 2.1 
Other 4 8.3 
Total 48 100 
 
Here we see that communication barriers are listed as the main cause 
in making recording of statements difficult. If we add the five officers 
that mentioned lack of cooperation, we see that altogether 37 of the 48 
officers mention communication difficulties as the key problem in this 
form of task solving and only four mention material restraints. This 
would of course look different if we had asked about restraints in ar-
rest-making or crime scene investigations, but it indicates that com-
munication problems are key factors in Kenyan police efficiency. 
When asked the more difficult question about the reasons why the 
problems about receiving statements were encountered, the response 
rate went down to the half – only 24 answered the question, and we 
got the following distribution: 
 
Table 12: Explanations of the problems encountered 
 
Explanation Freq. Percent 
Lack of enough materials 3 12.5 
Lack of education 4 16.7 
Lack of communication/can’t speak English/Kiswahili 12 50.0 
No challenge 1 4.2 
Fear of giving information 4 16.7 
Total 24 100 
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If we add the half of the respondents who mentioned ‘lack of commu-
nication/can’t speak English/Kiswahili’ with ‘lack of education’ we 
find that two-thirds of the respondents focused on a missing ability to 
communicate on the part of citizens as the major explanation.88 The 
fear of giving information as an implication refers more to a perceived 
lack of motivation to supply information to the police whether the po-
tential informant feared the criminal, the community response or the 
police. We will return to the ‘Lack of material’-explanation when pre-
senting some of the police-community clusters. Although not men-
tioned by so many, it appeared to us as a major mechanism for facili-
tating the daily extortion mechanisms applied by some police officers 
in the poorer police stations. We will also return to the lack of com-
munication matters when looking again and in a more theoretical way 
at the implicit ‘strangers to police stranger’ maxim that appears still to 
have some impact on the postings policy.  
 
2.3. The officers’ perceptions of their community and social  
environment 
When asked directly, most officers felt the relationship to the commu-
nity was good: 
 
Table 13: The relationship with the community 
 
Relationship Freq. Per cent 
Good 35 71.4 
Difficult 1 2.0 
No feedback 2 4.1 
Fair 11 22.4 
Total 49 100 
 
They also expressed that they believed that the police station was well 
liked whether that belief was sincerely held or not. 45 of 48 officers 
told that they believed the community was happy with their services.89 
They also claimed that the police station in fact received active sup-
port from the community: 
 
                                                 
88  Lack of education referred to the citizens’ lack of education, not missing education on the 
part of the police who all know Swahili and almost all English. This would only become a 
problem, however, if the local language of the police officer differed from the citizen in 
question. We should add that the police expect the citizen to be able to fill in a fairly de-
manding form themselves in order to accept a statement. This is clearly a key area in fu-
ture police reforms.  
89  It is again difficult to tell if these beliefs were sincerely held or not. After all, in almost 
any news media the police are strongly criticized on almost a daily basis. To shut out that 
barrage of criticism and consider oneself as well liked in the local context demands strong 
faith or insincerity. We will later see that our community respondents didn’t share this 
faith.  
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Table 14: Community’s support 
 
Supported Freq. Per cent 
Yes 42 85.7 
No 7 14.3 
Total 49 100 
 
It was somewhat surprising that the response rate to this question was 
so high. When asked to specify what kind of support they receive, we 
got the following answers: 
 
Table 15: Nature of support 
 
 
To understand the community policing answer one should note that 
the main practical aspect of the community policing program in Kenya 
was that police officers and local political organizations and NGOs 
would join some common meetings where they discussed local crime 
issues, jail conditions and so on. Some sharing of real crime infor-
mation could also take place under this heading, but such sharing 
proved at times to become problematical for the community leaders. 
 
When asked indirectly about their perceptions about their environ-
ment’s more sinister aspects such as ‘Do you always worry about your 
own security?’ – All officers answered the question and 40 out of 50 
confirmed that they felt that anxious at times. To some degree that 
anxiety may be something the police share with the citizens in general. 
We have seen from some of the crime surveys discussed before that a 
large fraction of the population appears afraid of crime – with good 
reasons – given their experiences with it. Nevertheless, some of the 
worry evidently is also based on their specific experiences as police 
officers. When asked about what they feared mores specifically, we 
received the following answers from the police officers: 
 
Nature of support Freq. Per cent 
Give information on criminals 32 69.6 
Assist in arrests 8 17.4 
Community policing 5 10.9 
Other reasons 1 2.2 
Total 46 100 
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Table 16: What are your main security threats? 
 
 Freq. Per cent 
Being targeted by criminals 21 51.2 
Robbers 9 22.0 
None 7 17.1 
Riots 2 4.9 
Militia 2 4.9 
Total 41 100 
 
More than every fourth officers told that they had been attacked by 
thugs/gangs. When probing into those episodes we found that most 
had been either encountered when the officer was stationed in Nairobi 
or at one of the Northern borders. When asked about whether any of 
their family members had been terrorized in the same way ‘because of 
your profession?’ only three out of 45 (6.7%) had experienced this. 
One major reason may be that the officers are stationed away from 
their homes most of the time.  
2.4. The officers’ perception and experiences with crime and crime 
reporting 
Our classification of crimes is somewhat idiosyncratic, but it may 
nevertheless be of interest to not that when we asked ‘What is the na-
ture of the crime in the community you serve? We got the following 
distribution: 
 
Table 17: Nature of crime in your community? 
 
Nature of the crime Freq. Per cent 
Car jacking 5 10.4 
Theft/robbery/fraud 18 37.5 
Murder/assault/domestic violence 20 41.7 
Other 2 4.2 
Militia 1 2.1 
Drug trafficking 2 4.2 
Total 48 100 
 
Note that this is a perception question. We asked about the officer’s 
beliefs about crime. The actual distribution of crime registered at the 
station may prove quite different. Alas, we had no access to each sta-
tion’s crime registrations. When asked about the officers’ beliefs 
about the causes of crime, they appear to be quite similar to the citi-
zens’ beliefs as they were registered in the surveys in part A of this 
paper:  
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Table 18: Major perceived causes of crime  
 
Major cause of the crime Freq. Per cent 
Unemployment 15 32.6 
Poverty 20 43.5 
Cultural beliefs/domestic violence 6 13.0 
Land issues 2 4.3 
Drugs 3 6.5 
Total 46 100 
 
The emphasis is on unemployment and poverty, reasons that make 
most perpetrators also the victims of economic misery. But crime vic-
tims have also a poverty dimension. One is that poor people are more 
afraid of or less competent when initiating a contact with the police 
when becoming a victim of crime. When we asked: ‘The perception is 
that poor people have difficulties in making a statement. Do you 
agree?’ – 20 out of 49 officers agreed. But when we started to probe 
and suggested that the reason for the negligence might be at the police 
end, fewer would confirm: 
 
Table 19: Even if poor people succeed in making a statement their 
cases are rarely taken seriously. Do you agree? Could you ex-
plain? 
 
 Frequency Per cent 
Yes 12 27.3 
No 32 72.7 
Total 44 100 
 
The subject was evidently touchy. Some reasons advanced by the ma-
jority who disagreed were strongly normative: ‘Al Kenyans are 
equal.’ Another argues that it would be illogical: ‘police services 
are for free’ – or maybe that claim is to deny any perceived accusa-
tion of bribery. The majority (19) may deny the verity of the claim: 
‘All cases are taken seriously’, or is this also a kind of normative 
statement? Some seeks to explain it as cases of ‘petty theft.’ The 
crimes are too small to be taken seriously Taken together it seems log-
ical to interpret the answers to imply that the police felt that poor peo-
ple are less competent in making statements. 
 
The police officers were asked a number of questions dealing with 
crime reporting and the rationing of cases they actually handled. One 
interesting aspect of policing is whether crime cases mainly reach the 
police through the victims’ and their family’s reporting it or whether 
the police register the crimes themselves through active scanning of 
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their environment. Here it appears that the majority of cases reached 
the police through victims’ report, but by not having formulated the 
questions sharply enough we cannot establish this conclusively: 
 
Table 20: Crime reporting 
 
Crime reporting Freq. Per cent 
Come to report 18 36.7 
Find it ourselves 2 4.1 
Both 29 59.2 
Total 49 100 
 
By allowing the category both, the outcome becomes too fuzzy, but 
we find it reasonably that many of the cases in this category consisted 
in victims reporting the case to the police that after some investiga-
tions found it correct to report it as a crime event. 
 
 We probed into the issue of whether the community they monitored 
experienced a much larger number of crime events than the police 
would register themselves. This we did by confronting the officers 
with data that seem to indicate that the police in Kenya generally han-
dle only a fraction of crime cases compared to what household report 
to have experienced in crime victimisation surveys. To avoid being 
too extreme we compared to GJLOS conservative crime victimisation 
findings with the official crime statistics. 10 out of 45 officers blankly 
refused to accept the truth value of the GJLOS findings, seven pointed 
towards great workloads – that is internal rationing inside the police – 
while eight pointed towards non-reporting of crime among the citizens 
and two officers claimed that part of the explanation was that the 
community solved the crime themselves. Only one pointed towards 
the existence of non-provable crime. The critical way the question was 
formulated made many to deny the existence of any large number of 
crime events that would never enter the attention of the police station.  
 
When formulated in a more understanding way more officers admitted 
the potential prevalence of the phenomenon: 
 
Table 21: Do you always have capacity to deal with all crimes  
reported? 
 
 Freq. Per cent 
Yes 18 37.5 
No 30 62.5 
Total 48 100 
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That is, more than half of the officers admit that they do not always 
have capacity to handle the criminal cases that reach their attention. 
Furthermore, 30 of 43 officers admit that there are types of crime 
events that they don’t register or take seriously in other ways. – We 
see that it was much harder for officers to accept the possibility that 
they did not know about much of the crime that took place in their 
neighbourhoods than to accept that there was a number of crime 
events they were unwilling or unable to do anything about. 
2.5. Police officers’ perception of and experience with police  
corruption 
Somewhat surprisingly, most officers were less insulted when we 
asked about bribe payments than when they were confronted with the 
discrepancy between the official crime statistics and GJLOS’s report 
on the households’ crime experiences. To suggest that they did not 
treat crimes in their community seriously seems to have hurt their pro-
fessional pride more than any suggestion of high corruption propensi-
ty in the police: 
 
Table 22: TI-Kenya surveys seem to indicate that the police in 
Kenya are the most corrupt. Agree or disagree? 
 
 Freq. Per cent 
Yes 22 44.9 
No 27 55.1 
Total 49 100 
 
All except one officer was willing to answer the question, Almost half 
agreed with the statement, and about the same fraction admitted that 
they have come across officers that have received a bribe (22 out of 
48) and even admitted that they had received bribes themselves (21 of 
47). The bribes were small, however, 1300 Ksh on average with 
10 000 Ksh as the maximum.90 Regarding anti-corruption actions 16 
out 46 reported that they knew about other officers that were under 
corruption investigations. 
Chapter 3. Observation aggregates. The community survey91 
In this chapter we will look at the whole sample of citizens in all the 
police station neighbourhoods together and see how they on average 
perceive and experience the crime events that hit them and their com-
                                                 
90  While this is certainly lower than the average bribe size of 2 000Ksh it is not so wide of 
the mark when we consider the incentive of the officers to regard their own involvement 
in bribe receiving as a morally minor matter. 
91  Note that the community around Gigiri police station is not included in the following 
analysis. 
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munities; their experience with and perception of their local police’s 
behaviour.  
3.1. The respondents and their crime experiences 
The total number of respondents was 242. Almost 90% lived in areas 
who the respondents themselves classified as urban, but several of 
these urban areas were close to or in the interstices of rural land. 
Hence, when we look at their occupations a larger share were in fact 
connected to rural activities: 
 
Table 23: Respondents employment distribution 
 
Occupation Freq. Per cent 
Self Employed, Agriculture 42 17.4 
Self Employed, Labourer. 9 3.7 
Self Employed, Trade & Commerce (Shops) 34 14.0 
Self Employed, Trade & Commerce (Street Sellers) 29 12.0 
Others (Self employed) 33 13.6 
Wage Employee private sector 22 9.1 
Wage Employee (Public Sector) 12 5.0 
Student 12 5.0 
Unemployed 44 18.2 
Missing Values 5 2.1 
Total 242 100 
 
If we adjust for the fact that at least some of the students and the un-
employed reside on farms, we may conclude that more than a fifth of 
the respondents were rural-based. Nevertheless, rural residence is 
clearly heavily underrepresented in our respondents group. If we add 
the group of unemployed and street sellers we note that about 40% 
were underemployed while less than 15% were employed in some of 
the formal sectors. 
 
 As we noted before, the average monthly household income reported 
was 11 400 Ksh per month. Alas, we were unable to determine the av-
erage household size in our sample,92 but if we use our summary size 
of 5, this imply household expenses of less than 1 US$ a day per 
household member.93 At the purely subjective level 60% considered 
themselves poor. Only one person considered himself as rich. When it 
                                                 
92  The reason was that our questionnaire proved too detailed regarding the respondent’s 
household composition where all members including their ages were to be listed up. 
When we reached the Nyanza and Western provinces the households’ sizes became too 
large for such detailed enumeration within our time restraints and we could not switch 
over to a more summary measure in time.  
93  11400 Ksh (about 115 US$ at the exchange rate at the time of the survey) which implies 
about 0.75 US$ per household member. While most of our respondents were not well off, 
this is too low and is probably caused by a sizeable fraction of the respondents were in 
fact reporting their individual income, not the household income they were asked to re-
port. 
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comes to questions about various amenities; phone, – water and elec-
tricity connections, we got the following responses: 
 
Table 24: Access to infrastructure amenities 
 
  
  
Yes I have. No I don’t have. Total. 
Freq. Per cent. Freq. Per cent. Freq. Per cent. 
A Landline Telephone 5 3.3 149 96.7 154 100.0 
A Cell Phone 186 84.5 34 15.5 220 100.0 
An Electricity Connection 79 43.6 102 56.4 181 100.0 
A Water Connection 63 35.0 117 65.0 180 100.0 
 
We note that not everyone answers these questions, but that a large 
fraction of those who don’t answer it are not likely to possess it. (Note 
that the response rate is lower for the items that the respondents more 
rarely possess). Hence while a majority owns cell phones close to a 
third have electricity and water connection. Very few have a landline 
telephone. 
 
The respondents are fairly well educated. Less than 40% have only 
primary school or less.94 Hence they are not representative for the 
Kenyan population in this regard either. This education bias is to be 
expected from our sampling method: To mobilise respondents through 
one or several local NGO organisations. It is not then so surprising 
that the level of political participation appears also quite high: 81% 
had voted in the last election and 70% had been on a political meeting 
‘during the last five years.’ Moreover, everyone had answered these 
two (implied) questions and displayed active political interests that 
way. 
 
Compared to the larger surveys referred to in Chapter 4, the reported 
crime incidence was in the higher end: 
 
Table 25: Crime experience last 2 years95 
 Freq. Per cent 
Yes 123 50.8 
No 79 32.6 
Missing values 40 16.5 
Total 242 100 
                                                 
94  In the large GJLOS survey wholly 64% reported that they only had the primary school or 
less (Republic of Kenya, 206b: 11). 
95  We asked about the last two years since our field visits took place the summer 2010 and 
we should then not catch the special post- election violence in winter/ spring 2008 since 
this hopefully was an exceptional event. It not only caused substantial political violence, 
but induced a considerable amount of commercially motivated crime. Nevertheless, we 
were probably not quite successful since respondents’ memories were probably blurred 
and they are also likely often to interpret it more like: ‘have you ever experienced the 
event?’ whether it is formally specified in the questionnaire to have taken place’ last 
year’, ‘last two years’, ‘last five years’; or whatever.  
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We note that more than half of the respondents that answered the 
question had either experienced crime themselves or some member of 
their households had done so.96 What was the kind of crime experi-
enced? Here we had it as an open question, so the respondent could 
describe it her-or him-self, descriptions that we then had to classify. 
Somewhat awkwardly (the crimes listed in the table are obviously not 
mutually exclusive) we find the following distribution: 
 
Table 26: Experienced crime type  
 
Nature of Crime Freq. Per cent 
Theft 74 54.4 
Cheating 2 1.5 
Property Crimes 4 2.9 
Burglary 15 11.0 
Robbery 18 13.2 
Physical Assault/hurt/grievous hurt/molestation/sexual harassment. 15 11.0 
Domestic violence 3 2.2 
Attempted murder 1 0.7 
Kidnapping and abduction 2 1.5 
Road accident 2 1.5 
Total 136 100 
 
We observe that the experienced crime number is higher after the 
specification (136 against 123) although this is a more complicated 
question that normally leads the response rate to go down. One may 
speculate why: double classification of same event, a question that fo-
cuses the memory, causing more events to be remembered, or … 
When we compare with the police’s perception of what the major 
forms of crime are (Table 15), it is striking that the community’s ex-
perienced rate of thefts (54.4%) is higher than the police’s perception 
of its incidence (37.5%). The other crime events are difficult to com-
pare since they are obviously classified in different ways by the police 
and community respondents (as interpreted by us).  
 
Going back to the other surveys in chapter 4 (and 5) in part A, the 
UNODC survey is the only one that has a category on fraud that could 
be somewhat similar to our ‘cheating’, but here the incidence is strik-
ingly different. While only 1.5% of our crime events are classified as 
cheating, 22% in UNODC were classified as consumer fraud.  
 
                                                 
96  If we only looked at the respondents who had answered the question, the rate would be 
above 60%, but since people who had experienced crime are more likely to answer, it the 
rate is likely to be closer to 50%. 
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3.2 Some psychological, economic and behavioural effects of the 
crime experiences 
Compared to the existing, larger surveys we have focused more on the 
economic and psychological consequences of the crimes the respond-
ents had experienced. We are fully aware of the likelihood that they 
when confronted by unstructured situations the respondents may tend 
to exaggerate the misfortunes caused by the crime. Nevertheless, it is 
rather striking that almost 65% who reported about the effects told 
that the crime hit them either very badly (36.9%) or quite badly (the 
rest). This together with some other effects we may present in the fol-
lowing figure: 
 
Figure 1: Strength in some general economic effects of crime 
19.2%
24.8%
27.8%
16.2%
17.8%
18.3%
27.7%
21.7%
20.6%
36.9%
35.7%
33.3%
Not at all.
A little. 
Quite badly. 
Very badly. 
Has it led to difficulty in paying school fees, paying for necessary health expenses, or delaying
marriages because of the loss of a dowry?
Has it changed how much do you earn or spend every month?
How badly did the crime affect you economically? 
 
 
When asked to state the effects somewhat more precisely, we received 
a set of responses that we classified in the following way: 
 
Table 27: How crime has affected respondents economically 
 
 Freq. Per cent 
Closure of business/change in lifestyle 31 32.3 
No effect 11 11.5 
Do not meet basic needs after event 22 22.9 
Increase in cost of production 2 2.1 
Use of savings to restore business/life 14 14.6 
Had to borrow 2 2.1 
Other effects 14 14.6 
Total 96 100 
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We see that the effects could be rather drastic for a significant group 
of respondents since 31 out of the 242 we had asked reported that they 
had to close business and/or change lifestyle due to a crime experience 
and 22 claimed that they (for a period) could not meet their basic need 
because of it. Note that not all the respondents who reported on a 
crime experience have answered this question. The same applies when 
we asked about the more psychological aspects and their subsequent 
adaption to it: 
 
Table 28: Has the crime affected you psychologically or changed 
behaviour? 
 
 Freq. Per cent 
Psychological torture 6 7.4 
Fear/avoiding places 27 33.3 
Never trust police/people 2 2.5 
Come up with other security measures 39 48.1 
Change in social life 2 2.5 
Other reasons 5 6.2 
Total 81 100 
 
We will make the understanding of the psychological and economic 
effects more concrete later when outlining a few case stories told by 
some of the respondents when we reach our community-station cluster 
presentation. 
3.3. Crime reporting and the experience with the police 
In a number of studies (Soares (2004), Azfar and Gurgur (2008), Hunt 
(2008)) using international crime victimization surveys have shown 
that the victims’ crime reporting may give important signals about the 
victims (they may be too poor to pay the police a visit), about the 
crime (victimless crime will rarely be reported) and the police (victims 
will tend to shy police that are far away, brutal, corrupt, inefficient or 
refusing to process crime information). Moreover a significant part of 
police corruption, a major object for analysis in this paper arises in 
connection with crime reporting. Since neither the police nor victims 
receive any rewards for reporting a specific crime, its no-reporting is a 
form for collective action problem. Hence, we have asked the re-
spondents a number of questions connected to their crime reporting 
and their experience with the police. When asking the very general 
question: ‘did anyone from you report to the police or anyone else?’ 
the majority among those who answered told that they had done so , 
but the response rate was not so high (about half of the respondents): 
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Table 29: Did anyone from you report to the police or anyone 
else? 
 Freq. Per cent 
Yes 77 58.3 
No 55 41.7 
Total 132 100 
  
The large fraction who confirmed that they had reported it is likely to 
be caused by the open way the question was formulated that allowed 
reporting to non-police agents. In fact, when we add all the numbers 
(from the same group of respondents) they sum up to 110 not 55: 
 
Table 30: # of non-reporting distributed on reasons  
 
  Freq. Per cent 
Not serious enough 13 11.8 
Solved it myself 15 13.6 
Inappropriate for police 2 1.8 
Reported it some other agency 1 0.9 
My family solved it 4 3.6 
No insurance 1 0.9 
Police could do nothing/lack of proof 20 18.2 
Police won’t do anything about it 13 11.8 
Fear or dislike of the police/no involvement wanted with the police 1 0.9 
Process takes too long 12 10.9 
Police would demand bribes 26 23.6 
Didn’t dare (for fear of reprisals) 2 1.8 
Other reasons Specified 0 0.0 
Don’t know 0 0.0 
Total 110 100 
 
Here we note that the most frequently cited reason for not reporting 
was police corruption. If we disregard the cases inappropriate for the 
police (in a wide sense – such as the lack of proof), corruption was 
reported as the major reason for not reporting a crime.  
 
Summing up some information that we don’t reproduce in tables, the 
following observations may be of interest: The average time for a re-
spondent to report a crime was about 80 minutes (average based on 80 
respondents). About one third of the respondents that answered the 
question (27) received detailed information about how to register the 
crime and 36 confirmed that the police at least began to investigate the 
case. Only 15 respondents told that the case had been brought forward 
to a court. And 18 confirmed that the criminal perpetrator somehow 
had received a punishment. Among the 55 answering the question 15 
told that they somehow got their stolen property back. 32 out of 92 
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told that they were satisfied with the way the police had dealt with the 
report.97 
 
Nevertheless, respondents come in contact with the police for a num-
ber of other reasons than reporting a crime. Only 10% of the meetings 
with the police were due to attempted crime reporting. Each respond-
ent had had about two (1.93) such meetings during the last five 
years.98  
3.4. The respondents’ bribe and extortion payment experiences 
with the police 
The respondents’ answer to our most general question about police 
corruption was originally focused on crime reporting: 
 
Table 31: Have you ever been forced to pay a bribe for crime  
reporting? 
 
 Freq. Percent 
Yes 57 39.0 
No 89 61.0 
Total 146 100 
 
We note again that the number of respondents who answer these ques-
tions is larger than the number who reports that they had experienced 
a crime. As a percentage of our 242 respondents, less than 25% of the 
respondents had paid this form of the bribe, i.e. considerably higher 
than the one reported in the GJLOS survey, but overall lower than 
most of the TI-Kenya and Afro barometer surveys.  
 
The average bribe size (only 31 respondents answered this) was about 
1800 Ksh (higher than what the police reported, but pretty close to the 
2 000 we used for our rough assessments in chapter 5, part A). Origi-
nally we focused mostly on this form of bribe, but discovered soon 
that this was not the only reason for paying a bribe to the police as 
will be clear from the Table 32 below. 
 
                                                 
97  Note that there are a number of inconsistencies here. For example, while only 77 told that 
they had reported the crime, 92 told that they were satisfied with the way the police had 
dealt with the report! 
98  Note the asymmetry here. When asking about police and police corruption we ask about 
happenings during the last five years while the crime questions are focused on the last two 
years. This is an undesirable feature, but probably less serious than it may appear to, due 
to the fading-memory effect we have alluded to above. It originated in a consideration that 
we might get too few police corruption observations since we knew we could only collect 
a small sample, and since we assumed that the extent of police corruption would be less 
influenced than crime by the election violence that had taken place 2.5 years before. As is 
clear from above, the lack of police corruption data proved never to become a problem, 
but the 5 years’ experience time accepted may, after all, explain part of the reason why the 
fraction police corruption/ crime events is exceptionally high in our survey. 
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Table 32: Paying a bribe  
 
  Frequency Percentage TOTAL 
  Yes No Yes No # % 
32
a 
Have you ever paid a bribe to a police officer to take 
enforcement action against someone? 
35 106 24.8 75.2 141 100 
32
b 
Have you ever paid a bribe to a police officer not to 
take enforcement action? 
44 98 31.0 69.0 142 100 
32
c 
Have you ever paid a bribe to a police officer to re-
lease you after enforcement action was already taken? 
44 102 30.1 69.9 146 100 
32
d 
Have you ever paid a bribe to a police officer to re-
lease someone else after enforcement action was al-
ready taken? 
55 99 35.7 64.3 154 100 
 
If we add all the number of respondents who have paid one of these 
forms of bribe, assuming that they are exclusive, 235 respondents out 
of 242 had done so, that is practically everyone. One explanation may 
be the simple one that we asked about the last five years. If the re-
spondents had perfect memory, that would be about 20% on a yearly 
basis.  
 
As we have suggested before 32b, 32c and 32d consisted mostly in 
extortion payments that the police collect from their victims (often at 
night time) using imprisonment or the threats of it as their major in-
strument, but that we due to the structure of the questionnaire com-
bined with our focus on crime reporting under-counted these extortion 
forms. Still these extortion forms constitute more than 80% of the po-
lice corruption incidences reported. Some of the explanation may be 
that our fieldtrip took place just after the World Championship in 
football where an exceptional large number of citizens ventured into 
the dark, not all sober, and thus increased the possible harvest for the 
police of making these forms of bribe collections that may tend to 
make for a larger number of bribes of this kind than is normal. Never-
theless, there are strong reasons to suspect that these extortion types of 
bribes are more frequent that the service-induced ones. 
Chapter 4. Police and crime interactions in the communities  
In this chapter we will look at our data in a different way and highlight 
the characteristics of each community and police station. In addition 
we will bring in more of the qualitative observations we made on our 
visits that may bring more information on the police-community inter-
actions and on the single cases where becoming victim to a crime 
seem sometimes to move the victim into extreme poverty and/or se-
vere psychological dis-functionalities.  
 
Rural police station A. This is a fairly large police station with around 
60 officers located in a village with a small population (about 1 000). 
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The police station is located together with a local jail. Court and town-
ship administration are nearby. 
 
The police station is a divisional headquarter and is supposed to cover 
a geographical area of about 300 square km and a population of 
100 000. Hence the police density is lower than the national average 
(about 1: 1500 compared with 1:600).99 The station has only one car 
(which often doesn’t work). All the roads leading to the police stations 
are unpaved. Practically no streetlights exist in the whole division. It 
is getting dark around 7p.m all year around. Needless to add, the po-
lice are subject to severe logistical restrictions –as is the population at 
large and particularly so at night. 
 
 The average household size in the larger district in 2002 was about 4 
(4.02.). Almost half the households are female-headed and about 4% 
were children-headed. HIV prevalence rate at the turn of the centenni-
al was close to 40%.100 Poverty level is above national average101, but 
varies considerably within the division.  
 
We interviewed five police officers and twenty six community mem-
bers. About 50% of the latter reported they had experienced a police 
bribe and 60% a crime event. If our sample was representative (which 
we cannot claim) about 15 000 crimes should take place during a two 
years period and 12 000 bribes during the last five years. The high 
crime rate in the area is somewhat surprising given the rural surround-
ings. It is likely to have serious economic impacts.102 
 
As we noted in the introduction it was striking how different the po-
lice and the community perceived their relationship when interviewed 
in this case. The police from station A told about how willing the 
community was to lend cars for investigations, that they received con-
                                                 
99  We have no information about whether the Administration Police do some patrolling in 
the division, but they don’t have any police station in the division. Our visit took place 
before the recent constitutional change that may have changed the administrative struc-
ture somewhat. 
100  All this information is according to Republic of Kenya (2005) «Siaya District Strategic 
Plan 2005 – 2010.’  
101  In 1999 64% was below the national rural poverty level. 
102  One of the interviewers asked the victims to assess the economic costs of the bribes and 
the crimes they had been exposed to. It was only 6 respondents interview by him, but 
they altogether had experienced crime costs of 88 000Ksh and bribe payments of 
9050Ksh..If we, by a stretch of imagination, assume this to be representative for the 
25 000 households in the division, the aggregate crime costs for this division should be 
367 million Ksh and bribe payments to the police around 38 million Ksh. In 2005 total 
taxes paid in Kenya was about 300 000 million. If this division paid taxes in the same 
rate as the rest of the population (it is likely to pay much less), it should be around 750 
million. That is, if we believe that the respondents have assessed the costs realistically 
and looked at the crime costs during the last two years, and bribe costs over five years, 
the ‘taxes’ paid to criminals and the police should be about 25% of the ones paid to the 
government. The uncertainty reigning around these numbers is of course enormous, but 
they suggest a significant criminal drain on the population’s assets.  
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siderable support through reporting crime, and so on.103 The commu-
nity respondents on the other hand reported a high degree of distrust, 
even fear of the police. 
 
In such cases of diverging perception of a relationship one may ask 
whether they both are seriously held or whether they are put up to 
please the interviewers, keep up self-esteem or to avoid negative sanc-
tions from superiors or other community members. There are obvious 
reasons to question the sincerity of the police reporting, but what 
about the community respondents? They may at the one hand despise 
the police because that is the opinion to hold, or because of serious 
negative experiences, but at the same time they may be willing to as-
sist the police in most situations. That is, the negative perception may 
not necessarily have negative impact on the policing of the area. 
 
It was not possible for us to investigate eventual effects of the public’s 
negative view of the police in explaining the crime rate reporting dur-
ing a brief visit. A short year after our visit, several newspapers report 
on an incident from the prison and police station A, however, that in-
dicates a significant lack of cooperation: about twenty prisoners104 es-
caped from the prison an early Friday morning in May 2011.105 They 
all escaped in the middle of this rural neighborhood running in differ-
ent directions, without anyone being caught in flagrante. As late as 
one month later only one was caught.106 While on the one hand this 
event suggests a lack of cooperation between locals and the police, it 
also suggests as plausible some forms of cooperation between (some) 
prisoners and (some) police. 
 
In addition to reporting their own bribe experiences our informal ques-
tioning of the respondent made them present various systematic forms 
of police –community interactions. 
                                                 
103  One police officer, who was asked about it, insisted that the community was very help-
ful and friendly although he didn’t know the local language. He claimed he makes 3-4 
arrests a week.. His salary was 17 000 a month and consumption expenditures 40 000. 
He insisted the police always had capacity to do their job although they only possessed a 
half-broken car. But note that if every police officer did 4 arrests a week and hence 200 
pr. year the police station should be able to make 12 000 a year altogether, a number of 
the right dimension when considered together with the reported bribe frequency?. 
104  The number was originally set to 11, but 20 appears to be the number settled on. 
105  Instead of singing hymns in the morning as we experienced, two prisoners had on this 
particular escape morning being ordered to carry the human wastes from the night in a 
bucket in order to throw it in the pit latrine. They threw into the face of the prison 
guards/police instead. This opened up for a mass escape.  
106  He was caught when attempting to highjack a car (Nairobi Star June 10, 2011). When 
explaining this lack of cooperation in this division, in addition to the general fear of the 
police we may point to the fact that while the composition of the police officers are eth-
nically mixed, the police station is perceived as alien by the communities in this division 
that are quite ethnically homogeneous. This was expressed in the 2007-8 election dis-
turbances where most registered deaths were by gun shot that the Waki commission in-
terpreted as police killings. The main anger in this and the neighbouring divisions was 
directed against the public authorities, not towards citizens belonging to other ethnic 
groups.  
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1) To induce the police to leave the police station for investigat-
ing a crime, the victims are often expected to either lend a ve-
hicle or pay for the fuel.107 
2) When paying a bribe, the police have sufficient local 
knowledge to discriminate the bribe size after the payer’s in-
come. 
3) After 8 p.m. it is risky to move outdoors for pedestrians and 
bikers alike, but less so for car drivers. The police may arrest 
anyone after that hour in practice whatever they are doing.108 
This has developed almost into an informal form of curfew 
from eight o’clock at night. Under this situation a large share 
of people moving around is likely to be risk lovers if not crim-
inals, sometimes legitimizing the police’s harassment behav-
ior. 
4) While some may pay a bribe on the spot, a significant number 
of citizens moving around at night are locked into a cell with-
out having done anything criminal in order make them pay ei-
ther by themselves or by friends or family. This practice is 
stimulated by the easy access to the fairly large prison attached 
to the police station in this division combined with the nearby 
court – both useful for credible threats.  
 
This practice, 4), mixes together basically law-abiding, but risk-taking 
citizens with hard-core criminals. While this is difficult to prove, a 
likely negative consequence of it is that this police practice eases the 
recruitment to organized criminal gangs; the cooperation between 
youthful risk lovers and hard core criminals, of which the 2011 May 
prisoner escape described above, possibly is a case. 
 
The 3) – practice may make the local youth to become even earlier 
risers than the rural settings demand, but on the whole is likely to 
hamper youthful energy, organizational life and non-agricultural eco-
nomic activities in general. 1) to 4) together is likely to make the 
community to report less of the criminal activities taking place than 
                                                 
107  This appears to have been an established practice in the district despite the fact that the 
OCPD of the district long time ago had confirmed that the practice was illegitimate and 
should be discontinued (Africa News Service | November 12, 2003). Whether the blame 
here should stay with the local police or be moved upwards as due to insufficient grants, 
we could not tell for sure. 
108  As pointed out before arbitrary arrests are of course not legal in Kenya, but the follow-
ing rules in the Kenyan Criminal Procedure Code, Chapter 75 rule 29 applied at the 
time of our investigation: ‘A police officer may, without an order from a magistrate 
and without a warrant arrest ….(f) any person whom he finds in a highway, yard or oth-
er place during the night and whom he suspects upon reasonable grounds of having 
committed or being about to commit a felony; ..(h) Any person whom he suspects of be-
ing there for an illegal or disorderly purpose, or who is unable to give a satisfactory ac-
count of himself;’. This has recently been softened somewhat, in the National Police 
Service Bill of 2010 where the rule 29(h) was deleted, while in the service bill for 2011 
all the odious reference to the ’night’ – suggesting larger and more discretionary powers 
for the police at night time is deleted, but the substance of the rules for ‘arresting with-
out warrants’ remains otherwise unchanged..  
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they would otherwise have done, exemplified with the prisoners’ es-
cape.  
 
What did the respondents tell about the crimes experienced in the 
community and their causes?109 Several pointed towards the police-
extortion-criminal-action loops described above. One respondent told 
about a criminal gang who had attacked a neighbour and three other 
homesteads using extreme violence. The neighbour had been cut in 
the head, had an arm broken and had to be hospitalized for three 
months. In another homestead they had killed a member. The re-
spondent believed this gang was composed by local people who pos-
sessed the necessary information of where to break in and by outside 
members who possessed the necessary knowledge and daring to apply 
instruments of violence. 
 
Regarding the causes of local crime, in additional to the usual refer-
ences to poverty and unemployment, some pointed towards envy: if 
you owned a lot more chicken than your neighbor, you were at risk. 
 
At the positive end, several believed that recent work on a public 
building, had kept several local youths who had got job there out of 
the danger zone.  
 
Station B: This is a very small police station. It is located in small 
town along a paved through road but inside a basically rural environ-
ment. The police station contains a prison cell that is so small that 
prisoners may risk standing the whole night if there are too many of 
them. It has no car, and the police officers claim that they even have 
no forms to fill in and register crimes. They have to use their own pri-
vate paper sheets for form filling and their own mobiles for communi-
cation. Not possessing any forms, it is extremely difficult for any su-
periors to monitor local arrests (like most other kinds of police activi-
ties) at the station. 
 
A police officer remarked that station B was a difficult station to stay 
in since ‘the community hates you.’ – Here it was not any pretense 
of cooperation. A respondent told from the other side that ‘if you 
report {a crime} to the police you are becoming a victim’. The ex-
pectations were consistently negative on both sides, hence seemingly 
consistent. Even so, a number of respondents supported that the police 
made a permanent roadblock despite the opportunities for bribe col-
                                                 
109  In this part we are not only reporting from the questionnaire outcomes, but also from the 
more unstructured parts of our interviews. Hence we could pick up information about 
things that had happened with neighbors, colleagues and non-resident family 
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lection it gave rise when combined with a friendly court.110 And the 
local police considered their job here as less dangerous than in larger 
cities despite feeling sometimes hated. 
 
Regarding local crimes the police considered the victimless ones (and 
hence crimes mostly not registered in our mini victimization survey) 
as the most frequent: prostitution and other sexual offences, smug-
gling (drugs from Uganda) and illegal alcohol distillation and distribu-
tion. Police did not get so much involved with sexual offences which 
are mainly monitored and taken care of by the elders. The illegal liq-
uor most in use, changa’a, is sometimes mixed with methanol, making 
the stuff deadly, and was according to the respondents the police’s 
main source of bribe income in the area, but falling outside our pur-
view. We were not told whether the local brews were dangerous or 
not. 
 
Station C: This police station is located in a medium sized city with 
large through traffic. The station is fairly large, but despite its size it 
lacked even so basic crime investigation equipment as the one needed 
for fingerprints. Even gloves were missing, we were told. The citizen 
respondents connected to police station C were picked up at three dif-
ferent places among which two may be considered rural and one ur-
ban, but there were mixed urban and rural residence among the re-
spondents at all interview spots. 
 
Both the crime rate and the bribe rate at the urban location were ex-
ceptionally high. Among the 13 respondents registered as located to 
the urban site all 13 had experienced a crime and 10 of the 13 had paid 
a bribe to the police. These are exceptionally high rates.111 Some of 
the rural interview sites were different. In one we had a sequence of 
six respondents where there were only two crimes and no police bribe 
registered, although in one crime case the respondent had to pay the 
transport for the police to the crime scene.  
 
This police station appeared to be more engaged in community polic-
ing ideas than most others, but one of the police respondents in station 
C admitted that it was more ‘difficult to arrest someone from our 
own tribe.’ 
 
                                                 
110  In autumn 2009 a national rule forbidding the police to introduce roadblocks was intro-
duced. The law allowed local exceptions, however, if it had local public support, and for 
a number of other reasons. 
111  While the high rates may of course have been accidental, they may be related to the fact 
that the town is a border town where a large number of trucks are waiting for border 
control at each point of time. The incidence of non-victim crimes such as transactional 
sex is exceptionally high. In a thorough work on the subject Robinson and Yeh (2011) 
estimate that 12.5% of adult women are engaged in transactional sex, many though on a 
part time basis. 
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Among the number of crimes reported by the community respondents 
at least one had changed a family’s life and livelihood situation drasti-
cally. A group of armed criminals had broken into the house of the 
parents of the respondent (then a well-off family) and killed her broth-
er. Afterwards the family practically broke down and her parents were 
unable to keep working in ways that could sustain their former living 
standard. The respondent was convinced that the murders were coop-
erating with the police, since ‘when the police arrived at the crime 
scene they didn’t wear gloves nor did they take fingerprints.’ She 
interpreted this to mean that the police made not any serious attempt 
to investigate the crime. – While this certainly, for other reasons, is a 
real possibility,112 we have already noted that a police respondent told 
us that they did not have this equipment (and he could not know that 
we were going to interview this respondent).113 The fact that this re-
spondent so quickly drew the conclusion that the criminals and the 
police cooperated reveals the kind of attitudes towards the police that 
have developed in Kenyan public opinion. This has to be accepted as 
one of the starting points for any police reform in the country. 
 
One respondent noted that the bribe charges made by the police and 
customs increased the costs of legal goods transported through the 
border town so much that it had induced widespread smuggling in the 
whole district despite the East African free trade aspirations. Smug-
gling may arise not only to avoid tariffs, but also to avoid bribes at 
high density entry points. That in order to keep this smuggling going 
other public agencies may have to be bribed, however, but we have no 
data on this possible interaction of bribe incomes between police sta-
tion B (who may be in position to tax some of the smuggling that seek 
to bypass the large scale border trade passing C).114 
 
Police station D: The police station here is located in one of Kenya’s 
largest cities. It is the main police station in the city. The main build-
ing is partly under construction and has become elegant from an archi-
tectonic point of view. The houses for the police officers located in-
side the police enclosure, on the other hand are of the old iron type, 
maybe protecting somewhat against bullets, but giving little protection 
against heat and cold. The community we were looking the police sta-
tion against, was in the first case a heavily populated part of the city 
embracing large slum areas. The community respondents collected in 
                                                 
112  The fact that the murders possessed guns could indicate the possibility, but the fact that 
this was taking place in a border town implied that there were a large number of other 
possible easily accessed sources for acquiring a gun.  
113  It was rather surprising; however, that such a fairly large police station located in an 
important border town with high crime rates could be missing so basic equipment. It was 
a striking feature in our material that several police bribes reported from the station C 
area were of exceptionally high value, 15 000 and 20 000 Ksh. 
114  A rare analysis of the interaction between corruption and smuggling is made in May 
(1985) and applied to pre-liberalized international finance and l trade markets in Ghana. 
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this case was mostly youths or young adolescents – they were clearly 
not a representative sample of the city. Moreover, in this case they 
were allowed to fill in the forms themselves and they were allowed to 
communicate. The time pressure involved when filling in the form 
constrained the amount of cooperation that was feasible, however.  
 
As mentioned under our presentation of our procedures, some of the 
questions had given the police respondents so much headache that 
they were unable to answer them. One such question dealt with how 
they allocated their time between different police activities. One of the 
officers here clearly understood the question, however, and suggested 
tentatively that 20% of the time was spent on internal activities like 
meetings, 20% on crime prevention, 30 % on crime directed against 
public and private organizations and 30% on citizen crime. Also in 
this case some police respondents confirm that the police are consid-
ered enemies, not public servants, by the ‘tribalistic’ communities: 
‘people here are rebellious and poor, but more enlightened.’ The 
police station registers about 350 crimes a week.115 Undesirable politi-
cal influence in police work is quite common, the respondent tells. He 
also confirms that he was transferred from a very distant part of Kenya 
against his will, and that he doesn’t know the crime patterns at his pre-
sent assignment well enough to be wholly effective, and particularly 
so since he doesn’t know the local language. 
 
Looking at the community respondents, 15 of 24 confirmed that they 
(or their nearest family) had experienced a crime recently while 14 of 
24 had paid a bribe to the police. One respondent had experienced im-
portant work equipment to be stolen. This had caused a serious in-
come loss for the last 1.5 years. With that equipment he had earned 
40 000Ksh a month while he now only could earn 8 000 Ksh a month. 
That is, so far he had lost 32 000Ksh x 18 =576 000Ksh, and he had 
moved from being OK to becoming rather poor. The highest police 
bribe reported was only 5 000Ksh. 
 
Police station E: This police station was the main station in one of the 
larger towns in Kenya. The community where most of our respondents 
are located is a densely populated lower income area (but not slum). 
At some of its edges, it borders agricultural areas and a couple of the 
respondents do farm work. 
 
The OSC had received our signal from their head office. The police 
officers are friendly. Among the information conveyed by the police 
officers at this station was that a police officer normally attends for-
                                                 
115  That is about 175 00 a year. This appears too high for the population the station moni-
tors, but is compatible with the higher end of the victimization surveys, but it is too high 
when we compare with our community respondents answers from the district. 
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mal training at point of promotion, for example when moving from 
constable to corporal. It is exceptional to receive training when re-
maining a constable. This implies that many of the officers who are on 
the beat lack sufficient training. If not in a position for promotion you 
only receive formal training if you are on good terms with the station 
bosses who tend to choose their friends to attend these trainings.  
 
Due to the fact that they are on call 24hrs they never have time to be 
with their families. Most of their time is dedicated to protecting 
mwananchi, they claim. The police force were full of praise for the 
local community as they had a strong community policing organiza-
tion and the community is always ready and willing to give infor-
mation about criminals to the officers. There is lack of enough equip-
ment and stationery to serve the members of public forcing them to 
request the civilians even for photocopies. Some of them do not take it 
kindly. There is only two computers serving the station and the major-
ity of the officers are not computer literate; that is, there is a training 
gap. 
 
On the other hand here many of the community respondents are full of 
praise for the community policing the community is well arranged and 
groups of young men offer security to the locals at a fee. Unlike the 
situation around police station A the mutual perceptions between the 
police and the community are both consistent and positive. Some of 
the interviewers got the impression that the local community had al-
ready rehearsed the answers they were to give us. Some were not pre-
senting a true picture of what was happening in the ground. In the pro-
cess of conducting the questionnaire some at the one hand refused of 
ever engaging in bribes but on the other hand, when further probed 
most of them had bribed the police to release a friend or relative who 
had been arrested during the police’s evening patrols. 
 
Regarding the community’s perception of the local causes of crime, 
the respondents reiterated the problem of unemployment, particularly 
youth unemployment, but here they also mentioned drug abuse as a 
major cause.  
 
While we have our focus on the regular police, as explained before, 
from the respondents’ explanations it is clear that this community at 
the time of our surveying was monitored by both the regular and by 
the administration police. Most of the daytime monitoring was done 
by regular plainclothes police, often patrolling in groups of 2-3 to-
gether with a dog, while the night-time monitoring was done both by 
uniformed administration police and the regular police. Although the 
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administration police are supposedly without rights to arrest people, 
both groups of police did in fact do arresting in this area.116  
 
The major method of bribe collection was the same as the other places 
we visited, but one respondent mentioned that the regular police pre-
ferred to be in plainclothes when collecting bribes. Crime reporting 
was not a regular source of bribes for the police; it was arrests and the 
threats of arrests that was the main mechanism. The respondents 
meant that that the police did active searching in order to get into 
bribe collecting situations. Furthermore, arrangement inside the police 
ensured that superior officers received a cut from each bribe. Not all 
police were equally eager in bribe collection, however, but only 1-2 of 
the local police behaved OK. 
 
Like the respondents around police station A, the respondents around 
E also reported that the bribe rates to pay vary in systematic manners. 
But since they were operating in a much larger population cluster than 
in A, the police here may not know each individual’s ability to pay. 
The size of the bribe then becomes context dependent: higher bribes 
have to be paid in case several police officers are present, if you are 
drunk or if you are behaving in an arrogant manner. If you speak Eng-
lish there is a discount. The normal bribe rate was inside the range of 
1 000Ksh – 5 000Ksh. When a person is unable to pay either by him-
self or through his network, he is beaten up. In that way the willing-
ness to pay is kept alive in the wider community. 
 
Several respondents claimed that the crime rate has gone down recent-
ly, despite the police’s bribe extorting behavior. After all, their in-
creased monitoring of the area has improved the overall security in the 
neighborhood. While no one reported such shattering of life- and live-
lihood- experiences as the one reported in the neighborhood of police 
station D, at least two respondents had experienced serious forms of 
crime with considerable negative economic consequences One had 
been burglarized and beaten so he had to go to hospital. The burglar 
had been caught and received a 5 years sentence. Another respondent 
told that he had been beaten up by a group of eight armed people after 
a burglary (about 10 000Ksh stolen). He had to stay out of work for 
two weeks. The police refused to do anything because the officers 
were afraid of this group. 
 
Some respondents also mentioned that youth groups were operating in 
the environment doing some policing on their own. Combined with 
the case just mentioned and one other case where a respondent told 
that he was exposed to blackmail from such a group, this could be an 
                                                 
116  One of the interviewers reports that four of the seven respondents he covered, lived in 
households that had experienced crime, three had paid the police a bribe.  
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indication that organized crime units were operating in this neighbor-
hood.117 In the discussion after the interviews at least one young re-
spondent (obviously very intelligent and assertive) expressed deep dis-
trust of our mission, suspecting us for being police spies. We showed 
him our police questionnaire to reduce his suspicion of having some 
secret cooperation. This was also the only neighborhood where the 
local chief did a check-up on our project suspecting us for not having 
received a police permission – which we had. The levels of trust ap-
peared to be lower in this community appeared to be lower than else-
where. 
 
Police station F: This was a police station located in a high income 
neighborhood, but formally in charge of monitoring a large nearby 
slum wherein we had drawn our community respondents from a 
smaller sub-section. The police station’s actual responsibility proved 
to be very limited, however. The regular police become mainly in-
volved in cases when some tourists or new NGO personnel dump into 
the slum or in cases of a murder or some other exceptionally serious 
crime. The actual policing of the area, limited as it was, was per-
formed by the administration police based on a police station where 
we had no access. When the community respondents here referred to 
the police they normally was thinking of the administration police ex-
cept when referring to experiences outside the slum118.  
 
The slum was hooked up illegally to both electricity and water net-
works, but the slum dwellers had to pay a charge to the organization 
that supplied these illegal services. 
 
Some respondents here too claimed that the [administration] police 
engaged in criminal activities themselves and are cooperating with the 
criminals in the area. An example illustrating the first claim is the fol-
lowing story: 
 
1) A friend of the respondent, P, had a laptop stolen by the police 
4 months ago 
2) P reports the theft  
3) The police arrests P 
4) P is released after paying 1 000 Ksh for the release and then 
5 000Ksh for the release of the laptop. 
                                                 
117  The researcher with best inside knowledge from this part of Kenya believed that a 
Mungiki group was still operating in this neighborhood, although probably with less in-
fluence than before which led some respondents to claim that the crime rate was declin-
ing in the area. The mungiki is a well-known organization/brand name that embraces a 
set of religious, political and regular organized crime activities. Its religion is based on 
the old Kikuyu pantheon and the groups thus are thus stronger in Kikuyu dominated are-
as. It is fired by youth discontent and poverty. 
118  The following subjective impressions are based upon one of the interviewers, who inter-
viewing five persons, discovered that three had been crime victims, while four had been 
victims to a police bribe. 
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The respondent’s interpretation of the outcome: The police had had 
difficulties in selling the used laptop for a better price. The story may 
be true or not, -maybe his friend really had stolen the laptop, but it re-
flects the kind of confidence the citizens in the slum has in the police. 
Moreover, it indicates how the administration police monitor the eco-
nomic transactions taken place in this neighborhood.119 
 
For his own part this respondent was exposed to a violent robbery 
when he was carrying money for his employer. He had to pay back the 
money in installments and thereby experienced reduced living stand-
ards for a considerable period. He was, nevertheless, lucky compared 
to another other respondent. This respondent had been responsible for 
his younger siblings, while he had 13 000Ksh stolen by his girlfriend. 
The money included money he carried for his employer. The girl-
friend ran and his employer fired him since he had been unable to pay 
back the stolen money immediately. When interviewed, he was visibly 
depressed, which didn’t help him to get a new job. This was clearly a 
crime that made him and his siblings drop into poverty. Unlike most 
other respondents he did not participate in any political gathering, he 
told. 
 
Several of the respondents here did not live in traditional families, but 
were adolescents or young adults who shared a shack, hence lived in a 
kind of ‘collective’ while they made efforts to create a living or to fin-
ish their education. One of the girls living this way told that one of her 
roommates reported someone had stolen 2 000Ksh from her. The 
roommate went to the administration police. The outcome was that 
several of her other roommates were beaten up. Neighbours inter-
vened, however, and chased the administration police away. The 
crime case was not solved, but was a typical kind of crime that may 
occur when people are densely packed. 
 
While falling outside our time frame (and hence not recorded in our 
survey output), this respondent told about another, more livelihood 
shattering crime event: During the 2007 election violence (that is more 
than two years before the interview, and hence it was not reported in 
our survey) she was living together with her mother and several of her 
siblings. Someone broke into their house and stole her mother’s sew-
ing machine. The mother then lost the income that had kept the family 
together and they had all to fend for themselves, moving physically 
apart. 
 
                                                 
119  This case was, of course, not counted either as a crime experience or as a police bribe in 
our survey since the respondent had not paid anything, but the episode reveals the kind 
of additional information that may reach the interviewers during field visits but that has 
to be lost in the survey report itself.  
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Another young teenage respondent told about the costs of belonging to 
a family where members are suspected of being criminal. She was liv-
ing in a family of two adults and six children. One brother was contin-
uously fighting with the administration police .He was frequently 
beaten and imprisoned. Recently they had to pay 5 000Ksh for the po-
lice to release him. The family was evidently poor and had no water or 
electricity connections despite the illegal possibilities in the neighbor-
hood. Moreover she was one of very few teenagers who did not pos-
sess any mobile phone. 
 
Police Station G: The station is well organized and located in a well to 
do area in Nairobi. The police officers are once more friendly, but 
what comes out strongly is the fear of their security due to the com-
munities they serve. They feel that the risk of becoming attacked is 
high since they are easily recognized as policemen. – Being located in 
a upper income fairly secure area, when criminals first get involved, 
the stakes are likely to be high. 
 
 Housing is a problem because two officers have to share each house 
forcing them not to stay with their families. The officers also tell 
about their concern about the lack of fuel for the vehicles used to pa-
trol or access crime scenes. Another difficulty is that most community 
members are not ready to sign statements or testify in court to give 
information about the criminals in the area.  
 
Their income is not sufficient for covering living costs so most of 
them supplement from subsistence farming. The average monthly in-
come of the five officers interviewed was Kshs 15600. The main 
cause of crime in this area is unemployment, drunkenness and pov-
erty. The dominant types of crime include theft, robbery, carjacking, 
sexual offenses and illicit brew. Problems encountered by the police 
when taking a statement are language barriers leading to distorted in-
formation. People do not understand the justice system and processes, 
and people are afraid of giving information. However, the officers de-
scribed their relationship with the community as good because some 
people give information about the mungiki. Three of the officers said 
this relationship is good. Four out of five officers said they worry 
much about their security, since thugs are likely to strike back and 
harm the officers. However, none of the officers has been attacked by 
thugs recently. 
 
Three out of the five officers here disagreed with the statement that 
police in Kenya are the most corrupt. However, three of the officers 
have come across a police officer who has received a bribe, but only 
one officer knew about a police officer who was under investigation 
for corruption. Two officers agreed that they have received a bribe, 
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but they were quick to add that it was an appreciation given to them 
for doing good work. Three officers disagreed with the claim that only 
10 percent of crime is registered in Kenya. Similarly, three officers 
disagreed that poor people have difficulties making a statement.  
 
Police Station H: This station is located in a remote, rural area, but 
again the police officers were very friendly and ready to be inter-
viewed. Most of them have not been transferred since they reported to 
the station. They do not have time to interact with their families, they 
live in very poor conditions; the forms of crime they normally deal 
with are land issues, death and murder. The main causes of crime are 
poverty, unemployment among the youth and the presence of orga-
nized criminal gangs (mungiki). The strong community policing man-
ages to help the police in effecting their daily duties. There is also fear 
for personal security by the police officers here too despite the rural 
location. The police also lack enough stationery and guns. 
 
It is striking with this location that the community lives in fear be-
cause of the mungiki. Hence, they all applauded the police force for 
wiping out the organized gangs. But more than elsewhere most citi-
zens were not so free to be interviewed or give information for fear of 
their words being used against them. This fear has affected the socio-
economic status of the place as the locals do not interact freely 
amongst themselves. There is also fear to invest in business as they 
are never sure when the organized gangs will strike. This was evident 
from the buildings that had been deserted. Nevertheless, it was re-
vealed that most locals have bribed the police to prevent arrest – espe-
cially among the youth, as police patrols are done every night. In this 
community, it is the norm to give bribes and the community does not 
see bribes as an illegal practice anymore.  
 
The average monthly salary income for five officers in the H area was 
Kshs.15400 while their household monthly budget was Kshs.8000. 
The main causes of crime in this area – as expressed by the respond-
ents – were lack of education, lack of resources, unemployment and 
domestic issues such as land. The main crimes include mungiki 
threats, domestic violence, land disputes, assault and robbery. The 
problems encountered by officers when taking a statement was high-
lighted as language barriers and lack of stationery.  
 
The support the officers receive from the community is community 
policing as well as information about criminals in the area. Four of the 
officers also worried about their own security especially during patrols 
at night. All criminals, especially mungiki are against the officers. On-
ly two of the officers agree that police in Kenya are the most corrupt, 
but admitted corruption was not rare, especially among the traffic po-
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lice officers. Only one of the officers said that he has come across an 
officer who has received a bribe. The other four officers dismissed the 
question and did not want to answer any question on corruption. Only 
one officer accepted that he has received a bribe. Three of the officers 
disagreed that only ten percent of crime is reported in Kenya. Similar-
ly, three officers disagreed that poor people have difficulties making a 
statement. The two who agreed that poor people have difficulties mak-
ing a statement attributed the difficulties to fear of going to testify in 
court and insecurity. 
 
The average monthly income of the 17 people interviewed in the local 
community was Kshs 16000. Seven out of the 17 people interviewed 
have experienced crime during the last two years. Such crimes include 
theft and burglary. It was surprising that the people in this area were 
not willing to answer the questions on crime freely. Our guess is that 
this is due to the relative strong influence of mungiki members. Many 
people are afraid of talking about mungiki. Only three out of 17 peo-
ple reported crime. Eight out of 17 people believe crime has gone 
down in the area. They reiterated that activities of mungiki, which are 
mainly criminal in nature, have gone down due to heavy presence of 
the police officers in the area and transfer out of officers who were 
collaborating with mungiki, committing criminal activities. Hence, 
eleven out of 17 people believe the performance of the police officers 
has improved and they have helped to bring down crime and improve 
security in the area. Twelve of the respondents somewhat trust police 
officers mainly because the police have helped to improve security in 
the area. Fourteen respondents will be more willing to report crime if 
there was less corruption among the police officers. 
 
The H area has experienced high rate of crime and insecurity in the 
last five years due to the organized group (mungiki), respondents 
claim. The group has caused fears among the people, destroyed their 
business and people are still afraid of interacting freely. 
 
Police Station J: From the J police station we got the impression that 
security situation in the Mombasa area is generally not bad and cor-
ruption incidents are not that many. The officers interviewed seemed 
to be happy with their profession but unhappy with their salary and 
transfer/working conditions. The police officers believe unemploy-
ment is the main cause of crime in the area as many young people are 
idle and get lured into drag trafficking and use. The officers trivialise 
their involvement in corruption as nothing compared to the grand cor-
ruption happing at the central government which involves huge sums 
of money. The officers tend to confuse corruption with gifts or pre-
sents that are given freely. They perceive many acts of corruption as 
gifts, indicating that there is no corruption.  
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The household monthly average budget for the five police officers we 
interviewed is s ten Kshs.10,000. With an average monthly salary of 
about Kshs.17,000, the police saves about Kshs. 7,000 per month.  
 
The main cause of crime in this area is poverty and unemployment, 
but common crimes are drug abuse, sodomy and defilement. The 
community collaborates with the police by providing information on 
drug dealers. It also assists the police through community policing to 
arrest criminals. 
 
Problems encountered by the police when taking a statement include 
language barrier and lack of openness on the part of the citizens in re-
cording a statement. The police always worry about their security as 
thugs can shoot them, especially while on duty and when they encoun-
ter robbery. Two of the police officers interviewed have been attacked 
by robbers more than three times. 
 
Three of the officers interviewed agree that the police, especially the 
traffic police, are the most corrupt public agency in Kenya. Two out of 
the officers we interviewed have received a bribe of about Kshs. 2000. 
This according to them was offered to them by the citizens. Two out 
of the five officers we interviewed know about at least a police officer 
who was under investigation for corruption. 
 
Three out of the five officers claim that most crimes are reported. This 
is contrary to the findings of the GJLOS study that only ten percent of 
crimes are reported. The perception that poor people have difficulties 
making a statement was also rejected by four out of five officers inter-
viewed. On the contrary, the officers argued, poor people are the best 
in making a statement and that all cases are taken seriously without 
discrimination based on income status. The officers remarked that 
crimes given priority include rape, defilement, sodomy and murder. 
However, they reiterated that no crime is given less priority. 
 
The community representatives interviewed were mainly community 
leaders working with the community policing programme. They have 
frequent interactions with the police, they are therefore known to the 
police and they also know the police. They act as intermediaries be-
tween the police and the community. They intervene in most of the 
crime cases hence are minimising the number of cases that are report-
ed to the police station. The community leaders work very closely 
with the chief and with the police when the chief is unable to attend to 
the case.  
 
The community around the J station is urban poor with average in-
come of about Kshs. 15,000 per month. Most families have an average 
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of 5-6 children. Eighteen out of twenty four people interviewed in this 
area have experienced crime. Nine of the crimes experienced were 
theft, two were robbery and one was kidnapping. Fifteen out of eight-
een people who experienced crime reported the crime to the police 
station and it took them an average of 30 minutes to record a crime. 
Those citizens who knew the officers personally took less time in re-
cording a crime. In the last five years crime rate has gone down. This 
was remarked by fourteen people out of twenty four people inter-
viewed. They attributed the decline in crime to increased citizen par-
ticipation in community policing. 
 
Four out of twenty four respondents have given a bribe to a police of-
ficer. Three were asked to give a bribe by the police officers, while 
one gave without being asked. The highest bribe given was Kshs 
2500. Thirteen out of twenty four respondents somewhat trust the of-
ficers. Three respondents have no trust at all in the officers. Only eight 
respondents have complete trust in the officers. Surprisingly, all the 
respondents will be more willing to report crime if there was less cor-
ruption in the police force. 
 
Police Station I: This area has a history of violence and crime with the 
most historical one being the violence of 1997. In the autumn of 1997, 
six policemen were killed when local raiders armed with traditional 
weapons and guns rampaged through the area. A police station and 
outpost were destroyed, along with countless market stalls and offices. 
Many non-local Kenyans were either killed or maimed, as the raiders 
targeted Luo, Luhya, Kamba and Kikuyu communities. It was esti-
mated that ten police officers and thirty-seven raiders were killed in 
the clashes. The remainder of fatalities were in the local community. 
 
Around and in the I police station the general impression was that 
crime incidences are declining due to successful collaboration be-
tween the community leaders working on community policing pro-
gramme and the police. There is also mutual understanding between 
leaders on community policing programme and the police. Here the 
main perceived cause of crime is poverty, and many households are 
very poor. Although the police deny discriminating against the poor, 
some households have experienced frustration with the police service. 
There are instances where cases reported by the poor households have 
not been investigated to conclusion. 
 
The average monthly income of the five police officers we inter-
viewed was Kshs. 16,600. The average household monthly budget was 
about Kshs. 15,000. The main causes of crime in this area are similar 
to those in the J area, that is, poverty and unemployment. The domi-
nant crimes include drug trafficking, burglary, robbery and assault. 
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Problems encountered by the officers while taking a statement include 
language barrier and unwillingness to give information on criminals 
by the citizens.  
 
Four out of the five officers interviewed always worry about their own 
security. The main security threats are attacks by thugs especially 
when on duty. Two out of five officers have been attacked by thugs 
more than ten times. 
 
Three out of five officers interviewed agree that the police are very 
corrupt just like any other government department in Kenya because 
of low salaries that do not meet their basic needs. Three of the five 
officers have come across a police officer who has received a bribe 
and three of the officers know of a police officer who is under investi-
gation for corruption. Three of the officers agreed that they have re-
ceived a bribe, however, but they claimed that they were offered and 
did not request to be given. 
 
Four out of five officers interviewed disagreed with the claim that on-
ly ten per cent of crimes committed in Kenya are reported. They ar-
gued that the opposite is true, that is, about ten per cent of crime is not 
reported. Also, four of the officers disagreed that poor people in Ken-
ya have difficulties making a statement. According to them, crimes 
that are given priority are robbery, murder and sexual offences. Four 
of the officers observed that their relationship with the community is 
good and that the community collaborates with them by volunteering 
information about crime and criminals. 
 
The average monthly household income of the twenty four community 
members interviewed was about Kshs. 15000. Fifteen out of 24 re-
spondents have experienced crime, mainly theft and physical assault, 
in the last two years. Only seven out of 24 respondents reported crime, 
however. The rest did not report for various reasons including crime 
was not serious enough, the police would do nothing in response, did 
not have time and family handled the crime. 
 
Four out of 24 people have paid a bribe to the police to report a crime 
after a police officer asked for a bribe. The rest of the people have not 
paid a bribe. Only seven out of 24 people gave an opinion regarding 
whether crime has gone down or up during the last five years. Three 
out of those who gave an opinion said that crime has gone down in the 
last five years. Poor response on this question may indicate that people 
did not know whether crime has increased or not. Eleven people ob-
served that police have performed well in the area indicating that they 
have done their duty well. However, only five respondents said they 
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trust the police, twelve did not trust and only six said they ‘somewhat’ 
trust police. 
Part C. Kenyan high- crime frequent- 
police- bribe equilibrium:  
An exploration of inter-linkages and 
policy instruments  
Here we will discuss various policy and theoretical questions raised by 
the evidence presented in the former chapters. The study of the vari-
ous policy instruments below will make it clearer how crime preven-
tion strategies on the part of the communities and the police are inter-
linked and have impact on police corruption levels. While some ana-
lytical questions are raised they are not followed far and the discus-
sion is explorative throughout.  
Chapter 1: Limitations of victimization studies for policy and 
research 
Our first policy relevant observation is of a rather negative nature and 
related to the limitations inherent in victimization studies themselves. 
We have presented most of the victimization based research on police 
corruption and crime in Kenya we are aware of together with our own 
small contribution. From this it is clear that even under the best of cir-
cumstances there are many important aspects of both police behavior 
and crime that will be out of focus when constrained to data of this 
kind. 
 
Regarding the police we are unable to handle their organizational 
structure in any meaningful, evidence-based way when we only have 
information about the crime and corruption victims. Even in our sur-
vey where we were allowed to interview police officers, the infor-
mation about how eventual bribe income is distributed and jobs allo-
cated are too scanty to build up any systematic picture on empirical 
grounds of how eventual bribe collection is organized and bribe in-
come distributed inside the police force. 
 
More importantly and particularly so for policy: we have argued, due 
to its role in society the police are an exceptionally politically sensi-
tive part of the public bureaucracy, but we cannot present any system-
atic evidence how the political mechanisms for hiring and firing police 
leadership, and the more diffuse political signals evolve and influence 
the organization about what kinds of behaviour that are permitted or 
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frowned upon. Not at least because the police are such a hierarchic 
organization a diffuse phenomenon like political will is a key to, for 
example, any anti-corruption policy in the police. 
 
To study the impact of politicians the police leadership has to come 
into the foreground. Any study of police corruption at this level have 
to focus on possible internal bribe transmittance structures and the 
large scale procurement decisions made in the security sector, not the 
victims of police corruption at the street level. While several of the 
largest corruption scandals in Kenya have arisen here, it is not any 
part of our study where the focus is on the inter-linkages between po-
lice corruption and crime as they arise as part of the citizens’ experi-
ences in their daily life. 
 
From this point of view it is more serious that we miss information 
about crime perpetrators since they are likely to supply a significant 
share of the bribe income collected by police officers. Equally serious 
is that agents involved in victimless crimes such as drug sales and 
prostitution (when illegal) are not likely to report on bribe payments 
either and will drop out of view from any victim-based data on police 
corruption. This is especially pertinent since victimless crimes consti-
tute a large share of the economic basis of eventual organized crime 
organizations whose eventual interaction with the police is important 
for the size and patterns of police corruption and crime patterns in any 
area. 
 
Finally, other important forms of police misconduct, such as unneces-
sary police brutality, are not covered in either our or other victimiza-
tion surveys. This would be unproblematic from a policy point of view 
if corruption and brutality either were totally uncorrelated or were 
strictly positively correlated with possible policy instruments working 
in the same manner on both. Research from New York shows that the 
latter under some under some situations is likely to be the case 
(Andvig and Shrivastava, 2009), but in countries like Kenya where the 
ethnicity matching of the police and the public may be significant for 
these behaviours, policy instruments may well impact in opposite 
manners: efforts to prevent corruption may increase police brutality. 
The interactions between police brutality, police corruption and crime 
are likely to be significant and important to study not only for police 
corruption but for crime, but so far data here are missing although po-
lice brutality should in principle be possible to study using the same 
survey instruments, only adding a few questions.120  
 
                                                 
120  It may prove more difficult to get respondents to answer these questions, however, since 
victims exposed to police brutality may feel that they then may be considered to be 
crime perpetrators themselves. 
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Moving now to victimization studies and crime, their inability to cover 
victimless crime forms and thereby also a large share of organized 
crime activities, is, of course a major weakness when mapping the 
crime pattern in a community. Reinforcing the lack of grip on orga-
nized crime activities is the fact that victimization surveys are not so 
well adapted to homicide research. In the nature of the case a murder 
victim is unable to report, so here all reports have to be indirect. More 
generally, another obvious limitation of any study of crime victims; is 
that it does not ask the crime perpetrator, whether they belong to a 
crime organization or not. To gain a real understanding of crime one 
must also study the supply side, the criminals’ motives, social and 
economic backgrounds and their ways of organization.. Hence, even 
in the best case crime victimization surveys will only give a lopsided 
picture of crime including police corruption. 
 
Nevertheless, a victimization survey gives an empirical framework, an 
empirical mapping of the incidence of a large number of daily occur-
ring crimes, the extent to which they victimize the population through 
actions that immediately reduce the welfare of victims not compen-
sated fully by the perpetrators eventual excitement. They should be 
well designed for covering most of the welfare loss associated with 
crime, that after all should be one of the most important, if not the 
most important policy issue in this field. 
 
Here we reach what we consider the most important weakness of us-
ing victimization surveys as an instrument for directing policy their 
high degree of variation in reported victimization rates across sur-
veys. This is a limitation of a different kind that limits their usefulness 
for the study of crime/corruption fighting policy consequences. Look-
ing back to our presentation of results, the large variation in outcomes 
is of course a cause of concern when using victimization surveys in 
any empirical framework. When the fraction of households that may 
pay a bribe to the police may vary between about 6% (GJLOS) to 70% 
(TI Kenya 2002) and the households’ regular crime rate experiences 
may vary between 16% (GJLOS) to possibly 100% (Stavrou, Afro 
barometer) of the households, the empirical research has so far been 
unable to narrow the extent of the phenomena impressively down, to 
put it mildly. Here policymakers have to wade into a field of large 
empirical uncertainty. To use any given victimization survey to meas-
ure in any precise way the impact of any definite policy instrument on 
the extent of crime (and police corruption) as was the intention behind 
the GJLOS survey, is almost doomed to failure. It will not be possible, 
for example, to tell if the crime has gone down due to the policy shift 
or due to a different framing effect associated with the new victimiza-
tion survey – or whatever that may have caused the shift in reported 
outcomes. 
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That said and admitted, it is of great interest whether the Kenyan pop-
ulation experiences crimes with the high frequencies suggested above 
or in the neighborhood of 0.175% as would be the situation if the offi-
cial crime rate based on police statistics had been the representative 
picture. It may hardly be in doubt that whatever the victimization sur-
vey that is the closest to the real crime rates, crime experiences and 
police corruption are part of the Kenyans’ daily life with significant 
negative welfare consequences. The police statistics will give a wrong 
impression. They are phenomena well worth to contain through poli-
cy. But how? 
 
Some of the most effective policy instruments are likely to be located 
wholly outside the judicial sector. Many Kenyans believe, supported 
by observations made by some respondents in our exploration, that the 
most efficient instrument against crime is public work directed to-
wards youth unemployment. If economically feasible, our exploration 
also suggests that increased street lightening should be tried. That is 
likely to reduce both police corruption (of the extortion variety), the 
fear of crime as well crime itself.  
 
But here we will focus on policy instruments inside the judicial sector 
itself. Here some of the most efficient policy instruments are likely to 
be located at the upper level of the police and the courts, close to the 
world of the politicians. This is, as mentioned, not a world we have 
explored here, so to propose policies at this level will be a kind of arti-
ficial add-on to our empirical study of daily life crime and bribery ex-
periences. The appropriate policy instruments to explore would have 
to be sought further down the hierarchical chain, in the workings of 
the daily interactions between the police and the public. 
Chapter 2. Community policing and crime-fighting as a  
collective action problem 
Among the last decade’s policy discussion about the police, the set of 
polices under the heading of ‘community policing’ have received most 
attention. More or less implicitly it recognizes the underlying com-
monality of interests between the police and citizens in many situa-
tions, but by doing so the policy discussions also assume away the 
many divergences in interests rooted in collective action situations 
made more difficult by Kenyan history; the prevalent mutual suspi-
cion, if not antagonism, between the police and the public. This has to 
be accepted as a fact before any sensible policy analysis can be made. 
Introduced prematurely, community policing ideas have often been 
launched more as a way to deny facts than to propose reasonable poli-
cies. 
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Among those facts are that the policy has to be implemented by a po-
lice force with a high bribe and extortion propensity confronted by a 
public among which a large share is suspicious if not hateful towards 
the police. Several of the collective action problems that arise between 
the public and the frontline police when producing the local public 
good of relative security against may be illustrated through an analysis 
of three set of policy instruments: 
 
i) the obligatory, non-voluntary transfers of officers across police 
stations, 
ii)  the ID requirements of the public and 
iii)  the crime registration process.  
 
We will first look at crime-fighting in Kenya from the more general 
perspective as a collective action problem and then discuss each of 
these policies from that perspective, that is, to look as crime preven-
tion and crime investigation as two linked, but partly separate collec-
tive action problems
121
 where both the police and the citizens ideally 
are involved.
122
 Why is it reasonable to look at the police and citizen’s 
actions together as a collective action problem? Our main line of de-
parture is to regard the frontline police to be sufficiently un-monitor 
able, and hence not reward able or punishable from above. This makes 
their crime-fighting efforts fairly close to voluntary actions; almost at 
par with the regular community members efforts. 
 
Let us first look at crime prevention. Here it is quite usual to regard a 
community of citizens as a relevant collective action group for supply-
ing local security whose activities may eventually be substituted by 
police efforts. In high crime areas which embrace most of Kenya, the 
outcome of mixing the police and community efforts may sometimes 
prove rather negative. Habyarimana et al (2009:1) observe a case from 
Uganda that is not likely to differ much from Kenya in this respect:  
 
‘The Ugandan government used to sponsor and equip local defense 
units (LDUs) to patrol neighborhoods like Kisalosalo [a high crime 
neighborhood in Kampala according to the authors]. But government 
support for the LDUs ceased in 2002 when they were incorporated 
into the formal police system; since then Kampala’s slum areas have 
been overtaken by crime and violence.’  
                                                 
121  Assuming that both the police and the community members both want increased security 
and both may influence it through some form of costly effort, this satisfies a rather 
standard criterion for being a collective action problem .(Medina, 2007: 23). 
122  To involve the public in the last link in the crime fighting chain, explicit punishment of 
criminals is more problematic since at this stage citizens may become quite emotional 
and the standards of proof very low. But at an individual level the prevalence of ex-
pected informal sanctions in form of disapproval of criminal actions and suspected crim-
inals may prevent crime. We haven’t brought in any questions that touch these issues, 
however, and will not discuss either this informal post crime-discovery sanctions or col-
lective citizens’ movements in this area such as the sungu-sungu phenomenon.  
98 Jens Chr. Andvig and Tiberius Barasa  
– It appears likely from this bit of information that when the police 
were assigned crime prevention tasks in this case, it reduced commu-
nity crime prevention efforts. The involvement of the state police be-
came a signal for community members to free-ride. Isn’t this in line 
with the role of a modern state where the introduction of a specialist, 
public bureaucracy may solve a collective action problem and allow 
community members to spend their time on something else?123 
 
Since crime prevention sometimes involves the use of instruments of 
violence which is the prerogative of the police (or private, formal or-
ganizations granted a permit from the state), this may appear not to be 
a community task. Moreover the police are a bureaucratic organization 
where tasks are supposed to be stipulated by superiors and executed 
by its frontline officers. To regard frontline police officers and com-
munity members to be parts of the same collective action group that 
may produce more or less of the public good: security against crime 
with potential freeriding as a major issue – may look fanciful. But 
when we consider 
 
i) that frontline officers have large scope for choosing their activity 
levels where their superiors are unlikely to know and then unable 
to reward or punish them on an observational basis, 
ii)  that their actions are likely to be influenced not only by their hi-
erarchical superiors and their fellow officers, but also by actions 
of local community members, 
iii)  that the community members may choose to do some costly 
crime prevention activities themselves,  
iv) many of those activities will not be rewarded or punished at an 
individual, selective basis but only through the common good of a 
lower crime rate124 and, 
                                                 
123  Here we touch a very general debate: does the state tend to destroy (Fukuyama, 1995) or 
enhance (Rothstein, 2005) voluntary forms of cooperation, community actions based on 
trust? In this Uganda case it clearly did the first. when a state institution was introduced 
from the outside. Ensminger (1990) also discuss a case where a state institution substi-
tutes for a voluntary arrangement, but instead of undermining a voluntary, partial solu-
tion to a collective action dilemma it presents a partial solution when a voluntary solu-
tion does not work any longer. In her case new property right conflicts lead the citizens 
to demand their settlement by a state police organization – the local chief instead of the 
local council of elders. In the following we will assume that the Habyarimana case is on-
ly one outcome when the police and local communities are involved in ‘fighting’ crime. 
In general, the complementarity in efforts between the state organization involved and 
the community, as suggested by Rothstein (over much longer time intervals and general-
ity of situations), appears more plausible, we suggest in the following. 
124  Habyarimana et al (2009) considered here voluntary patrolling as the relevant collective 
action, but crime prevention has many other aspects. For one thing, it depends on the 
kind of crime. For example, when a burglary victim turns up at the police station for re-
porting it he will in many cases know that the police are unlikely to discover and arrest 
the perpetrator or reclaim anything stolen of the uninsured goods. He then contributes to 
a common good, the stock of crime knowledge that may make it easier to prevent crime 
in the future. Practically no selective incentive will be involved in this case, whether of 
economic or of a private avenge kind. At the other end we have thefts of insured, goods 
like cars where the citizen has strong private incentive for reporting it to the police. 
While this information also may have a collective goods aspect (insurance fraud accept-
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v) But these or their outcomes will be influenced by what the police 
are doing; we realize that it is not so farfetched to consider crime 
prevention as a kind of collective action game where both the citi-
zens and the police are involved.  
 
Let us nevertheless start out with a very simplified situation where the 
community and police both are considered as a single decision-maker. 
Both prefer high to low security. The police prefer it because that 
makes their work less dangerous, superiors more satisfied and patrol-
ling less hard work. Community members prefer it because they then 
have lower risks of losing life and property. When the police are liv-
ing in the community with their families, that interest is shared by 
them.  
 
Let us further assume that in order to achieve low security levels, cost-
ly activities, called patrolling, are needed from both. For the police 
activity to have sufficient effect, community patrolling is needed. The 
police are too few to be able to monitor the social and economic space 
in question so it alone will have little preventive effect. Police efforts 
are needed on the other hand for community patrolling to have effect 
because the latter will have little effect without the punishment mech-
anisms the police control. We are led into a simple stag hunt (assur-
ance) game
125
: To simplify matters we reduces the crime preventive 
action to patrolling that may either be done by the police, by commu-
nity members or both. Frontline officers are so weakly monitored 
from above that may stay at the police station (local bar) without re-
ceiving negative sanctions from superiors:  
 
Diagram 1: Police –community crime prevention stag hunt 
game126 
 
 Police Patrol    Stay in station 
Community Patrol      { 2 , 2}       { - 1 , 1 } 
Stay at home      {1 , - 1}       { 0 , 0} 
                                                 
ed), the private incentive aspects will so strong that no collective action problem is like-
ly to arise in this case. The police on the other hand may be equally uninterested in both. 
125  Medina (2007) has argued for a stag hunt game as better representation of collective 
action models than the Olson a prisoner dilemma model. 
126  This game is only one possibility where no patrolling may easily arise. If the public may 
make efforts to inform the office’s superior about bar visits, and organized crime may 
punish citizen patrolling when not protected by the police, the worst situation for both is 
to do the opposite of the other and we are close to another classic non-cooperative game 
situation: the battle of the sexes. If the effort costs for both parties are high, the situation 
may approach a classical prisoner’s dilemma. Needless to add a serious, empirically 
based game theoretical analysis needs much more information about effort costs, the ef-
ficiency of actions to reduce crime and the allocation of information between the players 
and their preferences than we may provide here. 
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The preference level of each (numbers in the table) is a positive func-
tion of the community crime level and relies negatively on his/her 
own effort level. The public bad, the community crime level relies 
negatively on both parties’ effort levels. Lower levels give higher util-
ity for the police and the typical citizen alike. According to the as-
sumptions here there are two equilibriums, one with high and one with 
low crime prevention activity from both parties. The one with high 
activity is the preferred one for both.
127
 But if one party quit patrol-
ling, the situation will start to unravel towards the high insecurity situ-
ation where community patrolling stops and the police stay in their 
stations –like the situation as it evolved in the Kampala slums as de-
scribed by Habyarimana et al (2009). 
 
Nevertheless, if this is a realistic model for police–community interac-
tions, low crime (or high crime prevention) situations should arise 
quite often since (2,2) is stable. When this appears not to be the case 
for the majority of Kenyan communities it may be related to the fact 
that communities are not single decision makers but are composed of 
a large number of citizens. It will not be worth the trouble for any sin-
gle citizen to join a patrol except for (possibly) to guard his own 
home. The stag hunt then transforms to a prisoner dilemma game 
where no-patrolling becomes the dominant equilibrium and low crime 
prevention activity will be observed most places most of the time – a 
realistic case for Kenya.128  
 
Just to fix ideas and go little into what may lead to a stag hunt or pris-
oner dilemma solutions129: imagine that one unit of the public good 
would be to catch a dangerous burglar/killer (who also may have 
killed a police.). Presumably the effort costs in this case are fairly high 
both for the police and the active citizens, but both the public and the 
police welfare will increase significantly with this criminal behind the 
bar. When choosing whether to invest such efforts the police officers 
as well as the single citizen have to consider what difference they will 
make given what the others are doing. And each will have to make an 
assessment of what efforts the others are likely to put in. 
 
Let the utility for the frontline police be U(2) when they stay at the 
station, but the criminal is nevertheless caught, presumably by com-
munity efforts. No sanctions against the police from superiors will 
arise in this case. The utility of a catch with police effort costs deduct-
ed is U(1). The police may either make effort E, or do nothing, NE. 
                                                 
127  There is also mixed strategy equilibrium where each player assigns a probability that the 
other player will patrol where these probabilities are compatible with equilibrium. 
128  Another possibly more plausible explanation may be that the expected efficiency of both 
police and citizen patrolling with respect to reducing crime is too low for a stag hunt so-
lution to be realistic. 
129  The following is just an attempt to open the situation up for analysis. We will not settle 
for a definite model at this stage. 
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The police are more likely to make those efforts in case the utility in-
creases significantly after the success, the more likely the efforts cho-
sen by the police is to lead to success, p(E, f), and the lower the disu-
tility of the effort. The utility if the police are doing nothing and the 
criminal is not caught is U(4), and if he remains free after the police 
have done their customary efforts it is U(3). U(3) is assumed lower 
than U(4). Hence, while the superiors may influence the four utility 
situations for the frontline police through a combination of rewards for 
efforts and results these incentives are too weak to change this utility 
ranking. One reason is that the superiors have exceptionally sparse 
information about frontline bureaucrats in this case, so rewards are 
unlikely to be distributed with any precision.  
 
 The probability of catching the criminal with no efforts on the part of 
the police is q(NE,f). Then we will have that 
The expected value of effort,  W = p U(1) + (1- p) U(3),  
The expected value of non-effort: V = q U(2) + (1-q) U(4). 
 
To induce the police to make the effort, W ≥ V. 
Since U(4)≥U(3) and U(2)≥U(1), we see that p>>q, that is, the proba-
bility that the criminal is caught should increase significantly by the 
police effort; and, somewhat vaguely, the utility differences U(4)- 
U(3) and U(2) – U(1) should be ‘small’ around both situations, the 
capture and the non-capture, for the police to make the effort.  
 
Furthermore, when deciding whether to do the effort to contribute to 
the collective good of catching this criminal, the police officer has to 
estimate the fraction, f, in the community that may assist her. If this 
fraction has larger effects on the catch probability when the police are 
active than if passive, a higher share will not only increase the catch 
probability directly, but may also induce the police to increase its ef-
forts and thereby increase the probability further. If the effects on q 
are stronger, on the other hand, community efforts may cause the po-
lice to reduce its efforts and thereby partially reduce the effect of 
community efforts. In the extreme case when the police rely on com-
munity efforts to have any chance of catching the criminal, p - q will 
be close to zero when f ~ 0. Hence it makes no sense for the police to 
make any effort in this situation since it has almost no effect on the 
catch probability. If p - q increases with f, the police may switch from 
passivity at f= f´> 0. 
 
It is plausible that the typical citizen will have similar preferences and 
catching probabilities, although lower. For shortness, we will not 
specify them here.130 The difference is that each citizen will on the 
                                                 
130  But note that if quite symmetrical with the police, the sudden switch to non-activity 
when the police were introduced in the Kampala slum could arise if the community be-
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one hand only have a minuscule impact on the catch probability, on 
the other hand the effort costs may also be small, and so the final cal-
culation may not be that different.131 In both cases, costly individual 
efforts are not likely to forth come with only private-regarding behav-
ior without some institutional arrangements that may solve the collec-
tive action problem. 
 
Realistically, the shape of the probability functions p = P(E, f) and q 
=Q(NE, f) as well as the size of, E - the effort, will vary according to 
the crime considered as will the utilities for both the police and the 
typical citizen before and after the catch of the criminal. This catching 
of dangerous criminal is, of course, meant only to be metaphor for a 
significant improvement in the local crime situation. In the following 
we will not consider any specific crime but look at an aggregate crime 
level c = C/N where N is the size of the community population and C 
is the number of crimes in the community (each crime weighted with 
its disutility). The police’s efficiency in reducing crime disutility is –
ΔC = g( E, f) where f is the fraction in the community that cooperates 
with the police.  
  
While neighborhood patrolling do occur in some poor densely popu-
lated and young community members may be paid to keep guard in 
some lower middle class areas
132
, it is not likely to be among the most 
important crime ’fighting’ efforts on the part of the public. But here 
patrolling (like the ‘dangerous criminal’) may also be considered as a 
metaphor for all kinds of actions performed by the public directed 
against crime and information provided by the public about criminal 
activities that may be conveyed to the police at some costs to the citi-
zen provider of the information. Similarly, the police ‘patrolling’ may 
include all kind of costly efforts above the necessary minimum to 
keep the job that are likely to reduce the crime level in the area 
through arrests, crime investigations, inspections or other information 
gathering of various kind.  
 
                                                 
lieved that the police had much higher probability in catching the criminal than them-
selves. 
131  In Habyarimana et al (2009: 35) report that on average the low income communities 
address the collective action problem involved in security more often than garbage and 
drainage activities. The explanation appears to be the stronger positive selective incen-
tive in the excitement of crime catching compared to garbage collection, particularly for 
the younger community members.  
132  High income residential areas will use private companies. The quality of these are prob-
ably become somewhat better in Kenya–stories are more rarely told about guards turned 
burglary accomplices – and more reliable as the firm size of the private security organi-
zations have increased and thereby also the importance of their reputation. We have, 
however, chosen not to bring in these firms into our analysis. With increased efficiency 
they may together with more efficient electronic alarm systems increase the relative re-
turn to burglary in poorer neighborhoods and increase the crime rates there. A study ver-
ifying such effects in Argentine during the financial crisis there is presented in di Tella 
et al (2010). 
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As indicated above there are positive spillovers between the public’s 
and the police’s information collection: the more information collect-
ed by the public and conveyed to it, the more use the police may make 
from its own information collecting. We have, obviously, simplified 
the situation in various directions. One is that we have assumed that 
the effort levels of the different parties may be made independently of 
each other. This is unrealistic in some respects. If a crime victim in-
sists that a crime needs to be registered and makes the effort to go to 
the police station, a police officer will have to make some efforts to 
fill in a note in the occurrence book, or the officer may even have to 
move to the crime site in the middle of the night. In order to monitor a 
certain neighborhood and make it secure a police officer may need to 
arrest some suspected criminals that later may prove innocent, or gen-
erate traffic delays through road inspections, that is, the efforts of the 
police may also have direct negative impact on community utility lev-
els in addition to their effects on crime. 
 
We have no empirical information about police absentee rates, but re-
cently research on other groups of public employees has been per-
formed relevant for our discussion of the police officer low effort 
equilibrium is the study of absentee rates for teachers and health per-
sonnel in some developing countries (Chaudhury et al, 2006). Four 
observations are of interest here: 
 
i) The absence rates for these professions are high in developing 
countries. In Uganda 27% for teachers133 and 37% for health 
personnel. 
ii) It is higher for superiors and for health personnel than for 
teachers everywhere.  
iii) It is lower in areas where average citizen income and educa-
tion levels are higher 
iv) It is lower when the official is born in the same district as she 
works. 
 
We note that the absence rates increases with the difficulty of moni-
toring. No such data for police officers exists, however. As a matter of 
comparison we note that they, like teachers may few alternatives on 
the labor market. This may tend to reduce the absence rates, but they 
are (so far) even more difficult to monitor from above than health per-
sonnel. We believe the difference here to be more substantial, hence 
we may expect their absence rates to be even higher, but more diffi-
cult to observe (cf. the bar alternative) for superiors and researchers 
alike.134 In the following we will argue, that these high absence rates 
                                                 
133  While not wholly compatible the absence rate for teachers at Kenyan schools appear 
lower (around 20% -27%). Glewwe et al (2010). 
134  The iii) and iv) indicate a set of general mechanisms where the characteristics of the 
local communities have impact on the behavior of the public employees. Given the na-
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for the police are only latent. The peculiarities of police corruption 
substitute for absence. 
 
Low activity equilibriums for police officers may be quite prevalent if 
they are not presented with selective incentives that may be more pre-
cisely elicited from community members than from superiors since 
they are better informed about the efforts and even results achieved by 
the frontline police officers. Most police activities are after all per-
formed in public. Seen from this perspective, the community members 
are in a better position to distribute effort-related incentives than the 
officers’ superiors. That is, it may appear more efficient that commu-
nity members bribe the officers to draw them into dangerous work 
outside the police station (or the bar) than for superiors to supply per-
formance-based wages. Seen from an economic theoretical point of 
view it may be tempting to make the hypothesis that the high level of 
police corruption we may observe in poor, high crime areas is a rather 
efficient way to elicit efforts from a police force where the state is un-
able to present the officers with proper incentives to act, when they 
lack the commitment to state service that may induce police services 
in other contexts. 135  
 
A few observations we made can support that this mechanism some-
times work even to facilitate crime prevention. Members of the com-
munity around one of the small rural police station (police station B) 
told us that they supported the establishment of a roadblock in the 
community,136 knowing that it would increase the police’s bribe col-
lection, but believing that it reduced crime particularly from strangers. 
In this case the roadblock was situated at a fairly large throughway so 
most of the bribes were paid by non-members.137  
 
More generally, to ensure bribe payment to police officers to involve 
them in crime prevention, is in itself a collective action problem for 
the community that may only be resolved in exceptional cases such as 
the situation around police station B. For why should a specific com-
                                                 
ture of police work those are likely to be exceptionally strong in the case of police. In 
this context it has interest to note that the clearest result from Azfar and Gurgur (2008) 
was that the crime reporting rate of the public reduces police corruption. 
135  Brehm and Gates (1997) make a detailed empirical analysis of incentives and behaviour 
of different groups of employees, including police officers, in different US public organ-
ization and show how important professional commitments to public service are for 
avoiding misconduct. Given Kenyan history and social conditions, it is clearly a com-
mitment that may not easily arise. 
136  In the autumn 2009Kenyan authorities made a campaign against the police formation of 
roadblocks as a sensible component in their ant-corruption policy. To form on local 
community support was needed at the time of our investigation. 
137  Complex calculations regarding the location of roadblocks apparently take place. In the 
case of police station A – and according to newspaper stories published after our visit, 
the roadblocks had moved away from the through road dividing the district and into the 
local non-paved roads. Whether the last development was due to the higher national vis-
ibility of the latter through-road which carries more heavy traffic, local politics or a will-
ingness of national transport companies to pay for the stretch of roadblock free road, we 
don’t know. 
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munity member pay a bribe single-handed to provide a selective in-
centive for supplying the public good of a crime fighting police of-
ficer? The main selective economic incentive that community mem-
bers may apply in order to drag the officers away from the station (or 
the bar) is of course to bribe. Most of the bribes will be made after a 
crime has been committed since it is then some concrete decisions the 
police may make and which outcome specific community members 
may be willing to pay for. When those are paid by crime victims, they 
are likely to contribute to a reduction of crime in the area (when the 
crime events that police corruption itself constitute, are excluded). 
Whether the crime victim is willing to pay, will hinge upon the nature 
of the crime, whether the victim is likely to recover the stolen asset or 
gain revenge through an eventually increased likelihood of gaining 
legal punishment to the perpetrator. 
 
But our data indicate that payment from crime victims is not the most 
frequent source of bribe income for the police. More frequent are 
bribes paid in connections the wrongful arrests of citizens who have 
not made any crime. And even worse from the public good service 
perspective are the bribes collected from criminals in order for them to 
avoid or reduce their punishment. Most of these are likely to be unre-
ported in victimization surveys like ours.  
 
Hence, it becomes rather simplistic to regard bribe payments to the 
police simply as a way to improve police efficiency, even when we 
disregard all incentives that are not directly economic in nature. Nev-
ertheless, most of the time police officers have to move outside their 
stations in order to collect bribes whether they are gained through se-
rious investigative police work or through wrongful arrests of inno-
cents made in the middle of the night. That is, the hunting for bribes 
whatever source may have an energizing effect on the police.138 When 
bribe hunting, the police officers are likely to become more visible 
and will have stronger incentives to collect crime-relevant information 
from their neighborhood, whether that is to extract bribes from guilty 
criminals or from crime victims in order to catch the former.  
 
Extortion from innocent citizens produces of course less relevant in-
formation, but again its chase may move the officers into positions 
where crime information may inadvertently be collected such as it 
may happen at nightly patrols. Whether this increased activity and 
larger stock of crime- relevant information possessed by frontline po-
lice officers that are induced by the bribe hunting, will on average re-
duce or increase the crime level in the community, is an open ques-
tion. It will depend essentially on what the real alternatives are, but it 
                                                 
138  This is very different from other public employees who often have to reduce their speed 
in order to increase the citizens’ willingness to pay. 
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is not unlikely that bribe hunting unintentionally may contribute to 
less crime when only the police officers’ behaviour is considered in 
isolation. This unintended consequence of the possible efficiency gain 
of police corruption is of course not any explanation of its occurrence. 
Moreover, when regarding the effects of the police’s bribe chase on 
the public’s attitude to the police and its willingness to supply infor-
mation, all gains for crime fighting are likely to blow away. 
Chapter 3. Ethnic diversity, officer rotation, crime  
registration and ID controls 
In this chapter we will relate the crime ‘fighting’ process to recent and 
rapidly growing research that has looked at the impact of ethnic diver-
sity on collective action. The main thrusts of results are – rather un-
surprisingly – that ethnic diversity adds to the difficulty in establishing 
collective actions. In their study from Uganda Habyarimana et al 
(2009) through a combination of local experiments and question-
naires, found that the major mechanism through which shared ethnici-
ty worked, was through social sanctions. Social sanctions act as a kind 
of selective incentives that make free-riding more costly. With shared 
ethnicity social sanctions have stronger effect and are more easily elic-
ited. In particular, members are more willing to spend the efforts nec-
essary for such sanctioning.139  
 
There remain many puzzles in this research field, however, that may 
have implications for our study of the police- community interactions. 
For example, in a study of informal groups in Kibera Anderson and 
Francois (2008) found that co-ethnic groups established more formal 
devices such as written constitutions, external revisions, etc. than eth-
nically mixed groups. They suggest that intra-group social sanctions 
may work for low cost deviations, but not for more severe punish-
ments. Hence, co-ethnic groups may seek institutional solutions in or-
der to pre-commit to such punishment through more formal devices. 
Naturally, police officers have to mete out various forms of punish-
ments in the communities they are stationed. What will be the out-
come when the police belong to a different ethnic group than the crim-
inal or the regular non-criminal community members?  
  
In this chapter we will look at the implications of this research for our 
collective action problem where frontline police officers and commu-
nity members together may produce more or less of the local public 
good of security against crime.140 Due to the particular role of the po-
                                                 
139  The found little differences in the demand for the public good or other preference be-
tween the different ethnic groups that could explain the effects of ethnic diversity.  
140  Here as well in the following we will both disregard areas – such as rich Nairobi neigh-
bourhoods – where there may not exist any defined community and the issue of migrat-
ing criminals that may reinforce or weaken the effects of local collective action. 
Cops and Crime in Kenya   107 
 
107 
lice we will discuss the likely impact of having police officers who 
belong or do not belong to the dominant local tribal group(s) as we 
look at three different policy instruments: geographical job-rotation, 
crime registration procedures and local spatial control of citizen 
movements through such devices as ID controls, roadblocks and 
nightly patrols.  
 
Non-voluntary, geographical job-rotation. A striking feature of Ken-
yan police when looked at from abroad is its rotation policy. Even po-
lice officers at the lowest levels are rotated on a non-voluntary basis 
across different geographical areas of the whole country. These areas 
may differ substantially in local language and partially in customs. 
The practice appears to have evolved from British colonial ruling 
methods,
141
 although these varied in detail and vary in the degree to 
which they have survived in recent practices. For example, in the In-
dian police that in many ways was a model for the development of the 
Kenyan police, the rotation only took (and takes) place on the higher 
levels.  
 
Exactly how this rotation is implanted in Kenya; for example, whether 
there are guiding rules for how long an officer is assumed to stay at 
each station, whether one deliberately try to mix the ethnic composi-
tion at each station, whether one try to make the main force at it to be 
composed of a different ethnic composition than the local community 
as a deliberate policy, or whether the rotation is deliberately random 
decided by the whims of superior officers or the willingness to pay 
among the rotating, lower ranked officers, we don’t know at present. 
They should be studied in the future. We were unable to acquire exact 
data here, partly due to defects in our questionnaire. For example, we 
didn’t ask exactly where the officers had been employed before their 
present assignment. The process in itself appears non-transparent 
without any fixed rules. What we could observe, however, was that at 
any given time a large fraction of the officers interviewed were non-
locals. 
 
As we see it, any serious police reform in Kenya needs to consider 
whether this rotation policy should be continued or not. The answer 
isn’t obvious since it has many ramifications. First of all, it allocates 
large powers – including a potential source for bribe income142 – to 
                                                 
141  This rotation is not a necessary method for a state to rule foreign land. When the Danish 
king ruled Norway the local police function was allocated to the local fogd who was en-
couraged to stay at the same locality for longer periods to learn local conditions. For a 
number of reasons the danger of any undermining of central state direction was not 
prominent.  
142  We have no documentation that bribe payment of this kind in fact takes place in Kenya. 
The Daily Nation story about bribe payment for an inside casino job, was a description 
of weekly job- reassignment inside one police station, not assignment of multi-year posi-
tions across police stations. 
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the office that has the right of reallocation of officers across stations. 
This may in several ways be desirable. We argued in our theoretical 
chapter that one characteristic of policing is that it is extremely diffi-
cult for superior officers to observe the behavior of the frontline bu-
reaucrats and correct misconduct in the police since they are spread 
out and will have to make a number of decisions on their own howev-
er centralized the decision chain is. The threat of moving an officer 
geographically to an undesirable location is a powerful instrument that 
is easier to apply than to fire one and adds to the promotion power. An 
increased value of expected punishment will to some extent compen-
sate for the low detection probability. If mainly the frontline officers 
are involved in misconduct while the officers doing the transfers are 
committed to solving police tasks, this could be a strong argument for 
a transfer system.  
 
As mentioned before, we have no strong data on internal transfers of 
the bribe income collected at the frontline, but circumstantial evidence 
suggests an upwards transfer in the police hierarchy. Hence the rota-
tion policy is most likely to concentrate a higher share of the income 
up towards the rotation decision points. This is most likely to happen 
when the transfers are not rule-bounded. Hence the argument for rota-
tion as a method for strengthening central monitoring of misconduct 
appears double-edged in this context. If a genuine reform is about to 
take place where non-corrupt officers man the rotation decision points 
this may become an argument for keeping it for the time being, how-
ever, since these officers may then influence a larger number of street-
level police officers in a shorter time span. Moreover, if the superior 
officers are honest, it gives an instrument for swift punishments or re-
wards for desirable behavior among the rotating junior officers. The 
backside of any such punishment schemes is the regular one: it may 
pay to send dishonest signals about performance from the junior offic-
ers. The most commonly used economic model to analyze this would 
be a principal-agent variant. 
 
As mentioned, in practice there is another group that often is in a bet-
ter position to monitor the frontline police officers, the citizens or lo-
cal communities. They have rarely any formal way to sanction or re-
ward the officers, however. Here we have to switch perspective and 
look at the rotation policy from our former collective action perspec-
tive: crime prevention and investigation as a collective action prob-
lem
143
 where both the police and the citizens ideally are involved.
144
 
                                                 
143  Assuming that both the police and the community members both want increased security 
and both may influence it through some form of costly effort, this satisfies a rather 
standard criterion for it being a collective action problem .(Medina, 2007: 23). 
144  To involve the public in the last link in the crime fighting chain, explicit punishment of 
criminals, is more problematic since at this stage citizens may become quite emotional 
and the standards of proof very low. But at an individual level the prevalence of ex-
pected informal sanctions in form of disapproval of criminal actions and suspected crim-
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Let us now look at how rotation policy is likely to work for police-
community crime prevention strategies in an ethnically diverse coun-
try like Kenya where tribal identities are significant for many types of 
social interactions, including collective actions. 
 
Miguel and Gugerty (2005) document negative effects of having eth-
nic diverse communities for the deliverance of two low-cost, local 
public goods in two districts in Kenya. One of the districts is one 
where we have two of our police stations located. The public goods 
are different, however. One public good they had data for (84 observa-
tions) was local school funding for items like school books, chalks, 
classroom furniture and pencils (heavy items like teachers’ wages 
were paid by the state) for which the parents were supposed to con-
tribute voluntarily, but pressurized through public Harambee meetings 
and local school board meetings and the like. 
145
. The other local pub-
lic good they had collected data for was the maintenance of communi-
ty water wells (667 observations). They found that ethnically diverse 
community produced 20% less local school funding. The probability 
that a local well would not function was 6% higher with mixes. What 
was the mechanism that led to this result? In the case of well mainte-
nance, data for answering this question was missing, but for school 
funding detailed documents from meetings in the funding committees 
showed that social sanctions handed out and received by parents with 
the same ethnic had the strongest impact.
146
 
 
With a centrally directed rotation policy where police officers are ro-
tated across the whole country at any given point of time an officer is 
likely to do her policing in a district where she isn’t born and where 
the number of co-ethnics is few. If the manager of the rotations delib-
erately seeks to move officers into districts composed mainly of mem-
bers of a different tribe, as was the case in Kenya till sometime after 
the Mau Mau rebellion this effect may have been stronger, but even a 
random rotation will give a similar effect, and it is still an important 
aspect of local policing. To analyze this issue, we may decompose po-
licing into crime prevention, crime investigation and crime punishing 
components, loosely linked sequentially when producing the collec-
                                                 
inals may prevent crime. We haven’t brought in any questions that touch these issues 
and will not discuss either the spontaneous post-crime violent collective sanctions 
against suspected criminals – a quite common occurrence according to Kenyan newspa-
pers – or more organized collective citizens’ crime sanctioning movements such as the 
sungu sungu phenomenon, a more organized vigilante groups mainly operating in south-
ern Kenya and Northern Tanzania (Heald, 2007).  
145  The research took place before president Kibaki made it obligatory for the state to fi-
nance these items too.in 2002  
146  Habyarimana et al (2009: 173) main conclusion from their research on ethnicity and 
public actions in Kapapla’s slums combining questionnaires observations and experi-
mental methods was the same: ‘Our results suggest that co ethnics cooperate more ef-
fectively because they follow reciprocity norms that stipulate cooperation with co eth-
nics and sanctioning should a co ethnic fail to cooperate.’ 
110 Jens Chr. Andvig and Tiberius Barasa  
tive good of security against crime. They may all give rise to specific 
forms of police corruption. 
 
One important question that arises here is what kind of selective in-
centives besides bribes that the community may be able and willing to 
provide to police officers with and without local roots in order to elicit 
efforts? Let us furthermore divide the local population in criminals 
and non-criminals with the latter group constituting the majority.147 
They may both provide the officers with selective incentives. 
 
Let us look at crime prevention and investigation. Here we have noted 
that the rotation policy has implications for the officers’ own share in 
the local good of security. When the nuclear family148 normally 
doesn’t follow the officer as she rotates across the country, the family 
will stay outside the area where the officer is doing her policing. This 
reduces the ‘share’ that the patrolling officer receives of the local pub-
lic good of low security. Moreover she is likely to receive more en-
couragement and information from locals when they are co-ethnics if 
she works diligently and more negative sanctions if she doesn’t, mak-
ing her more efficient in information-gathering and pro-active policing 
than if she operates in an environment of ethnic ‘strangers.’. Similar 
effects will arise under investigations, both making co-ethnic, fairly 
honest police likely to be more efficient than when the frontline offic-
ers are strangers. 
 
 On the other hand, it may be easier for really dishonest police officers 
to gain knowledge of and join criminal projects with local criminals 
when possessing considerable local knowledge. But again, when shar-
ing ethnicity with non-criminals the latter are more likely to discover 
plots of this kind, creating counter-pressures which we believe in the 
final analysis will lead to the conclusion that widespread rotation of 
officers at the lower, operational levels are likely to result in less effi-
cient policing with less cooperation between the local community and 
the police. Due to the collective-action-like situation, informal posi-
tive and negative sanctions are needed to supply the frontline officers 
with the needed information and encouragement.  
 
So far we have mainly looked at the relationship to non-criminals. 
When looking at possible sanctions from the criminals, however, par-
ticularly the violent ones, the calculus may change. Being a ‘stranger’ 
without a local family reduces the value of selective negative sanc-
tions whether they consist of threats from dangerous criminals or from 
the large number of people who have been offer for the police offic-
                                                 
147  This division of the population in two ri 
148  None of the officers in our sample reported that they had more than one wife. Whatever 
the ir weaknesses police officers constitute part of the modernizing and relatively well 
educated part of the Kenyan population. 
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ers’ nightly ‘taxation’. It stimulates brave ‘macho’ actions. Here we 
approach another form of police misconduct that we have chosen not 
to research: police brutality. The negative effects of a rule of strangers 
are likely to be even more pronounced in this case, however. It is less 
risky for officers to behave aggressively in case retributions are un-
likely to hit their families.  
 
But what about corruption? One of the reasons stated by British colo-
nialists to let strangers rule strangers was to discourage corruption. As 
already pointed out, it is obviously true that it is easier to form risky 
corrupt agreements when the parties involved know and trust each 
other, which is easier to do when sharing tribal identities. At the low-
er, operational levels this may become a problem with crime investi-
gation, but here it works both ways. When sharing identities it is also 
more difficult for the officer to charge payment for what is she is al-
ready obliged to do. With respect to crime prevention activities we 
would expect that citizens only exceptionally are willing to pay for 
what are community tasks anyway. 
 
The real problem here arises at the punishment end. It is likely to be 
easier for criminals to pay their way out when guilty, when they are 
sharing identity with the police officers. It is not obvious that a bribe 
is necessary in this situation, however. When asked, several police of-
ficers admitted that it would be more difficult for them to arrest people 
with whom they share identity whether guilty or not. When we note 
that that a large share of ‘bribes’ actually is pure extortion payments; 
money paid by the non-guilty for not being arrested or to be released 
from wrongful incarceration, it appears unlikely that a shared identity 
between frontline police officers and most community members are 
likely to lead to higher police corruption rates.149 Presumably, arbi-
trary incarceration or the threatening with it, are more easily imple-
mented when strangers rule. 
 
Note that the preceding arguments only apply at the lower level, front 
line policing. The arguments for rotation are much stronger at the 
higher level. The reason is mainly that if they become stationary, 
higher level police officers may tend to melt into local power clusters 
that may exploit local populations as well as preventing legitimate 
central policy implementation. Since we deliberately refrain from dis-
cussing policy at this level, we will not pursue the argument here. 
 
                                                 
149  We noted in our presentation of results from the Afro barometer surveys that while the 
corruption incidence in Kenya has been high compared to other African countries, while 
the use of influence appears relatively rarer. This may just have been due to chance, but, 
somewhat speculatively, we may guess that this has also something to do with the Brit-
ish- inspired rotation policies.  
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Crime registration. Many observers have noted that it is difficult and 
time consuming for crime victims to get the crime properly registered 
at the local police station in Kenya. Given the high incidence of crime 
in the country some rationing of crime-induced efforts on the part of 
the police is needed anyway. Nevertheless, by allocating too much of 
the registration efforts on the victims, too few crimes are registered. 
Moreover, it is likely to ration the low income crime victims excep-
tionally hard for two reasons:  
 
i) The effort costs of form-filling are exceptionally high for vic-
tims with less education150, 
ii) Being poor, the nominal value of assets stolen is likely to be 
lower while the effects for their well-being may easily become 
higher. 
 
When the officer and the victim don’t share identities these weakness-
es of the registration process are likely to be aggravated. Victims with 
low education levels are more likely to be one who only masters the 
local language. A police officer, who belongs to a different tribe, may 
not master the local languages and may only know the national lan-
guages of Swahili or English for communication. Moreover, since the 
local victim is a stranger to the policy, the empathy for the victim 
when robbed for a minor item – a kitchen utensil or a chicken – may 
be more easily missing. 
 
When allocating a major share of the crime registration costs on the 
victims has become the rule, they may also be more willing to pay a 
bribe for making the officer to register it. When it comes to another 
major source of bribe income, the earnings from the wrongful arrests 
of innocents, the officers’ interests may be in lower transaction costs. 
The officer here will pay most of the registration costs so the question 
of co-ethnicity does not rise as an issue when it comes to the size and 
distribution of registration costs in this case, but , as noted, very much 
so for arrests of this kind itself. – Incidentally, both the risks and the 
effort costs associated with this form of corruption will be lower if the 
police station has received too few of the proper forms, a not uncom-
mon occurrence at the smaller stations, we observed.  
 
The crime registration process is much more complex than we have 
presented it in our analysis here where we simply describe the process 
as one where a crime has occurred, the victim may or may not present 
it to the frontline police and the police may or may not – in coopera-
tion with the victim – register it. In fact at some stations the crime 
                                                 
150  We have already noted a police officer’s counter-claim: that the cost of time is lower for 
the poor so they will more often take the bother to report a crime. We believe this effect 
to be weaker, but have not data of our own to substantiate it. Azfar and Gurgur (2008) 
weakly support our assessment of the relative strength of these countervailing pressures. 
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may not be registered before it has been presented to its crime register 
accountant; there are different rules for how the information should be 
distributed upwards hinging upon the crime and the proofs available, 
and so on. There are also rules for how to prepare it for the courts, if 
that stage is reached. All this is important for the understanding of 
how the police work and for the detailed design of proper policies. 
Since our focus has been on the crime victimization events, our data 
here are not sufficiently rich to pursue this trail, however. 
 
ID controls, roadblocks and nightly patrols. Unlike crime registration 
this is a set of police activities that normally don’t assume any cooper-
ation with the local community. A partial exception is, as we noted, 
the establishment of roadblocks that may need local permission after 
2009. While it is possible to regard the frequent collection of extortion 
rents at night time as a way to present the police with selective incen-
tives for doing the extra efforts, the community members who pay 
them don’t do so voluntarily. Naturally, this form of corruption is 
generally extremely unpopular, but at the same time are the public at-
titudes somewhat schizophrenic towards it.  
 
As we noted in the introduction this form of extortion may have con-
siderably effects on the economic activities in the community – and 
not only on life in pubs and bars. In many rural communities they may 
act as a de facto post eight o’clock curfew that may make participation 
in local organizations for non-car owners, that is the less wealthy ones 
difficult. Moreover it becomes to a degree self-confirming in the sense 
that if you have not planned to do something criminal or socially dis-
approved, you may prefer to stay at home. Hence, the police may of-
ten catch the somewhat criminal or at least less risk-averse, like the 
youth, although they may have done nothing wrong that night. Hence 
the schizophrenia: the extensive fear of crime that we have recorded, 
particularly at night time, makes many communities to accept any 
nightly extortion from the police at the same time as they condemn it. 
 
Nevertheless, on the whole these are deeply unpopular aspects of po-
lice behavior that prevent many forms of cooperation between the lo-
cal population and the police. It is also an area where policy changes 
appear to be developing. We have already noted the restrictions on the 
police creation of roadblocks. In the new ‘national police service bill 
of 2011’ there also appears to be developed procedures for police 
behavior that may make it slightly more difficult to make arbitrary ar-
rests at nighttime.151 
                                                 
151  Comparing the 2011 edition of the national police service bill we found that the earlier 
clause where it was given more licenses to act (arrest without warrant) during night time 
has been removed. For example in the 2010 edition it is written that ‘a police officer 
may without warrant, arrest a person – (g) whom a police officer finds in any highway, 
yard or other place at night and whom he suspects upon reasonable grounds of having 
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Chapter 4. Any match between theory and evidence?  
Conclusions 
We believe that we in the foregoing have demonstrated by our own 
work, but mostly through the analysis of already prevailing empirical 
research, that crime experiences have an important impact on Kenyans 
daily life. To pay the police a bribe is also a regular experience. In 
most developed countries crime experiences are also quite common, 
although in most countries less so than in Kenya,152 but paying the 
police is not. May we find any explanation for the joint occurrence of 
high police corruption and crime rates in Kenya? The simplest one, 
perhaps, would be to assume that each crime event presents the police 
a bribe opportunity so the police corruption rate is driven by the crime 
rate. Alternatively, and equally simple, is to assume that a corrupt po-
lice let crime flourish. That is, the high police corruption rate drives 
the crime rate.  
 
It should be clear from the preceding chapters that neither have been 
our starting point. We have argued that partly for historical reasons we 
may expect a rather low average level of commitment (internal legiti-
macy) at the outset among police officers to the Kenyan state. When 
combined with the inherent difficulties for superiors to monitor front-
line officers in any police organization, the latitude for the frontline 
police officers to decide the manner of how to perform their public 
services becomes exceptionally wide. 
 
When coming to the frontline police officers they are most of the time 
moving in public space. Hence, they may often be more closely moni-
tored by the public than by their superiors. Each citizen has not any 
direct interest in paying the police to keep it alert at the same time as 
they have a common interest, shared by the police, to keep local secu-
rity, including low crime rates. The ordinary citizen may also make 
some small contribution himself to the local security through neigh-
bourhood watching, costly crime registration initiatives, and so on. 
We then argue that we in the extreme case may regard crime-fighting 
as a collective action problem involving both the police and local citi-
zens. The precondition for looking at local security this way is the low 
internal legitimacy of the state among public employees. For related 
historical reason the state in general, but the police in particular, have 
also low external legitimacy (legitimacy among the citizens). The lat-
                                                 
committed or being about to commit a felony; ‘(The National Police Service Bill, 2010 
This we don’t find in the 2011 edition where it is simply stated that an officer may arrest 
a person without a warrant when there reasonable grounds to suspect the person ‘of 
having committed or being about to commit a felony;’. This change of text may not 
mean any change in policy, but given the adverse selection of people wandering around 
at night in some communities, the observation of anyone at night could more easily be 
considered to be suspected of felony if nighttime was specified in this clause.  
152  This varies considerably across countries and continents. Latin American countries in 
particular may have higher crime rates compared to economic income levels. 
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ter contributes to making it to become a difficult collective action 
problem to solve. 
 
Although we point to a number of ways where selective incentives 
may induce both citizens and the police to seek higher police activity 
–lower crime equilibriums, we find little evidence of the latter in any 
large variations in crime and corruption rates. Our own survey has too 
small samples to really indicate the presence of significant variation in 
crime levels (and corruption rates) across communities. The larger 
GJLOS survey reports only about a significant difference between ru-
ral and urban communities, but doesn’t support any multiple equilibri-
um outcomes (Medina, 2007) of this collective action, only a variation 
of an Olson’ian equilibrium where both the police and the citizens re-
main inactive. While low internal legitimacy may be the key, and low 
external legitimacy may contribute, the difficulties may be com-
pounded under Kenyan conditions when the police and local citizens 
are not roughly co-ethnic. 
 
Here we should also add that it remains unclear how effective any of 
the instruments available to the police and public really are for reduc-
ing crime. Without a convincing tie between actions and outcomes, 
there is difficult to see how selective incentives may induce the actors 
to stimulate each other to reach ‘better’ equilibriums.153 While not suf-
ficiently strong to shift uncoordinated collective action, we believe 
nevertheless that the impact on crime and feelings of security is strong 
enough to influence public welfare in a significant way if the police 
and the public are induced into higher levels of crime mitigating ac-
tions. 
 
In other public professions than the police a lower degree of commit-
ment combined with more difficult monitoring may result in higher 
absence rates in addition to eventual corruption – to the degree that the 
citizens that receive their services are willing to pay. Moreover, by 
turning down the activity level, a public employee is likely to increase 
the public’s willingness to pay a bribe. For example, when working 
more slowly the size of the queue waiting outside his office tends to 
increase, and so do the willingness to pay under normal circumstanc-
es.154 Not so for the police, we argue. In order to collect bribes the 
frontline police officers have to move around. The low activity part of 
                                                 
153  From a diverse set of observations crime rates appears to have components – both in 
developed (Glaeser et al. 1997) and developing countries that may show surprising shifts 
(van Dijk, 2008) or differences in levels (Andvig and Shrivastava, 2009) .that appear 
difficult to relate to economic and social conditions. If so, it is not surprising that crime 
rates may be difficult to influence substantially through the instruments available to the 
police and the citizens alike. 
154  Lui (1985) presents a well-known model that makes corruption increase queue speed. 
His assumptions are rather artificial, however. Most research performed in this area 
agree that in most situations lower activity levels in the public sector leads to or co-
varies with higher corruption levels.  
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the low activity – high crime equilibrium is likely to become latent 
only. 
 
The selective incentive that in practice may drag uncommitted officers 
into activity is corruption. Officers need to do active searching in or-
der to collect bribes. In general, more active officers are likely to col-
lect more. Still most of these corruption-induced forms of activity are 
not likely to contribute in a positive way to the public good of com-
munity security. Nevertheless, we accept that we may not write off the 
possibility that a weak effect in this direction may become the final 
outcome. A decomposition of the set of corrupt acts into three classes 
may make us realize that: 
 
i) Bribes paid by crime victims to ensure that the police register 
and process the crime, and make efforts to bring back stolen 
assets. This may induce crime-reducing efforts, but the police 
may drag their feet in the usual public bureaucrat way to in-
crease the willingness to pay in certain rare situation. 
ii) People having committed a criminal act may pay a bribe to 
avoid punishment. This clearly reduces the value of the public 
good sought and tends to increase the crime rate. 
iii) The police may arrest or threaten to arrest innocent citizens 
and collect the accompanying extortion rents. This may not af-
fect the crime rate directly, but will in most case reduce the lo-
cal public good of security, although the police may focus on 
less influential citizens. 
 
We have no information about the frequency of the ii) form, i) and iii) 
acts are the more frequent, but with iii) at the top. While only guess-
ing, we believe ii) to be less frequent. From these considerations it ap-
pears likely that bribe-induced police activity will increase crime lev-
els and local insecurity. When there may remain doubts about this 
conclusion, it is due to the information that emits jointly with the po-
lice bribe collecting efforts. Doing iii) the police may do night patrols 
which may frighten criminals away. Even doing ii) it pays the police 
to collect considerable amount of information about related criminal 
activities so by not catching the bribe paying criminal A, he may trace 
and catch the criminal B. 
 
Returning now to our starting question of what may the relationship 
between crime and police corruption frequencies, we are close to our 
first simplistic hypothesis: The crime rate may drive most of the police 
corruption rate. The number of possibilities for i) and ii) types of 
bribe collection clearly are likely to rise; iii) likely to either be un-
changed or to increase (easier to hide it when crime rates are high, alt-
hough capacity restraints may turn it around). When this is combined 
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with the proposition that the police corruption rate is likely to have 
only a minor or maybe even negative impact on the crime rate due to 
the information and signals produced through the police’s bribe col-
lecting efforts, the above conclusion follows. 
 
All this assumes that the police are at least weakly loyal in the sense 
that frontline officers do not frequently participate in criminal acts 
done jointly with regular criminals. Then the value of information col-
lection will be turned on its head.155  
 
We have also discussed a number of policies that may be implemented 
at the lower organizational levels such as officer rotation, crime regis-
tration procedures, roadblocks and night patrols, and how they may be 
used to induce better cooperation with the surrounding population. 
The traditional policy proposals such as increasing wage levels and 
frequency of training we have barely touched. We don’t consider the 
wage level to be extraordinarily low, however, given Kenya’s average 
income levels and the salaries of other public sector employees such 
as the teachers, but the costs for the police officers two run two 
households are not internalized in the police organization. They 
should be considered jointly with the rotation policies. 
 
The effects of such improved cooperation that we suggest may assist 
the situation somewhat, but are unlikely to become strong enough to 
really solve the collective action dilemmas presented. To really be 
able to do so, committed action from above together with improved 
internal monitoring – which presupposes more commitment both from 
top and middle levels of management – are necessary156 so the front-
line officers may be exposed to incentives that may tag rewards more 
closely to what they in fact do. In addition, stronger development of 
intrinsic rewards –stimulated by training – for good and honest per-
formance on the part of the frontline officers is of course also needed. 
But if this succeeds, our collective action conception becomes irrele-
vant and has to be supplanted by another – a bureaucracy-based one. 
 
                                                 
155  Many Kenyans believe this to be the case. Among our respondents we found one con-
crete case (from police station B) where this was asserted, but the reasoning of the vic-
tim was not convincing since she believed the lack of fingerprinting efforts was due to a 
deliberate liaison with organized criminals while we from other sources were told that 
this equipment was wholly missing from this police station  
156  The strong and fast decline in police corruption in Rwanda suggests that more may be 
achieved along this road than by more community policing; but we don’t know yet 
whether the last increase reported above signals that this low corruption rate is not a last-
ing equilibrium 
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Appendix 1: Overview of corruption and other governance  
indices in Sub- Sahara  
 WBI corruption index Ibrahim index GDP/capita 
 1998 2006 2005 2005 
Angola -1,37 -1,27 44,3 2335 
Benin -0,75 -0,59 61,2 1141 
Botswana 0,75 0,86 73 12387 
Burkina Faso -0,03 -0,4 56,7 1213 
Burundi -1,3 -1,12 46,8 699 
Cameroon -1,23 -1 55,6 2299 
Cape Verde -0,32 0,6 72,9 5803 
Central African Republic -1,18 -1 46,7 1224 
Chad -1 -1,2 38,8 1427 
Comoros -1,23 -0,65 53,8 1993 
Congo -1,23 -1,08 52,1 1262 
Congo, Democratic Republic -1,73 -1,44 38,6 714 
Cote d'Ivoire -0,38 -1,22 48,8 1648 
Djibouti -0,69 -0,62 52,5 2178 
Equatorial Guinea -1,39 -1,52 51,6 7874 
Eritrea 0,77 -0,32 48,3 1109 
Ethiopia -0,56 -0,65 53,2 1055 
Gabon -0,73 -0,9 67,4 6954 
Gambia -0,54 -0,71 55,8 1921 
Ghana -0,35 -0,1 66,8 2480 
Guinea -0,83 -1 51,5 2316 
Guinea-Bissau -1,12 -0,99 42,7 827 
Kenya -1,11 -0,89 59,3 1240 
Lesotho -0,21 -0,05 64,1 3335 
Liberia -1,72 -0,66 42,7 …. 
Madagaskar -0,4 -0,24 57,7 923 
Malawi -0,39 -0,72 63,7 667 
Mali -0,61 -0,42 56,9 1033 
Mauritania -0,14 -0,6 58,8 2234 
Mauritius  0,44 0,36 86,2 12715 
Mozambique -0,72 -0,65 55,8 1242 
Namibia 0,67 0,14 67 7586 
Niger -1,04 -0,95 53,1 781 
Nigeria -1,12 -1,14 48,3 1128 
Rwanda -0,87 -0,11 57,5 1206 
Sao Tome and Principe -0,38 -0,53 65,3 2178 
Senegal -0,31 -0,45 66 1792 
Seychelles 0,47 0,07 83,1 16106 
Sierra Leone -0,94 -1,1 48,3 806 
Somalia -1,72 -1,82 28,1 …. 
South Africa 0,64 0,44 71,1 11110 
Sudan -1 -1,15 40 2083 
Swaziland -0,02 -0,41 50,9 4824 
Tanzania -1,09 -0,42 60,7 744 
Togo -0,61 -1,09 49,8 1506 
Uganda -0,88 -0,73 55,4 1454 
Zambia -0,88 -0,71 57,5 1023 
Zimbabwe -0,38 -1,32 52 2038 
Source: Kaufmann et al.(2008, 94 -96),  
 http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/index. UNDP (2007, 229 -232) GDP is 
measured in $ PPP.-232). GDP is measured in $ PPP. 
Appendix 2: The Police questionnaire 
 
Guided Questionnaire for Interviews with Police Officers 
 
Name of the Police station:_____________  
 
Province: __________________ 
 
Interview Number: ___________________  
 
Date of Interview: ___________ 
 
Name of the Interviewer: ___________________________________ 
 
Starting Time:_______________ Ending Time:__________________ 
 
(A) Personal Characteristic 
1 What is your Name?   
2 What is your Age?  
3 What is your Religion?  
4 What is your ethnic background?  
5 What is your marital status?   
6 How many children do you have?   
7 How many people do you have in your household?   
8 How many wives do you have?  
    
 (B) Work/Location 
9 What is your rank in the force?  
10 What is your station?  
11 Which branch or unit are you currently working?  
12 Which branch of police have you worked before?  
13 When did you join the police force?  
14 How many transfers have you had since you joined?  
15 How far is your station from your house or where you 
leave? 
 
16 Do you leave in (a) Government house? (b) Rented 
house?  (c) Private house? 
 
17 How many rooms does your house/apartment have?  
18 Do you use a vehicle belonging to (a) Government car, 
motorcycle, and bicycle)?  (b) Private (car, motorcycle, 
bicycle)? or (c) Public transport? 
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(C) Income and Livelihood 
20 What is your monthly salary?  
21 How many people depend on your salary?  
22 How much do you spend on food per month?  
23 How much do you spent on rent?  
24 How much do you spend on transport to work per week?  
25 How much do you spend on medical care per month?  
26 What is your household monthly budget?  
27 Do you have any other source of income?   
28 If yes, please describe?  
29 What proportion of your time is directed to protecting peo-
ple and property at home? 
 
30 What proportion of your time is directed to protecting citi-
zens (and private cars) in public space such as roads? 
 
31 What proportion of your time is spent on protecting and 
recovering property for consumers? 
 
32 What proportion of your time is directed to protecting pro-
ducers (like truck and bus drivers) their working instru-
ments and recovering them? 
 
33 What proportion of your time is spent on internal matters, 
meetings and reports? 
 
 
(D) Community Service 
34 Do you think the community around you is happy with 
your service? 
 
35 What is the nature of crime in the community you serve?  
36 What are the main causes of crime?  
37 Do you have a relative in the police force?  
 How many relatives do you have in the force?  
38 Did you assist him/her to join the force or did he/she assist 
you to join the force? 
 
39 If yes, what was the nature of assistance?  
40 What problems do you encounter when taking a statement?  
41 Please explain?  
42 Do people come to report to you about crime or you find 
crime on your own? 
 
43 How often do you make patrols in the community around 
the station? 
 
44 How many people do you serve in a week?  
45 How would you describe your relationship with the com-
munity? 
 
46 Do you receive any support from the community?  
47 What is the nature of support?  
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(E) Career Development 
48 Are you happy with your current positing/unit?  
49 Given an alternative which unit would you choose and 
why? 
 
50 What motivates you to stay in the police force?  
51 When did you last go for training?  
52 Are you happy with the training you have received?  
53 Do the skills you have acquired in the training help you 
perform your duties much better? 
 
54 Do you have the necessary facilities or equipment required 
for your job? 
 
55 What are the factors constraining you from serving the 
community better? 
 
56 How many promotions have you had since you joined the 
force? 
 
57 When was your last promotion?  
58 Did you have to do anything to be promoted?  
59 How would you describe your relationship with your im-
mediate superior?   
 
 
(F) Personal Security 
60 Do you always worry about your own security?  
61 What are your main security threats?  
62 Have you ever been attacked by thugs/gangs?  
63 How many times have you been attacked by thugs/gangs?  
64 Has any member of your family ever been terrorised by 
thugs/gangs because of your profession? 
 
 
(G) Transparency and Accountability 
65 Transparency International surveys seems to indicate that 
the police in Kenya are the most corrupt. Agree or di-
sagree? 
 
66  Do you come across any police officers who have received 
a bribe? 
 
67 Do you know any police officers who are under investiga-
tion for corruption? 
 
68 Have you ever received a bribe?  
69 Did you request for it or were you offered?  
70 How much did you receive?  
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(H) Crime and Reporting 
71a When comparing crime victimization surveys (GJLOS) 
with police surveys, only 10% of the crime is registered by 
the police. Any comment?  
 
71b How many crimes do you register (FIR) pr. Week?  
71b How often (percentage)do people report (FIR) crime com-
pared  to when you initiate a report yourself?  
 
71c Have you ever been compelled to attend to cases by people 
who somehow can support you 
 
72 Do you often feel pressured to take a statement by any-
body? Who in particular? 
 
73 The perception is that poor people have difficulties making 
a statement. Do you agree? 
 
74 Do you have to take a statement or register a crime report-
ed from the public or are there crimes that you do not reg-
ister or take seriously? 
 
75 Even if poor people succeed in making a statement their 
cases are rarely taken seriously. Do you agree? Could you 
explain? 
 
76 Do you always have capacity to deal with all crimes re-
ported? 
 
77 Have you ever been compelled to attend to cases brought 
by people who can support you in one way or the other?  
 
78 What type of crimes do you give priority by acting upon 
immediately when reported? 
 
79 What type of crime do you give less priority and why?  
 
(I) Arrests 
80 How many arrests are you involved in per week?  
81 How often are they initiated by local police?  Superiors? 
Courts or the public? 
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Appendix 3: The community questionnaire 
 
Guided Questionnaire for Local Community around the Police 
Station: Survey on Crime Reporting 
 
Name of Police Station: _________________   Province: __________________   
 
Name of the Local Community _____________ Interview Number: ___________ 
 
Name of the Interviewer: ____________________Date of Interview: ____________ 
 
Starting Time: _______________________      Ending Time: _________________ 
 
Section (A): Background information     
 
1 What is your name? _____________________________ 
 
2. What is your age? _____________________________                                            
 
3: Gender: 
     (i) Male___                                             (ii) Female ___  
                                                     
 4. Educational background:     
 (i) No education ___    (ii) non-formal education ___   (iii) Primary ___ 
(iv) Secondary___              (v) High school ___                  (vi) Tertiary  ___ 
(vii) Graduate/higher education ___ 
 
5. Occupation: ____________________________________   
 
  (i)  Self employed, agriculture 
  (ii)  Self employed labourer 
  (iii) Self employed, trade and commerce (shops) 
  (iv) Self employed, trade and commerce /street sellers 
  (v) Self  employed, other (specify) 
  (vi)  Wage employee, private sector 
  (vii)Wage employee, public sector 
  (viii) Student 
  (ix)  Unemployed   
 
6.Religion: 
(ii)  Muslim ______              (iv) Other (please specify) ______            
(iv) Christian_____              (v) Hindu__________                               
 
8: Marital status:                     
 (i) Married  ___                                                  (ii) Single ___ 
(iii) Widow(er)__  (iv) Divorced__  (v) Cohabitation___ 
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9.  Please list the members of this household from the oldest to the 
youngest 
Age Gender Education Occupation Income 
     
     
     
     
     
 
10. Area                                       
(i)  Urban /lower status residential area ___ 
(ii) Urban/ middle status residential area ___  
(iii) Urban/higher status residential area ___ 
(iv)  Rural poor____________ 
 
11. Household socio-economic description: 
(i) Very poor___              (ii) Poor ___         (iii) Moderate poor ___ 
(iv) Lower well-off ___  (v) Middle well-off  ___       vi) Rich___ 
 
12: Structure of the house: 
(i) Apartment ___    (ii) Flat  ___   (vi) Semi permanent___________      
 (iv) Maisonette___                (v) Hurt_____   
 
13. Household income (in Shillings) 
 
(a) Weekly_______     (b) Monthly__________     (c) Annually___________   
 
14.   Do you have? 
 A landline telephone 
 A cell phone 
 An electricity connection 
 A water connection 
 
15. How much did your family spend last month on food and gro-
ceries? _____________ 
 
16. How much did your family spend in the last year on clothes 
___________________ 
 
17. Did you vote in the last election for the following posts? 
(i) General election_________________ 
(ii) Did not vote____________ 
(iii) Have never voted__________________ 
 
18. Have you been to any political rallies or other political gather-
ings in the last 5 years? 
(i)Yes                (ii)No 
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Section B: Crime Questions 
 
 
19.Have you experienced crime during the last 2 years?   
Yes __ (Go to question 20) No __ Go to question 32 
 
20 If yes, kindly describe the nature of crime 
 
(i) Theft  
2. Burglary 
3. Robbery   
4. Physical assault/ hurt/ grievous hurt/ molestation / sexual harassment. 
5. domestic violence 
6. Attempt to murder 
7. Kidnapping and abduction  
9. Road accident  
10. Cheating  
11. Property crimes 
 
          
 
Details of incident: Go to Section B1 
 
Section B1:  
Unstructured follow up on questions for each crime 
 
Ask about each crime:____________________________________ 
 
21.(a)Did you know the offender by name or sight: 
No ___ Yes, by name ___                Yes, by sight ___ 
 
(b) Please describe the crime briefly in your own words. 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________
___________________ 
 
About property crimes ask: 
(c) How badly did the crime affect you economically?  
Not at all ___  A little ___  Quite badly ____  Very badly ____ 
 
(d)Has it changed how much do you earn or spend every month?   
 
Not at all ___  A little ___  Quite badly ____  Very badly ____ 
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(e) Has it led to difficulty in paying school fees, paying for necessary 
health expenses, or delaying marriages because of the loss of a dowry?  
Not at all ___  A little ___  Quite badly ____  Very badly ____ 
 
(f)Please describe how crime has affected you economically 
 
________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________ 
 
(g) Has the crime affected you in any other way? For example do you 
now avoid certain areas? Do you distrust other people more? Are there 
specific kinds of people you fear more? 
 
________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________ 
 
22.  Did anyone from you report to the police or anyone else? 
(a) Yes_____(Go to Section B2)          (b) No (go to section B3) 
 
 
Section B2 
Reported Crimes: follow-up on questions for each crime 
How did you report the crime? (Unstructured and structure) 
   
(a) When you visited the police station how long did you wait to talk to a 
police officer? 
__________ Minutes (If respondent answers in hours, multiply by sixty) 
 
 (b) What time of day or night did you visit the police station? ___ 
 
(c) Which rank of the police officer did you encounter?________________ 
 
(d) Did the police officer inform you in details about how to register a 
crime? 
       (i) Yes                 ___                        (ii) No            ___     
 
(A) If yes, Please describe the process (unstructured) 
  Respondent appears to understand process  ____ 
  Respondent doesn’t appear to understand process  ____ 
 
________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________ 
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23. How was the crime reported to  the police station?  
 
24. Fill out the answers to the following questions if answered in the 
unstructured response, otherwise ask questions directly and note re-
sponse 
 
(a) Did the police investigate the incident?      ___ 
(b) Did the police after investigation settle the case at the police level? ___ 
(c)  Did the police investigate and forward the case to a judicial court?  ___ 
(d) Is the case still pending at the judicial court or disposed? ___ 
(e) Is the case disposed without hearing?     ___ 
(f) Did the guilty one get punished?     ___ 
 
For property crimes 
(g) Did the stolen property get recovered?   ___ 
 
 On the whole, were you satisfied with the way the police dealt with 
your report? 
 
Yes ___     No ___ 
 
If No 
For what reasons were you dissatisfied? (You can give more 
than one reason) 
 Didn’t do enough 
 Were not interested 
 Didn’t find or apprehend the offender 
 Didn’t recover my goods 
 Didn’t keep me properly informed 
 Didn’t treat me correctly/were impolite 
 Were slow to arrive 
 Other reasons 
 Don’t know 
 
25.  If crime was reported then what happened afterwards? (Un-
structured) 
 
________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________  
 
Section B3: Unreported Crimes 
 
26. Why did you not report the crime? 
 1. Not serious enough 
 2. Solved it myself 
 3. Inappropriate for police 
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 4. Reported it some other agency 
 5. My family solved it 
 6. No insurance 
 7. Police could do nothing/lack of proof 
 8. Police won’t do anything about it 
 9. Fear or dislike of the police/no involvement wanted with the 
police 
 10. Process takes too long 
 11. Police would demand bribes 
10. didn’t dare (for fear of reprisals) 
 11. Other reasons Specify __________ 
 12. Don’t know 
  
27. Did the police officer ask you to leave the police station with-
out making a statement? 
(a) Asked you to leave with a threat   ___   (b) Physically har-
assed you to leave ___ 
(c) Persuaded you it’s not worth it  ___      (d) Simply asked 
you to leave  ___ 
 
28. What did you do after you couldn’t make a statement?  (un-
structured) 
 
 
________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
30. Did the police visit you on their own accord after somebody 
else reported? 
 Yes ___  No ___ 
 
31. (a) Do you still want reports the crime? 
 Yes ___ No ___ 
  If no, why not 
 
________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________ 
 
(b) In the past five years has crime in your area gone up or down 
 Up  No change  Down 
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Section C: Bribery and Extortion 
 
32 Have you or any of your family members come into contact 
with a police officer during the past five years? 
    (i) Yes     (ii) No 
If (i) yes 
(a) When ? 
________________________________________________________  
 
(b) How many times? ___________________________________  
 
(c)  Why? (Unstrutured)____________________________________ 
 
 
33. Did the police officer ask for some kind of a payment for re-
porting or registering a crime? 
   (i) Yes     ___     (ii) No     ___ 
If yes,  How much did the police officer ask for a payment?  
_____ 
Were you given a receipt or a case no? 
      (a)  Yes receipt   ___    (b) No receipt   ___             
      (c) Yes case no. ___       (d) No case no.   ___  
 
  
 34.  Have you ever been forced to pay a bribe for crime report-
ing? 
      (i)  Yes ___                                          (ii) No ___    
 
 If yes: (i) 
(a) How much did you have to pay? ___________________________ 
 
(b) Did you pay? 
      (i) Before reporting       ___          (ii) After reporting   ___ 
 
(c) Did you pay to the police in parts? 
(i)  Yes         ___                                  (ii) No      ___ 
 
(d) Have you ever paid a bribe to a police officer to take enforcement 
action against someone? 
(i)  Yes         ___                                  (ii) No      ___ 
 
(e). Have you ever paid a bribe to a police officer not to take enforce-
ment action? 
(i)  Yes         ___                                  (ii) No      ___ 
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(f) Have you ever paid a bribe to a police officer to release you after 
enforcement action was already taken? 
Yes         ___                                  (ii) No    
(g) Have you ever paid a bribe to a police officer to release someone 
else after enforcement action was already taken? 
(i)  Yes         ___                                  (ii) No    
(h).Do you make routine payments to the police in exchange for pro-
tection?  
(i) Do you make routine payments to the police in exchange for confi-
dential information? If yes, then what sort of information do you re-
ceive? (This should be open-ended to see what response you get) 
 
(j)Have you ever been the victim of a police-initiated crime for not 
making a payment that was requested by a police officer? (Such as 
some type of retaliatory action)  
 
 (h) Did you sell some personal valuables for the payment? 
(i)  Yes         ___                                  (ii) No   ___ 
 
(i) Did you borrow the money for the payment?  
(i)  Yes         ___                                  (ii) No   ___ 
 
If no, (ii) then  
How did you manage to file a report?  (Multiple responses allowed) 
 
(a) Police officer was from the same tribe as mine?   ___ 
(b) Police officer was familiar to my family or friends? ___ 
(c) I  know some police officer or local powerful men ___ 
(d) The police officer was honest?   ___ 
 
Unstructured comments made in response to question 
 
________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Section D 
 
35. How do you rate the performance of the police in your area?  
(a) Very good job         ___    
(b) Fairly good job       ___  
(c)  Fairly poor job       ___ 
(d) Very poor job          ___ 
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36. How safe do you feel in the dark? 
(a) Very safe                ___ 
(b) Somewhat safe       ___ 
(c) Somewhat unsafe   ___ 
(d) Very unsafe           ___ 
 
37. Do you trust police in your area? 
(a) Complete trust in police                      ___ 
(b) Somewhat trust in police                   ___ 
(c) Somewhat distrust the police             ___ 
(d) Do not trust police at all                      ___ 
 
38. How much corruption is there in (0-10 scale?) 
Police station ___ 
The district level_____  
The provincial level____ 
The central government____ 
 
39. If there was less corruption in the police would you be more or 
less willing to report crimes to the police? 
1. Less willing___  2. It would make no difference____  3. More willing___ 
 
 
40. Have you ever done anything illegal in your life? 
Yes ___ No ___ 
 
Section E: General 
 
41.       Have you paid a bribe to these government units? 
             
           ___________________ 
 
(a) In urban areas kindly rank this  
(i)Income tax 
Health 
Transport 
Municipal 
Electricity 
Education 
Police  
Any other kindly specify 
 
(b) In rural areas kindly rank  
Land revenue 
Health 
Electricity 
Transport 
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Irrigation 
Education 
Police 
Any other kindly specify 
 
42. Which organisation do you think is the most corrupt? 
 
(a) In urban areas kindly rank this  
(i)Income tax 
Transport 
Municipal 
Electricity 
Education 
Police  
Any other kindly specify 
 
(b) In rural areas kindly rank  
Land revenue 
Electricity 
Transport 
Irrigation 
Education 
Police 
Any other kindly specify 
 
(Answers must be coded in such a way that Yes answers to the 
first questions can be distinguished from Yes answers after 
prompting.) 
 
 
 
 
